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ABSTRACT 
This dissertation seeks to understand the role of women as political actors in the 
rise of Islamo-nationalist movement in Palestine. Using a historical and ethnographic 
approach, it examines the changing opportunity structures available to Palestinian women 
in the nationalist struggle between 1987 and 2007. It looks into the sites of political 
engagement of Palestinian women as mothers, organizers and political candidates, suicide 
bombers, and nonviolent activists with attention paid to the evolution of the Islamist 
ideology within these four pathways for political participation. The goal of this work is to 
engage the question of how some Palestinian women who appear to diverge from the 
commitments of feminist emancipatory visions are active participants in the Islamist 
transformation of the Palestinian nationalist struggle. In doing so, this dissertation seeks 
to unveil the evolution of gender relations within the Palestinian nationalist struggle 
while providing a deeper analysis of the emergence and significance of the Islamist 
movement in contemporary Palestinian society. It makes an interdisciplinary contribution 
to existing literature in nationalism and post-colonial studies, social movements, identity 
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The month of September 2007 brought an end to my first long stint as a resident 
member of the Al-Azzeh refugee camp in Bethlehem. In the countdown of days before I 
planned a quick trip to the USA to stand in the wedding of a dear friend, I devoted every 
free moment to spending time with my host family. Like any large and boisterous brood, 
we often came together for an evening meal, which we ate on the rooftop of the family 
home. The open space provided a respite from the cramped living quarters of the refugee 
camp. Along with this, the rooftop always bore the promise of a cool breeze to mitigate 
the enduring heat of the day. 
On the final evening before my departure, I sat in my white plastic chair beside 
the other adults in the family on the rooftop. Per our nightly custom, one of the youngest 
members of the family asked to climb into the child-sized space in my lap. By this point 
in my time as an auxiliary member of Palestinian society, a small child in my lap was a 
regular and welcoming feature of my daily routine. However, in these quiet and gentle 
moments of human contact, I often wondered if I was the one holding these children of 
Palestine, or if, in fact, they were the ones holding me. The affection of one child in 
particular, a little girl named Amal, served as a healthy departure from the daily and 
extreme stresses of being a participant-observer of political life in the Palestinian West 
Bank. 
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Three months earlier, in mid-June, the long-strained relations between the West 
Bank and Gaza Strip—long considered the territories of the future Palestinian state—had 
come to resemble enemy countries, where the pools of human blood in the streets 
expressed the opposing political ideologies at play. I was visiting a friend in Ramallah 
when I first experienced the tremors of this particular political earthquake. Ninety 
kilometers away, Hamas violently overthrew the Palestinian Authority in the Gaza Strip. 
Meanwhile, the residents of Ramallah poured into the streets of the city to watch masked 
men with large guns encircle Manara Square, the city centre, in their string of large 
SUVs.   
Swept up in the historic moment as it unfolded around me, the terrifying sight of 
masked men shooting live rounds of ammunition in the air prompted me to ask a woman 
in the gathering crowd if Hamas forces had somehow arrived from Gaza to overthrow the 
Palestinian Authority in Ramallah? No, the woman informed me, these men were the 
security forces loyal to Fatah and the Palestinian president, Abu Mazen (Mahmoud 
Abbas). Upon closer examination, I recognized that each of the gun-toting men was 
wearing an olive green uniform, even as their faces were covered with black masks. From 
this, I was able to ascertain that this group of men represented a parade of force for 
Fatah—a hyper-masculinized peacock ritual of sorts, a demonstration to the members of 
the Hamas opposition that the Palestinian Authority (and Fatah) remained in control of 
the West Bank. I interpreted this show of force as the veritable growling and barring of 
teeth as two male lions might do before engaging in a battle of supremacy over their 
pride. With this, I was reminded of other forms of masculine expression, such as the 
hyperbolic threats and muscle-flexing rituals made by icons of the professional wrestling 
 3
world. The scale and scope of the political ritual taking place that day made me wonder 
how to say in Arabic, “My gun is bigger than your gun!”  
In my role as a member of the audience, I played my ancillary part by chanting 
unfamiliar slogans of political support while being dazzled by the sight of so much 
bellicose machinery. Perhaps seeing the look of trepidation on my face from the sporadic 
rounds of gunfire spit into the atmosphere, the woman next to me squeezed my hand and 
said, “Don’t worry, girl! We are safe because Fatah still governs the West Bank!”1 
This sentiment of the woman from the crowd in Ramallah remained with me 
throughout my time in the Occupied West Bank of Palestine. From her political statement 
of support for the secular-nationalist Fatah regime, I often wondered if this woman 
included herself as a woman in her sweeping reference to the Palestinian people and their 
“safety” under the Fatah-backed Palestinian Authority? From many divergent 
conversations I had with other Palestinian women, while some firmly swore their 
political allegiance with Fatah on the basis of its early secular and democratic socialist 
principles, others maintained that Hamas was the party of choice for respecting and 
upholding the rights of women and their safety. Moreover, some women felt that Hamas 
ensured a more or less “equal” place for women in overall political and family life. Yet, 
how could Hamas, a political entity known for its embrace of religious ideologically 
conservative social mores and seeming antipathy for women’s rights and gender equality, 
manage to capture the hearts and minds of so many Palestinian women? 
This question and the many that have since come to frame this dissertation, 
loomed in my mind as I sat with little Amal in my lap that final summer evening on the 
                                                 
1 Notes from fieldwork 2007. 
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rooftop of the refugee camp in 2007. Overhead, a blanket of stars began to permeate the 
sky. Along with the cool breeze, a welcome sense of peacefulness encircled us, even as 
sporadic rounds of gunfire could be heard echoing between the hillsides of Bethlehem 
and the rest of the Holy Land. I pointed to the heavens to show Amal one star directly 
above us that seemed to blink more than the others. I whispered to her that a girl could 
wish on a falling star to make all of her dreams come true. The blinking star suddenly 
darted across the sky, and Amal excitedly clasped her hands together and secretly made 
her wish. Sadly and silently, I realized that the entity I encouraged this Palestinian child 
to wish upon was actually an Israeli reconnaissance drone taking pictures of us from 
above. Caught between the violence of the Palestinian fratricidal civil war that now raged 
around us on the streets of the West Bank and the radical injustice of Israeli military 
occupation that hovered over head, I could not help but wonder if the Palestinian 
people—and most especially its women and girls—will ever be “safe” in the name of 
political freedom, much less able to wish on a star for gender equality? 
While the body of the work that follows is not entirely ethnographic, it is 
grounded by the time I spent with the people of Palestine, and most particularly, its 
women and girls. Between 2007 and 2009 in the name of field research, I became 
immersed in the fabric of daily life, a witness to weddings, births, funerals and overall 
daily routine. Because politics is infused in every personal choice and aspect of the 
Palestinian reality, each hour of the day served as an opportunity to bear witness to the 
ongoing political story of the Palestinian people. In 2007, I lived with a young family in 
the Azzeh Refugee Camp in Bethlehem and worked with a small women’s development 
non-profit in the nearby community of Beit Sahour. In 2009, I resided in an Palestinian 
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Arab community in East Jerusalem known as Sheikh Jarrah and split my time between 
volunteer work at the Young Women’s Christian Association (YWCA) and making 
regular trips to visit with the women I knew in Bethlehem, Beit Sahour, Beit Jala and 
Ramallah.  
Within these two years of field research, I regularly noticed how some of the 
Palestinian men I encountered seemed to perform a series of silent-yet-obvious mental 
gymnastics to accommodate my presence (as a young, unmarried Western woman) 
among them. Sometimes they regarded me as if I was a doll in a glass box—I was 
politely acknowledged but otherwise ignored. Other times, they seemed to warmly 
welcome me as a novelty among them. In the latter case, some of the more self-described, 
“progressive” men invited me to be an “honorary man”, whereupon I was asked to join 
male-only social gatherings. As I enthusiastically gathered with the men to eat and 
discuss politics, my female counterparts awkwardly served me plates of food and drink. 
As if my sex had temporarily changed with these invitations to the exclusive circle of 
men, the women did not make eye contact with me again until I left the circle and we 
were back together again, as women.  
Of course, I amassed a trove of observational writings and journal missives of 
these moments, which I imagine compiling for my next project, a full ethnography. But 
for the purposes of this project, I can safely say that it is through this cultural immersion 
and so many first-hand experiences that this dissertation on Palestinian female political 
behavior was framed and written. As I awkwardly lumbered through the cultural and 
linguistic barriers around me, and, with this, a series of so many highly gendered 
encounters in the Holy Land, I quickly learned that the real story of Palestinian politics 
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today was taking place in the lives of women and girls. Meanwhile, however, it also 
became apparent that while I was busily focusing my gaze upon the objects of this work, 
the women and girls I encountered in Palestine took it upon themselves to observe and 
mirror me—the “young” ajnabiyye (foreigner), uninitiated in the ways of marriage, 
motherhood, self-sacrifice, poverty, political oppression and war.   
In this most valuable crucible of interaction between observer and observed, many 
powerful social and political forces violently raged around us. In the spring and summer 
of 2007, buildings were burned and the body count rose as internecine violence between 
Hamas and Fatah spilled from the Gaza Strip into parts of the West Bank. At the same 
time, the devoted foot soldiers of the Israeli Defense Forces encircled us at military 
checkpoints and roadblocks, blended in among us in the market place as they sat in 
unmarked cars and carried out targeted assassinations and suffocated us from above in 
the military reconnaissance drones that littered the sky. It was in the intersection of all of 
this that I learned of the political choices available to Palestinian women at the center of 
the most complex and longest running nationalist struggle to date. Thus, along with the 
political behavior of these women, my witness to the historic shift in the politics of 
Palestinian nationalism also undergirds this dissertation.  
This dissertation is a study of the relationship between the Palestinian Islamist 
movement and Palestinian women as active participants in the collective struggle for self-
determination against the ongoing Israeli military occupation and control over the long-
sought state of Palestine. By also bringing research on Palestinian women up to date, the 
objective of this work is to observe and account for the changes in Palestinian women’s 
political participation between 1987 and 2007. In this an attempt to understand role that 
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Palestinian women play within the Islamist movement, which can appear as antithetical—
and even inimical—to Western conceptions of social and political rights and 
understandings of the equality of women. Focusing on the evolution of and points of 
contestation between traditional aspects of patriarchy and modernity in gender relations 
in the Palestinian nationalist story this study also provides a deeper analysis of the 
evolution of the Islamist movement and the factional politics that plague the Palestinian 
nationalist movement. While the history of the Palestinian people and continued horrors 
of Israeli occupation make any study of the Palestinian people and their struggle unique, 
the conclusions of this dissertation offer a broader applicability of this study by way of 
looking at the politics and practices that underpin Islamist movements and the role of 
women within their rise and evolution. Accordingly, this dissertation contributes to the 
development of more nuanced feminist analysis for understanding female participation in 
the religio-political movements of the Arab and Islamic worlds that have often attempted 
to falsely categorize female participants in Islamist movements as passive pawns or 
victims of male-centered political and social circumstances. 
 Asserting the claim that Palestinian women are more than pawns of the greater 
political processes and machinations in which their daily lives are embedded, this 
dissertation sees women as active agents in a long-standing and continuous struggle for 
gender equality and women’s rights within the historic endeavor for Palestinian 
statehood. For many Palestinian women, these issues of self-determination and gender 
equality exist in tandem and are not mutually exclusive. This project demonstrates that 
despite the shift from secular to Islamo-nationalist forms of political expression, the 
 8
vision of gender equality and statehood remain central elements of female participation 
across the ideological spectrum. 
  
Chapter Overview 
This study begins with a review of literature followed by the question of the large-
scale sociopolitical processes governing the rise of the Palestinian Islamist movement and 
its relationship to Palestinian women as citizens and participants in the nationalist 
struggle. From this, the question becomes: What happens to notions of gender equality 
and traditionally secular modes of female political participation within the Islamization of 
the Palestinian nationalist struggle? I endeavor to show that even as the expression of 
political activism has become (sometimes literally) dressed in Islamist rhetorical garb, the 
desire and commitment of women to remain firmly in the public sphere while promoting 
feminist ideals of gender equality remains the unchanged. 
The attempt to focus this question draws this dissertation into chapter-by-chapter 
investigations into micro levels of female political behavior. How does the rise of Islamo-
nationalist politics impact the mobilizing identities of secular versus Islamist in terms of 
Palestinian motherhood, female political representation, female suicide bombers and the 
work of nonviolent female activists?  Looking more sharply at these four aspects of 
female political behavior, this dissertation captures the dialectical relationship between 
the smaller and often-overlooked aspects of female collective action and larger political 
and ideological processes underway in the Palestinian struggle and the greater Middle 
East. Each chapter identifies the impact of the larger sociopolitical forces at play during 
these times on the mobilizing identities of women. In turn, each chapter demonstrates 
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how Palestinian women responded to the changing opportunity structures available to 
them within the rise of the Islamist movement as well as the interplay between secular-
nationalist and Islamist forces over the course of 1987 to 2007.  
Chapter One presents a brief background on Palestinian women and an overview 
of the problematic and method. The method of study is generated by a two-pronged 
methodology that historically and ethnographically seeks to understand the complexities 
of female roles in the Palestinian struggle by tracing the shift in the political expression 
and political identity of Palestinian women in the Islamo-nationalist rise.   
Chapter Two gives a review of literature and analysis of the four scholarly areas 
where this dissertation makes its greatest contributions. These areas are nationalist and 
post-colonial studies, social movements, identity studies and feminist political research in 
the Middle East. By examining the political opportunities afforded to women in the 
Islamist rise, this dissertation extends the existing literature in each domain. The result is 
a more nearly complete account for understanding the often-overlooked relationship 
between women and the emergence of the Islamo-nationalist movement in Palestine in 
recent years.     
Chapter Three draws upon research in the area of religion, Islamization, Middle 
East and Palestinian history to present a streamlined account of Palestinian Islamism 
within the rise of Islamist politics in the Muslim world. This chapter grounds the project 
in the vocabulary of Islamist politics and a historic understanding of the rise and 
significance of this particular movement in the Palestinian context. 
Marking the latter half of the dissertation, the chapters that follow give a detailed 
account of the rise of the Palestinian Islamist movement along with the discursive shifts 
 10
in the conception of Palestinian motherhood in the political domain, the rise of 
Palestinian Islamist women’s organizations, the emergence of female suicide martyrs, 
and the role of Palestinian women as nonviolent activists.  
For example, Chapter Four examines the maternal imagery in the secular-
nationalist discourse, which was used during the 1987 intifada to politicize femininity in 
the Palestinian struggle and mobilize female participation in the framework of the 
traditional social norms of Palestinian society. In particular, this chapter analyzes the 
Islamization of the Palestinian struggle since the 2000 intifada and seeks to understand 
how ‘political motherhood’ has been co-opted as a tool for political representation of all 
Palestinian women. A comparison of the political characteristics of female leaders as 
“mothers” of the first intifada and second intifada periods is used to illustrate how the 
Islamization of the Palestinian struggle has increased the political presence of women as 
mothers in the 2006 Palestinian elections.   
Chapter Five provides an account of Palestinian women’s political mobilization 
and organization in the 1987 and 2000 intifada periods. Exploring the shifting role of 
women at the point of contestation between the secular-nationalist movement and the rise 
of the Palestinian Islamist movement, this chapter demonstrates how the rhetoric of 
Palestinian women’s contributions to the nationalist movement changed, and with this, 
how the rhetoric used to justify the mobilizing effort of women by the women themselves 
also evolved.        
Chapter Six examines the rise of female Palestinian suicide martyrs and the 
violent role of female militants as a point of collision and competition between secular-
nationalist and Islamist political ideologies and their respective approaches to ending the 
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Israeli military occupation through the use of force. This chapter examines the paucity of 
female suicide bombers in the 1987 intifada and the rise of this phenomenon in the 2000 
intifada from within the entrenched factionalization of Palestinian politics following the 
failure of the Oslo peace agreements and Camp David Accords. Between 2002 and 2007, 
eighty-eight Palestinian women attempted to become suicide martyrs. Although only ten 
women were successful, this small number is actually quite revealing when compared to 
the fact that there were no female suicide bombers in the 1987 intifada period. The 
changes in the secular and Islamist stance concerning females as violent militants are 
examined both through speeches and the fatwas, or religious decrees, of Islamist leaders, 
and through accounts by Palestinian women themselves.  
Chapter Seven seeks to understand the role of secular-nationalist and Islamist 
Palestinian women as nonviolent political activists in the nationalist movement. Moving 
beyond the spotlight of organized violence that has resulted from the entrenched violence 
between Israelis and Palestinians in addition to the internecine violence that is taking 
place between the Palestinian factions, this chapter focuses on Palestinian women as 
continuously active agents of nonviolent political protest against the Israeli occupation, 
which is not usually visible to the outside world.    
The Conclusion of this work returns to the main arguments and findings of this 
study and suggests how the findings relate to larger bodies of literature, including 
research on Islamism, social movements in the Middle East and gender politics. It also 
addresses the decline of secular-nationalist politics in the Palestinian nationalist 
movement in recent years and comments on the future of Palestinian women and 









 THE PROBLEMATIC AND METHOD 
 
 
This chapter begins with a brief overview of the history of women in the 
Palestinian nationalist movement and the questions raised by their more recent 
participation in the Islamo-nationalist rise. The questions that are raised drive the 
problematic of this project and method of study. This chapter demonstrates that 
Palestinian women are widely celebrated for their instrumental roles in the Palestinian 
nationalist struggle. Specific to these accounts is a strong reverence for Palestinian 
women as agents of women’s rights and gender equality in the secular-nationalist 
political platform that historically represented the nationalist movement. However, what 
is missing in much of the literature on Palestinian women is an account of a 
transformation of female political participation from secular-nationalist to Islamo-
nationalist, especially in light of the rise of Hamas as a major political power in the 
Palestinian Territories to date.  
The study presented here is generated by a two-pronged methodology that 
historically and ethnographically seeks to understand the complexities of female roles in 
the Palestinian struggle by tracing the shift in the political expression and political 
identity of Palestinian women in the Islamo-nationalist rise. In doing so, this dissertation 
demonstrates that the demand for social and political equality remains a stable feature of 
female political participation across the changing ideological spectrum of Palestinian 
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nationalism. Moreover, the rise of the Islamist movement in the Palestinian context can 
be attributed in part to the active (and continued) political involvement of Palestinian 
women as participants and supporters. Last and most important to this study is the 
observation of the small ways in which the Palestinian Islamist movement has evolved to 
incorporate female participation within its ranks. This is seen in incremental ideological 
changes and adjustments in response to the demands of its female supporters.    
  
Framing the Problematic: History of Women in the Palestinian Nationalist 
Movement 
Foundational to this study is the fact that Palestinian women enjoy a long and 
celebrated history as secular participants of the national resistance. As far back as the 
British Mandate, Palestinian women organized politically and mobilized as women in the 
name of defending their homeland (Fleischmann 2003). Since the establishment of the 
Israel in 1948 and the dispersal of the majority of the Palestinian civilian population from 
their homes and villages (before, during and after the Arab-Israeli war that followed), 
Palestinian women have managed their families’ survival under social and economic 
displacement, physical insecurity and political uncertainty. Especially since the Israeli 
occupation of the West Bank and Gaza Strip in 1967, the social and political behavior of 
Palestinian women has been fashioned by the spirit of survival and resistance to the 
humiliations and injustices associated with life under Israeli military control.  
In the decades prior to the founding of the Islamic Resistance Movement (Hamas) 
in the late 1980s, Fatah was the most dominant political voice in the Palestinian 
Liberation Organization (PLO) represented the hegemonic secular-nationalist voice of the 
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Palestinian struggle. In addition to Fatah, the PLO consisted of an array of highly 
organized, grassroots, secular-nationalist women’s organizations. These organizations 
became the bedrock of grassroots civilian mobilization in the 1987 intifada, and female 
participation in this political cause revealed a growing social acceptance of female 
engagement in activities beyond the family hearth and home. Along with this came an 
increased emphasis on social and political equality not only for the Palestinian people in 
general, but also for the Palestinian women as principle players in the realization of the 
nationalist dream. Female participation in the resistance movement engendered a rise in 
secular-nationalist women’s organizations, which maintained a decidedly feminist agenda 
for the pursuit of social and political gender equality in tandem with the vision of 
Palestinian statehood. 
Since the end of the 1987 intifada, the rise of the Palestinian Islamo-nationalist 
movement has attempted to reframe the language and expression of female political 
participation. Rejecting the secular-nationalist leadership and its political ideals as an 
inauthentic import of the West, the leadership of the Islamist movement connects the 
future triumph of the Palestinian resistance to a society-wide revival of a conservative 
Islam.2 Adhering to this vision, the Islamo-nationalist agenda reframes Palestinian 
women in accordance with its conservative norms. As politically engaged advocates of 
the Islamist agenda, Palestinian women are venerated for their renewed commitments to 
Palestinian nationalism. Such women are now piously outfitted in the conservative 
                                                 
2 Esposito (1984) argues that Islamic revivalism in the twentieth century was a response to the perception 
that Islamic communities were in decline. He writes that in many cases, such as Saudi Arabia, the Sudan 
and Libya, this led to the creation of Islamic states, which has since created a pattern of modern Islamic 
movements with similarities in world view, ideology, language and methods. A more in-depth analysis of 
this phenomenon is presented in Chapter Three. 
 15
“Islamic” female costume of the Middle East. They act according to strict rules of female 
comportment and social segregation from men in public spaces. As a result of these 
adaptive behaviors, Islamist Palestinian women today are cast as prominent figures in the 
Islamo-nationalist struggle. They are the wives, mothers and political representatives of 
this new brand of Palestinian nationalism, and the symbol of the Islamo-nationalist 
movement. 
On one hand, the involvement of Palestinian women in the Palestinian struggle in 
recent years appears to be a continuation of their long history of political involvement 
and mass mobilization. On the other hand, the recent void created by the demobilization 
of secular-nationalist women’s organizations has been filled by Islamist female voices 
that seem to diverge from the secular-nationalist language concerning women’s rights 
and gender equality (Jad 2009). Meanwhile, as the Palestinian Authority struggles to be 
popularly seen as the true representative of the Palestinian street, Hamas has built 
extensive infrastructure of support among the people, and most especially among the 
women. Hamas is seen as an attractive alternative to the moral bankruptcy and corruption 
of Fatah and the Palestinian Authority. Concordantly, Palestinian Islamist women have 
emerged as activists and agitators for the new Islamist political agenda.  
One example of the changing character of Palestinian female political expression 
is Miriam Farhat, a 2006 elected female representative of Hamas. Commonly known as 
Umm Nidal (“Mother of Struggle”), Farhat became widely hailed in 2005 as a Hamas 
Party representative of Palestinian women. Farhat is the mother of three sons who were 
killed or “martyred” through their actions against Israel. Famously portrayed as the 
“Mother of Martyrs”, Farhat was held in wide acclaim for her public declaration of a 
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prayer she once made to God, in which she wished for ten Israeli settlers and soldiers to 
be killed by each of her sons (Bostom 2006, 1). Whereas in the 1987 intifada, the 
connection between motherhood and militarization was one of resistance—best 
characterized by the life-preserving, defensive techniques used by women to physically 
shield their children from the brutality of Israeli military occupation and violence—the 
Islamist shift since the 2000 intifada has rhetorically reinvented Palestinian motherhood 
as a “new” political trope where women-as-mothers gain respect for the loss of their sons 
in the battle against the Israeli occupation.3  Here, the evolution of the child-turned-
suicide bomber has grown in line with the evolution of the trope of the Islamist mother-
of-martyr. Within this paradigm shift, the Islamist movement explicitly uses aspects of 
faith and traditional social mores to honor women like Umm Nidal for her reproductive 
power in creating children to be soldiers in the political struggle, even for the purpose of 
suicide terrorism or “martyrdom”. 
Beyond rallying women as Islamist political organizers and pious-yet-politically-
assertive mothers, the Al-Aqsa intifada in 2000 saw the emergence of yet another new 
aspect of Palestinian women’s political behavior: the female suicide bomber. Until it was 
used in Palestine, suicide martyrdom was foreign to Sunni Islam. Moreover, prior to the 
outbreak of the 2000 intifada, Islamist leaders in the Palestinian Territories did not deem 
it appropriate to use woman as suicide martyrs. Of note is the fact that the leadership of 
Hamas was initially reluctant to recruit female bombers but inevitably removed the ban 
under pressure from its female members, some of whom “threatened to act on their own 
                                                 
3 Of course, social and political reverence for mothers of fallen sons in battle is nothing new or particularly 
inventive in the Palestinian context or beyond. However, what is noteworthy here is the Islamist 
reinvention of the motherly symbol of moral and nationalist sacrifice as it pertains to the Islamist political 
agenda.    
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initiative or in association with other factions” (Tamimi 2007, 162). Importantly, the first 
female suicide bomber in the Palestinian nationalist struggle was not sent by the Islamist 
factions at all, but arrived in the form of 26-year-old, Wafa Idris who blew herself up in 
Jerusalem in 2002 with the assistance of the military wing of Fatah, known as the Al-
Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades. Following a sporadic campaign of female suicide bombings 
dispatched by the military wing of Fatah, the Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) and Hamas 
soon joined in rank (Tamimi 2007, 162). Between 2002 and 2007, ten Palestinian 
women, ranging in age, education and social background, successfully engaged in suicide 
martyrdom. Dozens of women on similar missions that failed are seen as threats to the 
security of the Israel and are spending their lives in Israeli jails. 
Today, the Islamist agenda has become firmly embedded in the political process 
of the Palestinian Territories, most recently with the 2006 Parliamentary election of a 
Hamas-led majority to the Palestinian Authority, and in the 2007 Hamas takeover of the 
Gaza Strip. The issue of social and political fragmentation within the Palestinian struggle 
has most recently been seen in the threat of a civil war in the struggle for power between 
the leadership and supporters of Fatah and Hamas in the Palestinian Territories. Through 
this, the emergence of traditionally conservative socio-political thought in the Territories 
(associated with the rise of Hamas) has been widely noted as an impediment to women’s 
social and political emancipation from patriarchy (Saliba 2000, 1089). Browers writes 
that in the name of national liberation and Islamic authenticity, female behavior is 
circumscribed and regulated through the gendered constructions of Islamist discourses, 
even through those that imagine an emancipated status for women (Browers 2006, 24).  
However, what is lacking in this approach is the pertinent question of how has Hamas 
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grown to be so popular among Palestinian woman? Accordingly, has the continued 
demand for attention to “women’s issues” changed in the rise of Islamist political parties 
in the Palestinian Territories? The literature on Palestinian women is yet to fully address 
this. 
 
The Problematic       
The central problematic of this study is informed by the observation that secular 
Palestinian female activism once stood at the center of the Palestinian nationalist story. 
However, this form of nationalism is no longer the hegemonic political voice of the 
Palestinian people. Looking to the women of the Palestinian struggle, the question 
becomes, what happens to notions of gender equality and traditionally secular modes of 
female political participation in the rise of the Islamo-nationalist movement as the 
Palestinian story continues to evolve? At the root of this question is the observation that 
the Palestinian Islamist movement is a brand of politics that embraces a conservative 
social and political platform. From this, feminist scholars and human rights activists 
lament that the Islamist agenda is contradictory to traditionally secular ideals of female 
empowerment and gender equality.  But is the Islamist political movement permanently 
fixed and unchanging when it comes to women’s rights and gender equality?   
To answer these questions, this dissertation begins with an examination of four 
main expressions of female political participation in the nationalist movement. It 
compares secular-nationalist female political participation against female participation in 
the Islamo-nationalist rise, and gives a nuanced account of how notions of gender 
equality and women’s rights persist through the still unfolding story of Palestinian 
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nationalism. It also finds that a powerful demographic of Palestinian women has 
emerged. Importantly, this new demographic of Islamist Palestinian female activists 
challenges the assumption of the enduring incompatibility between the Islamist political 
platform and women’s rights and gender equality. In light of these revelations, one can 
begin to see how Islamist woman continue to occupy a political place while perpetuating 
notions of gender equality in the political process still underway.   
By looking at female participation through the continuities and ruptures 
associated with the transformation of Palestinian nationalism to date, this project serves 
to deepen an understanding of the less revealed aspects of female participation in the 
Palestinian Islamo-nationalist movement. This entails a recognition of the fact that 
women are central to this process are “frequently university educated, highly articulate, 
and vocal in their defense of women’s rights, conceptualized, of course, in Islamist 
terms” (Winter 2001, 16). While women can and do find involvement in the Palestinian 
Islamo-nationalist movement empowering, this does not mean that the acknowledgment 
of such agency is the same as tacit or implied approval. As Winter writes, to give 
unsanctioned approval for this type of female political behavior would be to “fall into 
either the “multiculturalist” trap of paternalism or the “pluralist” trap of liberal 
acceptance” (Winter 2001, 16). For example, in the former case, it would be all too 
simplistic to declare that we must withhold any scholarly scrutiny of Palestinian female 
political behavior, not only because these women happen to be Arab or Muslim, but also 
because they have suffered the effects of displacement and Israeli military occupation for 
over six decades as a people.  In the latter case, falling into the trap of “liberal 
acceptance” would be to superficially celebrate Islamist female activism as working in 
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the name of progressive ideas. Thus, the key to this purposed method of study is to 
acknowledge Palestinian women as social and political actors while rigorously exploring 
their political behavior in the finer details of each case.   
 
Methodology 
Generated from the problematic above, the methodological approach of this 
dissertation contains two complementary aspects.  The first aspect is an in depth 
historical case study of Palestinian female political behavior between 1987 and 2007. The 
second aspect is an inductive, ethnographic approach driven by my time spent as 
participant observer in the West Bank and East Jerusalem between 2007 and 2009.  In 
combination, this two-part method of study helps to reveal new ways of looking at the 
evolving aspects of female political behavior in the Palestinian Islamist movement.   
Looking to the emergent themes of female political behavior between 1987 and 
2007, the first aspect of the methodology presents a historical overview, which is divided 
into four independent case examinations of female political engagement. The four cases 
are emblematic of the enduring opportunities for direct female political participation in 
the nationalist movement. Within each case is an account of the relationship between 
women and the secular and Islamist political movements, respectively, which enables the 
project to draw upon the historical intersection of secular-nationalist paradigm and the 
Islamo-nationalist rise. From this, the project is then able to demonstrate the historical 
transformation in Palestinian female political activism and discourse from secular-
nationalist to Islamo-nationalist by design.  Figure A presents a descriptive overview of 
each case. 






























































































Each case shown above represents an avenue for female political engagement as it is 
expressed through the secular-nationalist discourse that rose to prominence in the 1960s 
and remained the hegemonic voice of Palestinian nationalism through the 1980s.  
Broadly, the women who filled these political roles considered themselves to be secular 
and progressive vanguards for women’s rights and gender equality in the greater Middle 
East. They appeared in the streets of the Palestinian Territories wearing denim jeans and 
uncovered hair, in a style that emulated the fashions of Western secularism of the 1980s 
and early 1990s. Beyond their physical appearance and attire, female political activists 
characteristically embraced the ideals of women’s rights and gender equality within a 
framework of democratic self-governance for the Palestinian people.  
However, as the popularity of secular-nationalism waned and the Islamo-
nationalist movement gained ground, Palestinian women remained in these available 
avenues for active political engagement, albeit in a newly fashioned, “Islamist” way. The 
female political activist of recent years is Islamically-dressed and seemingly “anti-
secular”. Yet, like her secular counterparts, she still holds to the vision of Palestinian 
freedom, human rights and notions of gender equality. This time, however, she is doing 
so through the lens and new language of Islamo-nationalism. 
Each case fits together to present a more coherent historical vision of Palestinian 
female political engagement. With this in mind, Figure B demonstrates the approach to 
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design, this element of the methodology relies on what Cédric Jourde refers to as an 
“ethnographic sensibility”, an approach which undergirds the evidence presented here. As 
Jorde writes, ethnographic research methods are based on person-to-person contact, 
which helps to elicit insider perspectives and sensibilities (Jorde 2009, 202). This allows 
political scientists to see and question political relations and political sites that are 
generally “unseen” by mainstream research methods traditionally used by political 
scientists (Jorde 2009, 201). In this study, the historically “unseen” elements of female 
political engagement are, in effect, “seen” through first-hand anecdotes and participant-
observer accounts of Palestinian women in their own contexts. As a result of my first-
hand experiences in the West Bank and East Jerusalem between 2007 and 2009, the 
synthesis of ideas and observations presented here is done through what Jorde describes 
as an  “ethnographic lens” that would not otherwise exist if I (as the researcher) had not 
interacted extensively with Palestinian women and their social world as a participant-
observer (Jorde 2009, 202).   
Combining the two features of the methodological approach of this study helps to 
generate a new understanding of female motivations for political action while, at the 
same time, highlighting the finer nuances of the Palestinian Islamo-nationalist movement 
as a coherent force. In doing so, this dissertation seeks to build upon previous studies of 
the Palestinian Islamist movement, such as Robinson (1997), Mishal and Sela (2000), 
Tamimi (2007), Gunning (2009) and Milton-Edwards and Farrell (2010).  Importantly, 
these studies focus on a descriptive evolution of Hamas as an evolving social and 
political movement. At the same time, however, they fail to look at the interplay of 
Islamist leadership and demands placed on the movement by female supporters and 
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detractors alike. For example, Beverly Milton-Edwards and Stephen Farrell’s most recent 
study of Hamas claims to get “inside” the mind of Hamas. In doing so, these authors 
present Hamas as a coherent force with absolutely no ideological “middle ground”, as 
they claim in the opening pages of their book (Milton-Edwards and Farrell 2010, vi). Yet, 
in spite extensive first-hand accounts with Hamas fighters and activists and a chapter 
devoted to “Women”, Milton-Edwards and Farrell also do not explicitly engage in the 
evolving details of Palestinian female political behavior vis-à-vis the Islamo-nationalist 
movement or perhaps see it as a compelling story worth telling. 
Admittedly, what Milton-Edwards and Farrell indicate concerning the lack of 
political or ideological “middle ground” in the Islamist movement is what drives this 
dissertation to produce a more nuanced account of the movement by looking at the 
women of Hamas.  As Milton-Edwards and Farrell also note, “Hamas can be excoriated, 
but it should not be underestimated” (Milton-Edwards and Farrell, Hamas 2010, viii). Not 
only is Hamas one of the most important Islamic organizations in the Middle East today, 
its centrality to the Palestinian nationalist movement will resonate for years to come 
through the generations of Palestinians who remain, as ever, stateless and politically 
disenfranchised. Bearing the plight of these two issues in mind, what this project 
demonstrates is that female participants in the Palestinian struggle still have not 
abandoned feminist principles of gender equality and women’s rights in exchange for the 
brand of hard-line political extremism that may exclude them from the political process. 
Moreover, these ideals are incorporated and infused in the vision of the “new” Islamo-
nationalist woman. It is from these observations that this project shows how historically 
secular ideals of gender equality and women’s rights remain with Palestinian women in 
their interaction with the Islamo
Palestinian self-determination as a whole. Finally, from this inductively
perspective, this dissertation proposes that a “new” Palestinian 
the Islamist challenge to secular
Palestinian woman, in turn, is also shaping and bri
nationalism.  Shown below, Figure C demonstrates the synthesis of ideas emerging from 
the methodology of this inquiry:
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platform is less coherently fixed than what is presented in prevailing studies. As such it 
has been historically pressured to accept and accommodate Palestinian women as 
constituents and political actors within it. At the same time, some Palestinian women 
have gradually-yet-critically accepted and accommodated the Islamist political platform 
as a vehicle for political participation and social contestation in Palestinian society.  
 
Conclusion 
This dissertation seeks to develop a new analytical approach for understanding the 
Palestinian case in order to challenge the question of how and why some women—who 
appear to diverge from the sensibilities and commitments of Western feminism’s 
emancipatory visions—are active participants and supporters of the Islamist 
transformations. I argue that the available avenues for female political participation in the 
Palestinian nationalist struggle have not been limited or controlled by the Islamist 
movement in its rise. Nevertheless, while the avenues for political participation available 
to women remain unchanged since the start of the 1987 intifada, the mode of expression 
of female political participation has changed by becoming more “Islamist” as a result of a 
dynamic and evolving opportunity structure generated by the proliferation of the Islamo-
nationalist movement.   
From these observations, this dissertation builds upon Saba Mahmood’s 
observation of a prevalent yet false supposition in the West that female supporters of 
Islamist movements are “pawns in a grand patriarchal plan, who if freed from their 
bondage would naturally express their instinctual abhorrence for the traditional Islamic 
mores used to enchain them” (Mahmood 2005, 3). With this in mind, this study, begins to 
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answer Lila Abu-Lughod’s call to more closely follow the discussions of Muslim 
women’s rights as the important issues of social and political equality that “circulate 
through debates and documents, organize women’s activism, and mediate women’s lives” 
(Abu-Lughod 2010, 2). 
 The chapters that follow build from the methodology in order to examine the core 
argument presented that illuminate the pathway of female commitment to gender equality 
and women’s rights through the various manifestations of Palestinian women’s political 
behavior. However, before moving ahead, Chapter Two provides a review of existing 
















In light of the recent and profound ideological shifts concerning the Islamization 
of the Palestinian struggle for statehood, the political role and objectives of women in the 
Islamo-nationalist movement of Palestine deserves greater scrutiny. To date, few 
academic studies attempt to critique the secular-Islamist shift in female involvement in 
the Palestinian struggle. This dissertation clarifies the story of what happens to 
Palestinian women and their notions of gender equality through the changing patterns of 
political participation, while making a contribution to studies in nationalism and post-
colonial movements, social movements, identity and feminist research in the Middle East. 
  Seeking to broadly explain the role of women in nationalist endeavors, Deniz 
Kandiyoti explains, “Despite the extensive literature on nationalism, there are relatively 
few systematic attempts to analyze women’s integration into nationalist projects” 
(Kandiyoti 1991, 429). Responding to this statement, this project assumes a systematic 
approach to women in the Palestinian nationalist projects in a blended, interdisciplinary 
approach. This approach draws from four scholarly areas of thought in order to account 
for the shifts in female political behavior in the Palestinian nationalist story. These areas 
are: 1) nationalism and post-colonial studies, 2) social movement research, 3) identity 
studies and identity politics, and 4) feminist political thought.  
Depicted below in Figure D
draws and, in turn, seeks to make its scholarly contribution:
 
Figure D:  Four Foundational Pillars of Thought Framing this Dissertation
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Figure E: Relationship Between the Pillars of Thought in this Dissertation
 
In the onion-like model in Figure E
framing this project occurs in stratified layers, where each individual area contributes to 
the dynamism of the project as whole. At the center of this study is the theme of 
nationalism and post-colonial scholarship, which is then lay
movement research. Enveloping both of these approaches is the body of work done in the 
scholarly domain of identity studies and identity politics. Lastly
this study—the level that entirely “wraps” the project tog
research pertaining to women in the Middle East. In its entirety, the 
interdisciplinary approach to each area of study. In light of the integration of these four 
areas, the greatest contribution of this work
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The following sections of this chapter provide a review the existing literature 
within each area of thought by highlighting the scholarly contributions and connections 
brought to the dissertation. In turn, each section highlights what this dissertation adds to 
each area of thought and explains the contribution that this project makes to the gaps in 
the preexisting literature.   
 
Literature Review 
Nationalism, Post-Colonial Studies (and Women) 
Since the late eighteenth century, the study of nationalism has been the subject of 
scholarly inquiry. Emerging in the latter half of the twentieth century, nationalism studies 
relevant to the Middle East demonstrate the paradoxes and limitation of a Western-
inspired enterprise of nationalist thought in the post-colonial world. Preliminarily, this 
dissertation draws from the work of three more mainstream scholars of nationalism and 
post-colonial thought in the Middle East. These scholars are Elie Kedourie, Benedict 
Anderson and Edward Said. Added to this critique are feminist studies on women and 
nationalism, which also inform this area of the project. 
Drawing from twentieth century scholarly approaches to nationalist projects, Elie 
Kedourie’s work speaks directly to the development of nationalist thought and its 
limitations in the Middle East. As a critic of the imperial order and Western values that 
the British attempted to instill and then subsequently abandon in the Middle East, 
Kedourie published Nationalism in 1960. Nationalism demonstrates Kedourie’s 
perspective the historic downfall of nationalist projects under the political circumstances 
created by the British in the Middle East. For example, this work builds a theoretical and 
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historical case against nationalism as an ideology that has generated new conflicts, 
exacerbated tensions and brought large-scale catastrophes to innocent people. As 
Kedourie simply writes, “The attempts to refashion so much of the world on national 
lines has not led to greater peace and stability” (Kedourie 1993, 133-4). A decade later, 
Kedourie published a collection of essays known as the Chatham House Version and 
Other Middle Eastern Studies. Once again, against the prevailing perception in Britain 
that the post-colonial moment brought forth a “liberation” or “awakening” to the former 
subjects of the British crown, Kedourie is critical of the dislocation of millions, the 
extreme flashes of violence, and emerging tyranny and despotism of the self-appointed 
leaders that took root in post-colonial lands, all in the name of the nationalism (Kedourie 
1984).  
Of particular importance to this dissertation is Kedourie’s reference to the modern 
Middle East as ‘a wilderness of tigers’, or a product of radical (“leftist”) nationalism, 
which came to fruition in the hasty British withdrawal from the Middle East in the mid-
twentieth century, and came more fully to light in the pan-Arab political designs by the 
leading powers of the Middle East thereafter (Pryce-Jones 2004). Here Kedourie’s 
dissatisfaction with the ideological perspective that sees the “awakening” of the Middle 
East under British colonialism is evident. Of course, Kedourie’s acrimonious account of 
nationalism depicts the new countries of Middle East as “awakening” to their own 
despotic traditions, which are exacerbated by the Western model of self-determination.   
Kedourie’s work is pivotal to this dissertation for explaining the historic rise of 
secular Palestinian nationalism in the twentieth century and the story of the Islamist shift 
of this brand of nationalism in the 1990s as it correlates to the broader political history of 
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the Middle East in the twentieth century. Certainly, the Palestinian case is not immune to 
the rise of nationalism in the post-colonial era and the degree of extreme destabilization 
and the emergence of despotic leaders that came with it. (This is especially relevant in the 
current revolutions taking place in the Arab world in recent events as well.) However, 
what is missing in Kedourie’s writing is an account of how the finer intricacies of the 
same notions of self-determination vis-à-vis the Palestinian nationalist endeavor. For 
example, what is missing is an account of how the participation of women in the 
nationalist movement may have facilitated the Palestinian nationalist story in a unique 
and interesting way. In this silence, Kedourie’s work omits the fact that one essential and 
lingering component of the post-colonial nationalist legacy in the Middle East is the 
political behavior and ideological expression of the women of the Middle East today as 
proponents of self-determination and gender equality—admittedly, two very Western 
conceptions in origin and design. Focusing on the outcome and legacy of post-colonial 
nationalist thought in the Palestinian case, this study bridges the gap between Kedourie’s 
focus on the detriments of what he sees as an uncritical view of post-colonial nationalist 
movements in the Middle East and the question of what more has come from the 
contradictions of nationalism in the Middle East--particularly in the Palestinian case for 
self-determination and its female proponents/participants. 
Kedourie’s political stance on the poverty of nationalist designs in the Middle 
East is clear, yet this trenchant viewpoint of nationalism also overlooks the fact that 
nationalism is considered by some to be based on deeply rooted feelings of unity and 
community among peoples. For example, in his work on nationalism, Anderson’s 
Imagined Communities sees a nation as a socially constructed entity, created by a group 
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of people who perceive of themselves to be a part of a definable entity. Anderson argues 
that it is the notion of an imagined community that makes it possible for many millions of 
people to kill in the name of the community and die for it as well (Anderson 2006, 7).    
With this, Anderson uses culturally rooted ideas of national consciousness to support his 
claims. While Anderson’s work fails to address the case of Palestine directly, he would 
argue that the inspiration for nationalism in the Palestinian case is not the nation itself, 
but the nationalism that “invented” it.   
Building on Anderson’s claim but taking it a step deeper, Julie Peteet argues that 
the notion that all national identity is “constructed” is a dangerous claim (Peteet 1998). 
For example, insofar as Palestinian nationalism can be perceived as a modern invention 
with no historical roots per se, simply seeing Palestinian nationalism as a social 
construction can potentially empty the nationalist cause of its moral (and even practical) 
validity. Responding to Anderson, Peteet demonstrates that the veritable “dream” of 
Palestine is tied to the actual nightmare of the nationalist dream of Zionism in Palestine.  
This nightmare arrived in the Middle East in the socially constructed form of Zionism, or 
“exclusivist sectarianism”, with a self-styled logic calling for the displacement and 
erasure of the Palestinian people from a land called Palestine (Peteet 1998, 81-82).  
According to Peteet, the identity of the Palestinian people became dramatically sharpened 
under Zionist claims. Historically, the Palestinians were long considered Arabs—broadly 
identified by regional elements of kinship, religion, class, tribe and a much broader Arab 
identity under Ottoman rule. However, as we know it today, the trajectory of Palestinian 
identity and nationalism is correlated to the suddenness and particular experience of 
collective dislocation. 
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Building from Hall and relying on the in depth nature of the study done by Peteet, 
this project demonstrates that the “dream” of the Palestinian nationalist project is 
continuing to evolve in a socially constructed way due to the active and expanding role of 
women as authors and agents of Palestinian nationalism in the twenty-first century. In 
doing so, this project seeks to add more to the study of nationalism in two ways. First, 
this dissertation demonstrates how the idea of Palestinian nationalism is not only an 
obvious and valid claim, but also one that is continually evolving beyond the initial 
features of Anderson’s social constructivist design. This is shown by tracing the more 
recent emergence of Islamist political movements in the Middle East and their impact on 
the character of the Palestinian nationalist movement to date.   
Second, what Anderson misses in his model is the role of women as active 
members of the imagined community. Here, Anderson only goes so far to say that the 
objectives of nationalism use the vocabulary of kinship and home, terms used in 
association to classically feminine idyllic behavior of selfless attachment and personal 
sacrifice. However, the finer details of female actions and interactions within nationalist 
movements and group identity are overlooked. Tracing the four specific aspects of female 
political engagement in the Palestinian nationalist struggle mentioned in Chapter One, 
this dissertation seeks to bridge Anderson’s theoretical design nationalist ideology with a 
demonstration of its implementation. 
While arguments and approaches to the defining characteristics of nationalism in 
the Middle East continue to be challenged by scholars, the field of postcolonial studies   
is also relevant to this study. In particular, the work of Edward Said offers another 
important foundation for the research presented here concerning Palestinian nationalism.   
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Said’s work shows how Palestinians were collectively dispossessed of their homes, lands 
and identity, and thus denied the right to claim their national identity in relation to a 
particular place. In a well-known essay entitled, “Permission to Narrate”, first published 
in the London Review of Books in February 1984, Said states that the Palestinian narrative 
has “never been officially admitted to Israeli history, except as that of “non-Jews,” whose 
inert presence in Palestine was a nuisance to be ignored or expelled (Said 1994, 254).  
Said argues that political recognition of national identity is the basis for giving justice to 
the people of Palestine and resolving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. From this, Said’s 
work challenges any researcher of the Palestinian struggle to explore the dark silences in 
the study of history, anthropology and international relations (and other academic 
disciplines) in an effort to cast greater light on the Palestinian voice and claims for a 
universally recognized national narrative. 
Interestingly, where a study of Middle East women is concerned, credit is given to 
Said’s publication of Orientalism (1978) as engendering the emergence of recent feminist 
scholarship and debate in Middle East studies. However, the social and political agenda 
of Said’s work is not to address women in the Palestinian nationalist movement per se. 
As Abu-Lughod writes, Orientalism was not meant to be work of feminist scholarship or 
theory, yet the work “opened up the possibility for others to go further than Said had in 
exploring the gender and sexuality of Orientalist discourse” (Abu-Lughod 2001, 101).  
To this end, Said’s work provides the foundation for more robust research, and 
specifically a “burgeoning historical and anthropological research that claimed to be 
going beyond stereotypes of the Muslim or Middle Eastern woman and gender relations 
in general” (Abu-Lughod 2001, 101). Again, however, while Said’s writing has served to 
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inspire the emergence of feminist scholarship in the Middle East, it stops short at the role 
that Palestinian women play in their own nationalist story. Every chapter of this 
dissertation endeavors to bridge this gap. 
At the heart of this study, the work of Kedourie, Anderson and Said inform this 
project on Palestinian nationalism. Their work also provides this project with an 
intellectual jumping off point where the issue of female agency in the nationalist struggle 
is concerned. Due to this missing piece in the mainstream literature on nationalism, 
feminist research on women and nationalism also informs this dissertation. Yet, while 
feminist research on women and nationalist movements is particularly robust, an account 
of Islamist women in the Palestinian nationalist movement is yet to be fully developed. 
Historically, the gendered elements and aspects of female support for nationalist 
projects have long been a staple of feminist intellectual inquiry. This is especially 
highlighted by Virginia Woolf’s essay on women and nationalism, Three Guineas (1938), 
which presents the dilemma of why English women were asked to support the nationalist 
cause in the Second World War when they had not yet attained full citizen rights in their 
own country. Woolf writes, “Our country…throughout the greater part of history has 
treated me as a slave; it has denied me education or any share of its possessions…in fact, 
as a woman, I have no country. As a woman I want no country. As a woman my country 
is the whole world” (Woolf 1938, 107-109). Woolf’s critique of the contentious 
relationship between feminism and nationalism informs the evidence presented in this 
dissertation between the tensions that arise when Palestinian women become nationalists 
in the name of their country while also struggling for recognition as equal citizens. 
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From Woolf’s work, this dissertation gains its foundation as a project seeking to 
build upon the tensions already observed from the relationship between women (as 
citizens), feminism (as women’s equal rights) and nationalism (as territorial integrity, 
political independence and sovereignty).  To this, Deniz Kandiyoti’s work on women and 
nationalism elicits the observation that the integration of women into nationalist projects 
in post-colonial societies has been “rich in paradoxes and ambiguities” (Kandiyoti 1991, 
440). Kandiyoti’s work indicates that the bulk of academic discourse on nationalism 
more generally demonstrates how women and gender remain ignored or marginalized in 
nationalist movements. Against Woolf and Kandiyoti’s observations on women in 
nationalist projects, however, this project sees Palestinian women as part of the 
nationalist movement as citizens and activists, and not as passive recipients whose rights 
and voices become eclipsed in the political sphere. Even if female involvement in 
nationalist endeavors can be rife with inconsistency and contradiction, nationalist and 
post-colonialist movements have also created the space for debate over the question of 
women’s role in society. Moreover, this dissertation sees women in the Palestinian 
nationalist movement as struggling to define and re-conceptualize their relationship to the 
movement as it evolves.    
In sum, this first pillar of the project works within the intersection of studies on 
nationalism, feminism, and female agency in nationalist movements, and builds upon this 
foundation by studying the case of Palestine. Literature on nationalism and post-colonial 
nationalist movements in the Middle East serves this area of investigation. Additionally, 
key studies on women and nationalism in feminist studies help to generate the feminist 
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lens of this project as a whole. From these two approaches, this dissertation furthers two 
relevant insights to the study of nationalism and feminism: 
  First, this dissertation builds upon the demonstrated tensions in feminist political 
thought between feminism and nationalism by providing an analysis of female agency 
within the Palestinian nationalist struggle. Second, it demonstrates the evolving character 
of nationalism in the Palestinian context and the role that women play within it. Some 
Palestinian women have come to support the Palestinian Islamist movement as an answer 
to the enduring struggle for nationhood, and also as a response to the insecurity that has 
plagued their society as one under military occupation. Certainly the rise of Islamist 
political movements in the Middle East more broadly has served to reinforce harsh 
stereotypes about the people and the region—especially in regard to the status of women 
in Islamic cultures. However, this dissertation sees the tie between nationalism and 
feminism in Palestine in a far more complex way as a means of drawing new connections 
from the relationship between women and the story of the Palestinian nationalist struggle. 
 
Social Movement Studies (and Women) 
 The next pillar of this research comes from existing literature in social movement 
studies. Seeking to explain how and why social mobilization occurs, interdisciplinary 
approaches to social movements are found in a wide range of sociological, cultural, 
psychological and political studies. On one side of the spectrum of social movement 
research is the structural approach, which focuses on states and groups and the 
international system to explain large-scale episodes of collective action. On the other side 
of this spectrum is the rational choice model, in which individuals (as opposed to states or 
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groups) are rational actors, who interact in the world around them on the basis of 
strategically maximizing their utility. Meanwhile, social movement theory (SMT) falls 
between structuralist and rational choice schools of thought, in a “middle ground 
approach in analyzing episodes of contentious collective action” (Robinson 2003, 113). 
For the purpose of this study, each approach adds increasingly greater layers to a more 
complete understanding of the Palestinian struggle and the agency of female participants 
within it. 
The structuralist approach to understanding collective action is well known in 
Theda Skocpol’s States and Social Revolutions (1979). Skocpol’s work explains that 
social revolutions are essentially rapid transformations of a society's state and social 
structures. Unlike a rebellion, which may not engender a structural change to the state 
apparatus, Skocpol writes that a social revolution can be distinguished by fundamental 
changes occurring within a state’s structure as a result. From this, two aspects are 
prevalent in social revolution: 1) basic changes in social structure and political structure 
occur in a mutually reinforcing fashion, and 2) these changes occur through intense 
sociopolitical conflict.   
 Employing the structuralist approach to collective action in this study, this project 
addresses four instances of social movements taking place in the Palestinian case. First, 
the evolution of secular-nationalist Palestinian nationalism as early as the 1950s is in 
itself a social movement occurring in the broader historical and sociopolitical structure of 
the Middle East in twentieth century Arab nationalism. Second, within this movement is 
the historic emergence of Palestinian women as agents of Palestinian nationalism.  
Subsequently, some female Palestinian nationalists became advocates of the evolution of 
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viewpoints concerning the gender-based social structures governing Palestinian society as 
a whole. In this case, feminism (based on ideas of gender equality) and nationalism came 
to be seen as mutually reinforcing issues for the women of the Palestinian nationalist 
movement. Third, is the emergence of Palestinian Islamism from the greater structure of 
Middle East history and the Palestinian struggle, and particularly the political entity, 
Hamas, which is, itself, a social movement engaging in extensive and social activities that 
continue to shape the character and expression of the Palestinian nationalist movement.  
Finally, a corollary to the rise of the structural forces that gave way to Hamas is the 
emergence of the Palestinian Islamic female activist in recent years due to the changing 
opportunity structure created by the rise of Palestinian Islamism. 
Approaching social movements from a structural perspective, Skocpol argues that 
the voluntaristic (rational choice) theories, which are common in political science, fail to 
perceive the structural forces that create opportunities for social revolutions. To this, it 
can be seen that the emergence of Palestinian feminism was not autonomous, but bound 
to the structure of the national context which helped to not only produce it, but give it 
space to proliferate. However, by taking only a structuralist perspective in this study of 
Palestinian female agency necessarily entails a failure to perceive why some women 
choose to more directly participate in the Palestinian struggle, whether as secular or 
Islamist activists, respectively. Here, in light of the larger structural issues at play, 
Skocpol’s account of greater structural issues fails to illuminate the more personal and 
circumstantial choices demanded of Palestinian women as citizens of what can appear as 
an enduring and an unending struggle for personal and political freedom.   
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Against the structuralist approach to social movements, rational choice theorists, 
such as Edward Muller and Karl-Dieter Opp (1986), strongly consider the personal 
convictions of individuals when participating in social movements. According to Muller 
and Opp, “Rational individuals will compare the benefits and costs of participation with 
those of inactivity, and choose the course of action in which their expected utility is 
maximized” (Muller and Opp 1986, 471). The structural explanations of the four 
Palestinian movements mentioned previously are best explained by looking more widely 
at the whole of the Middle East. However, to answer the question of why some 
Palestinian women choose to become Islamist political activists on one hand, while, on 
the other hand, other women become secular political activists is best explained by the 
emphasis on the individual in the rational choice approach. According to rational choice 
theory, states, systems and groups do not make rational choices, but individuals do. This 
accounts for why—as feminist scholar, Valentine Moghadam, claims—“it is a mistake to 
see Islamist women as passive and subservient. In many of these movements, one finds 
women activists and ideologues” (V. Moghadam 1991, 268). 
Observing and incorporating the systemic forces at play in the Middle East as 
well as voluntaristic choices made by Palestinian women, this study incorporates the 
structural and rational actor units of analysis in what is more recently known as Social 
Movement Theory (SMT). According to Glenn E. Robinson, SMT emerged as a more 
nuanced approach in studying episodes of collective action by serving as a middle ground 
in social movement research (Robinson 2003, 113). For example, SMT sees large-scale 
structural change as beyond the control of any individual. At the same time, however, 
structural elements are also important in providing changing opportunity structures in 
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which an individual chooses to act. Changing opportunity structures do not necessarily 
dictate specific outcomes since the individual is the one with rational agency.    
Using SMT, Robinson’s (2003) work sheds light on Hamas as a social movement.  
He regards the middle-ground approach of SMT as both useful and relevant to his 
research for constructing a more powerful understanding of groups like Hamas. To 
Robinson, SMT avoids more polarized analytical frameworks, which is especially 
important in the study of social movements such as Hamas, which may already appear as 
polarized and extreme in its own political stance. Importantly, Robinson writes that his 
research demonstrates that, “Islamism, like other things Muslim, can be understood 
through the application of general concepts and does not exist in a parallel explanatory 
universe where a completely different set of theoretical tools is necessary to make sense 
of it” (Robinson 2003, 135-136).   
Particularly in the Muslim world today, more contextualized approaches to social 
movements are beginning to be used in order to understand the patterns unique to Islamic 
activism (Wiktorowicz 2003). As Quintan Wiktorowicz writes, these new developments 
in social scientific research can provide “theoretical leverage over many issues relevant to 
Islamic activism” (Wiktorowicz 2003, 3). In sum, this project takes into account the pillar 
of structural and rational choice models for interpreting the evolution of the Palestinian 
nationalist movement as a study of social movements. However, it most relies on 
Robinson’s embrace of SMT as an analytical framework for studying the Palestinian 
Islamist movement.  From this, the structuralist and rational theoretical approaches in 
social movement studies are used as a mean for explaining the choices and agency of 
Palestinian women in the nationalist movement and their struggle for gender equality.  
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Importantly, this second pillar of intellectual inquiry furthers Robinson’s work with SMT 
on Hamas as a social movement by providing a fuller conceptualization of the Islamo-
nationalist shift in Palestinian nationalism by seeing the agency of female participants 
within it.   
  
Identity Studies (and Women) 
For the past four decades, social and nationalist movements have shifted scholarly 
attention to issues of group agency and political action (Cerulo 1997, 386). As a result of 
this, identity studies now focus on an array of areas that inform the field. These areas are 
mainly gender/sexuality, race/ethnicity studies and class-based research as a way of 
understanding the mobilizing aspects of collective identity. As the third intellectual pillar 
framing this project, identity studies is joined in an interdisciplinary manner to feminist 
studies in nationalist movements mentioned previously. For example, as Kandiyoti 
writes, “The very language of nationalism singles women out as the symbolic repository 
of group identity” (Kandiyoti 1991, 434). As the third pillar of this investigation, studies 
in identity form a critical cornerstone within modern sociological thought and provide 
this project with a lens for observing women in the secular and Islamist aspects of the 
Palestinian nationalist movement in greater detail. For the purpose of this investigation, 
the work of Stuart Hall and Judith Butler, scholars in identity and identity politics, 
respectively, are discussed. While each author’s work contributes to the pillar of thought 
informing this study, they also provide a jumping off point from which this dissertation 
contributes to the canon of identity and identity politics in the study of Palestinian female 
identity in the nationalist movement. 
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At the heart of sociological studies of identity, Stuart Hall maintains that identity 
is a continuously evolving construction or “a process never completed—always ‘in 
process’” (Hall 2000, 16). For Hall, specific formations and behavioral practices within 
historical and institutional sites inform the evolution of identity. To illustrate this, Hall 
writes that his use of the word “identity” refers to meeting point between discourses and 
practices and the social processes which create them (Hall 2000, 19). Asking the question 
of what makes identity or where does it come from, Hall cites cultural critic Kobena 
Mercer, who observes, “Identity only becomes an issue when it is in crisis, when 
something assumed to be fixed, coherent and stable is displaced by the experience of 
doubt and uncertainty” (Mercer 1990).  
While Hall and Mercer’s work does not speak directly to the Palestinian case, this 
project evokes their mainstream sociological approach to identity and nationalism to 
build a contextualized understanding of the historical struggle for a nation called 
Palestine in light of the awakening of the Palestinian people to their sudden 
disenfranchisement with the establishment of Israel in 1948. Building from Mercer’s 
observation above, a distinct sense of Palestinian identity emerged from the catastrophic 
realization that the stable sense of transcendent Arab “unity” would do nothing to save or 
preserve the people of Palestine from the territorial aims of the Zionist national project. 
In fact, it is only after the physical displacement of the Palestinian people from their 
homes and ancestral communities in 1948 that a distinct and coherent conception of 
Palestinian identity became crystallized. To this, Hall notes that the process of 
“identification” is open-ended and variable, and therefore open to new conventional 
layers and re-invention. As the systems of meaning and cultural representation multiply, 
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Hall writes that human beings are “confronted by a bewildering, fleeting multiplicity of 
possible identities, any one of which we could identify with—at least temporarily” (Hall 
1996, 598). Thus, as identity is socially constructed and the quality and character of 
identity is fixed to the influences of time and place, it is not fixed, but open to continual 
interpretation and evolution.   
Hall and Mercer’s views on identity studies enable this third pillar of the project 
to demonstrate how the understanding of Palestinian identity was initially formed from a 
moment of crisis and has since evolved in response to the changing circumstances facing 
Palestinian nationalism. However, where their work shows the theoretical construction 
and ever-changing aspects of identity in a very broad sense, there is failure to articulate 
how elements of national identity and cultural difference are exerted in a local context. 
This is especially pertinent in forms of social control over women and girls (such as 
compulsory veiling in the Gaza Strip) that ultimately impinges on female rights as 
citizens of the modern state. This secondary aspect of identity studies in this project is 
framed by the feminist thinkers in identity politics, Judith Butler and scholars in Middle 
Eastern gender identities, Floya Anthias, Deniz Kandiyoti, Valentine Moghadam and 
Nira Yuval-Davis, who focus more acutely on the intersection of identity construction 
and gender relationships in nationalist contexts. 
Like the work of Stuart Hall, Judith Butler’s contribution to the framing of 
gendered political identities is foundational to this investigation for her demonstration of 
how subjects of political structures are “formed, defined and reproduced in accordance 
with the requirements of those structures” (Butler 1999, 4). Related to this is the question 
of how Palestinian women operate within changing political opportunity structures, and, 
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in doing so, how they are constituted as recognizable subjects by the secular and Islamo-
nationalist leadership, respectively. Butler writes, “the feminist subject turns out to be 
discursively constituted by the very political system that is supposed to facilitate its 
emancipation” (Butler 1999, 4). In this, Butler’s work challenges this new research on the 
politicization of women in the Islamo-nationalist movement as a way of understanding 
how the category of “women, the subject of feminism, is produced and restrained by the 
very structures of power through which emancipation is sought” (Butler 1999, 5).    
Like Hall’s work on the social construction of identity, Butler’s work presents a 
theoretical call for greater critique of the relationship between feminist political identity 
and practice, the empirical question of the fate of female identity in Palestinian 
nationalism question remains unaddressed. Acknowledging this gap, this dissertation 
observes and demonstrates how elements of female identity can ultimately be articulated 
as forms of control over women and infringe upon their rights as citizens. Yet, as 
mentioned in previous sections, this project continues to see women as simultaneous 
subjects and authors of their political fate. From the perspective of identity studies, the 
approach to female subjectivity in this dissertation adds to Hall and Butler’s analysis.  
Moving further, it also builds from the work of Yuval Davis and Anthias on women in 
nationalist movements, insofar as women are not only “signify the nation but also 
embody it as subjects, as authors narrating the nation, as participants and leaders in 
nationalist struggle, and as those who bear and nurture children for nation-state projects” 
(Yuval-Davis and Anthias, Woman-Nation-State 1989, 8). Thus, while the relationship 
between political Islamization and the role of Palestinian female behavior may seem 
counter-intuitive to a feminist political agenda at first glance, this dissertation fills in the 
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gap in how the role of women in Islamist movements is understood, by way of seeing 
female identity in the Palestinian nationalist movement as a result being influenced by the 
rise of the Islamo-nationalist movement within it.      
 In sum, Hall’s work tells us that identity is a product of ever-shifting social 
conditions dictated by time and place.  Butler’s work shows us that the development of 
political identities are also context-dependent, but can be perpetuated in a manner to 
ultimately work to dampen the rights and notions of citizenship afforded to female 
subjects within systems of power. Taking these two approaches in identity studies into 
consideration, what this dissertation seeks to demonstrate is how the Palestinian 
nationalist movement has evolved from secular to Islamo-nationalist, and within this 
context, how Palestinian female identity has shifted and adapted while Palestinian women 
continue to demand equal political rights and social equality in a new political terrain that 
may be antithetical to such notions. 
 
Feminist Political Studies in the Middle East 
Forming the final foundational body of literature in this dissertation is feminist 
political studies with a regional emphasis in the Middle East. This is also the area of 
thought where this project makes its greatest contribution in terms of expanding the 
literature on the role of women in Islamist political movements. From an interdisciplinary 
perspective, feminist political research draws from wide range of studies, including (but 
not limited to) work in nationalism and post-colonial movements, social movements and 
identity politics, and feminist political research.  Feminist case studies of the Middle East 
provide multifaceted and extensive accounts of female experience and social history of 
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the region. The paragraphs that follow contain an overview of the existing literature 
relevant to this dissertation and a discussion of the existing gaps in the literature, which 
this project ultimately seeks to fill.    
To date, the existing literature on Palestinian women forms a distinct subset to 
feminist research on the Middle East. During the late 1980s and early 1990s, many 
celebratory accounts of Palestinian women’s movement emerged. These accounts 
roundly praised Palestinian women for their embrace of secular feminist principles within 
the struggle for Palestinian freedom. The existing literature includes Abdo (1991, 1994), 
Abu-Duhou (2003), Gluck (1995), Hammami (1990), Hasso (2005), Hiltermann (1993), 
Jad (et. al), Jad, Johnson and Giacaman (2000), Kuttab (et. al), Mayer (1994), Najjar 
(1993), Peteet (1991, 1994), Rubenberg (2001), Sabbagh, ed. (1998), Shalhoub-
Kevorkian (2009), Sharoni (1994), Strum (1992), Warnock (1990). Similarly, these 
authors demonstrate that Palestinian women have long been active at the center of the 
Palestinian nationalism, albeit reluctantly, as agents of Western feminist ideals. As a 
result, the secular forms of activism and feminism are now well-known aspects of the 
Palestinian case. However, a new critique of the rise of Islamist female political activism 
in recent years is yet to be fully developed.  
With this in mind, much of the work in feminist political studies of the Middle 
East is ethnographic in design, with a deliberate effort made by the researcher to profile 
the lives of Middle Eastern in their own social and political contexts. For example, 
Elizabeth Warnock Fernea’s groundbreaking feminist study of women in the Middle 
East, Guests of the Sheik (1965), uses feminist ethnography to study Iraqi women from 
the remote village of El Nahra in the mid-twentieth century.  As a cultural anthropologist, 
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Fearnea’s work inspired the realm of contemporary feminist research on the Middle East, 
which this project seeks to make its greatest contribution. Recently, ethnographic studies 
have begun to focus on women in religious movements, demonstrating the ongoing need 
to expand on research in this vein. For example, Sherine Hafez’s work The Terms of 
Empowerment: Islamic Women Activists in Egypt (2003), questions the applicability of 
the term “empowerment” as defined by Western liberal discourses to Islamic women's 
activism. Hafez follows this with An Islam of Her Own (2011), which looks to religion 
and secularism in Egyptian women’s movements. This work challenges binary 
representations of women in Islamic movements as secular/ religious, liberal/non liberal, 
rational/irrational. Focusing on the Shi’a community in Lebanon, Lara Deeb’s account of 
gender and public piety in Lebanon in An Enchanted Modern (2006) how women are at 
the heart of their community as “everyday Islamists”, where the realms of politics and 
piety are not at all discreet.   
Missing in the geographic variety of these ethnographies is an equally rigorous 
approach to women in the Palestinian Islamist movement. Although this project is 
decidedly not a full ethnography by design, it is inspired by two years of field research 
and firsthand accounts of Palestinian women in the pivotal rise of Islamist politics of the 
nationalist movement between 2007 and 2009. As such, the opening and concluding 
chapters of this project pull from the enormous amount of time spent living and working 
with Palestinian women in the West Bank and East Jerusalem. Interspersed throughout 
the chapters of this work are various references to field notes, which support this 
project’s contribution to the expanding genre of feminist scholarship pertaining 
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Palestinian women. Moreover, this project serves as an inspiration for my next project, 
which is a feminist ethnography of my own fieldwork and experiences in Palestine. 
Supported by fieldwork and the ethnographic insights this generated, each chapter 
returns to the theme that women in the Palestinian Islamist movement are not only 
searching for a sense of respect in their society, but also for a redefinition of status as 
women. This approach furthers Chandra Talpade Mohanty’s account of third world 
women in terms in their daily lives within the framework of underdevelopment, 
oppressive traditions, high illiteracy, rural and urban poverty, and religious fanaticism 
(Mohanty, Russo and Torres 1991, 3-4). It also adds to Valentine M. Moghadam’s work 
on the relationship between women and Islamic social and political conventions in the 
Muslim world, by bringing greater awareness to the merging aspects of politics and 
religious piety in women’s lives in the Palestinian case.   
Moving further into the evolving debate on women and Islam, this project builds 
upon Saba Mahmood’s groundbreaking account of women in the Egyptian piety 
movement, The Politics of Piety (2005). Mahmood deconstructs the distortions that 
common modes of liberalism and feminism still impose on the women of the Muslim 
world. In recent years, Islamist political movements and their emergence in the Islamic 
world have been broadly disparaged for their social conservatism and rejection of liberal 
values, particularly in the area of gender equality. As Mahmood indicates, Islamist 
movements have been disliked on this basis, which further reaffirms their status as 
“agents of a dangerous rationality”, especially where “women’s active support for socio-
religious movements that sustain principles of female subordination poses a dilemma for 
feminist analysts” (Mahmood 2005, 1, 5). Mahmood’s work demonstrates the continuing 
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need for Western feminists to question the basic assumptions that inform their 
understanding of feminism, and thus, their approach to understanding the lives and 
intentions of women living beyond the context of the Western world. Mahmood’s work 
shows how the adherence of women to the patriarchal norms of illiberal social 
movements demonstrates the limited scope of key assumptions within feminist theory 
concerning freedom, agency, authority and the female subject. It forms the baseline for 
this inquiry, insofar as it builds upon what is already known of female involvement in the 
Islamic political movement in the Palestinian case by seeing the agency of Islamic 
women, even in a movement that is antithetical to Western notions of gender-based social 
and political equality and rights.   
Each substantive chapter of this dissertation seeks to demonstrate the continued 
discussion of women’s rights and gender equality in the Palestinian case is now linked to 
the integral project of Islamization and the opportunity structures for women this 
movement has created in terms of political motherhood, opportunities for political 
representation, and forums for participation in violent and nonviolent modes of 
resistance. Pertinent to this approach is the work of Islah Jad (2009), whose most recent 
writing on Palestinian women demonstrates the need for a greater critique of the classic 
secularist stance that separates faith from politics. Importantly, Jad makes the observation 
that, “By ‘Islamising’ Arabs and ‘nationalising’ Islam, the Islamists have proved 
themselves successful in forging a brand of nationalism on which Islam was integral and 
constituted a mobilising force for the masses” (Jad 2009). Where newer studies of 
Palestinian women are concerned, Jad’s work creates a new space for continued scholarly 
contributions on the women in the Palestinian Islamist movement, specifically. In light of 
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this, this dissertation seeks to add to Jad’s commitment to a fuller account of non-secular 
women, by seeking to demonstrate their agency and voices in the Palestinian case. 
 
Conclusion 
This dissertation attempts to make several contributions to the areas of thought 
and the literature highlighted in this review. Broadly, the first is a synthesis of previous 
work that sees women’s lives and political choices in scholarly accounts of nationalism, 
social movements, identity politics and feminism. By examining the political 
opportunities afforded to women in their role as mothers, political representatives and 
participants in violent and nonviolent aspects of the struggle, this dissertation extends the 
existing literature in each domain. The result is a more nearly complete account for 
understanding of the often-overlooked relationship between women and the emergence of 
the Islamo-nationalist movement in Palestine in recent years.    
Broadly, this dissertation makes its greatest contribution to feminist political 
research in the Middle East. Here, the evidence of feminist elements in female 
participation in the Islamo-nationalist movement remains a widely contested issue due to 
the fact that this sort of female behavior can be easily interpreted as counter-intuitive to 
notions of gender equality and the promotion of women’s rights as human rights. In light 
of ongoing attempts made by the West to strengthen democracies throughout the Islamic 
world by focusing on the role that women play in the development and maintenance of 
their civil societies, a focus on female political agency in Islamist political movements is 
unlikely to fade in the years to come. With an eye to the development of civil society 
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through the furtherance of human rights and human security, greater attention will 
continue to focus on the modes of female citizenship in this design.    
The Palestinian struggle remains at the center of regional conflict in the Middle 
East. Since the establishment of Israel in 1948, Palestinians have been dispersed 
throughout the globe with the concentration of growing refugee populations in the greater 
Middle East. Consequently, the conflict itself is not limited to the boundaries of a single 
state; rather, it includes local, regional and international politics. However, a study of the 
political behavior of Palestinian women within the emergence of Palestinian Islamist 
political groups cannot begin in isolation from a critical discussion of the elements of 
Palestinian Islamization and its connection to the Islamic world. For this reason, the 
following chapter presents a review of the historic rise of the Islamist movement in 








THE ISLAMIZATION OF THE PALESTINIAN STRUGGLE  
 
In the minds of the unprepared or the unalert, Islam calls up images 
of bearded clerics and mad suicidal bombers, of unrelenting Iranian 
mullahs, fanatical fundamentalists, and kidnappers, remorseless 
turbaned crowds who chant hatred of the United States, “the great 
Satan,” and all its ways.  And behind the wave of “Islamic” images 
battering the United States’ unprotected shores stand the string of 
Palestinian terrorists—hijackers and masked killers of airport 
crowds, athletes, schoolchildren, handicapped and elderly innocents—
who in the unexamined popular mythology of our day are presumed 
to have begun the whole shameful and frightening thing.   
            
–Edward Said (1988) 
 
 In 1988, the late Edward Said observed that notions of contemporary terrorism are 
most often identified with Islam. Before the end of the first Palestinian intifada and the 
rise of Islamist politics in the Palestinian struggle thereafter, Said recognized the way in 
which the terms “Islam” and “terrorism” were commonly conflated. According to Said, 
the melding together of this terminology created the subliminal subtext of Western 
vernacular, causing the usage and understanding of the term “Islam” to develop into a 
notion “no less overused and vague than terrorism itself” (Said 1995, 342). Similarly, 
Said noted in his writings on the Palestinian people that while “a huge body of literature 
has grown up, most of it polemical, accusatory, denunciatory…for all the writing about 
them, Palestinians remain virtually unknown” (Said 1986, 4). It is for the sake of these 
issues that this chapter endeavors to explore Palestinian Islamism and the emergence of 
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Palestinian Islamist identity in context and detail. Inherent to the project as a whole is an 
exploration of the way in which the Islamization of the Palestinian struggle affects 
Palestinian women’s political participation and identity as citizens. However, prior to 
focusing on the specificity of Palestinian female citizenship and the relationship between 
women and the Islamist political agenda, it is pertinent to understand the historical basis 
and evolution of Palestinian Islamism first.  
  
Islamism Defined 
  Broadly, the adherents of “political Islam” or “Islamism” ascribe to an 
understanding of Islam as a theological body of faith with the ability to establish and 
implement social and political order in the contemporary Muslim world. However, this 
basic understanding of Islamism does little to explain the complexities and political 
activity undertaken in the name of Islam in the context of Palestine. Here, the political 
history of Palestine, in addition to the confluence of religion and politics (in this case, in 
the form of Palestinian Islamism) is far more complex than a generic approach to 
Islamism that fails to account for the circumstances from which this new brand of 
politics popularly emerged. Where the historical context is pertinent to understanding 
Islamism more generally, it would be remiss in studying the case of Islamism in 
Palestine to fail to underscore the significance of 20th century statelessness, military 
occupation and the neocolonial exploitation of the state of Israel vis-à-vis the Palestinian 
people as key elements in the advent of Islamism in the Palestinian story.   
These very specific political circumstances play a large role in the formation of 
the modern Palestinian Islamist movement today as opposed to Islamist movements 
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elsewhere. The ideas of the Islamic movement in Palestine reflect the social, economic, 
religious and political aspects of the Palestinian historical experience and modern-day 
reality. As such, the rise of Islamist groups in the West Bank and Gaza Strip constitutes 
not only a new wave of Islamic life in the region, but also a new, formidable and 
unprecedented challenge to the Palestinian national movement internally. As Beverly 
Milton-Edwards states, “Palestinian Islamists are calling for an end to the Israeli 
occupation, the creation of an Islamic state system, for national leaders to represent all 
Palestinians and for a social order that permits the free practice of religion and respects 
the religious rights of the majority population” (B. Milton-Edwards 1996, 3-4). Relying 
on Denoeux’s terminology, and also taking into account Lybarger’s extensive 
ethnographic research on the question of identity and religion in Palestine, I use terms,  
“Islamist,” “Islamism,” and “Islamo-nationalist movement” here to describe the 
spectrum of groups committed to the social and political integration of Islam as a 
framework for Palestinian national aspirations (Denoeux 2002, Lybarger 2007).  
Despite that fact that a great deal of the literature on political Islam and Islamism 
refers to these sorts of political movements as “fundamentalist”, I am avoiding the use of 
this term in this project. Drawing from Milton-Edwards’ work on Islamic politics in 
Palestine, my objective is based on the observation that terms, “fundamentalist” or 
“fundamentalism”, are often pejoratively tainted or distorted in their usage. As Milton-
Edwards states, these terms fail to characterize those who are truly ‘fundamentalist’ from 
the groups and organizations that promote or purvey an Islamic ideology that is based on 
certain political objectives, strategies, and political phenomenon (Milton-Edwards 1999, 
3). Citing Sami Zubaida and Yousef Choueiri, Milton-Edwards also notes that Islamic 
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fundamentalism has “become a catch-phrase which is supposed to define and describe 
all active involvement of Muslims in politics” (B. Milton-Edwards 1999, 3).4 Esposito 
notes that the use of the term is both controversial and has pejorative implications, but 
adds, “there is general recognition that activist movements of Mulsim revival are 
increasingly important and reference must be made to them” (Esposito 1995, 32)  
Among the many terms used for this purpose, Esposito also suggests “Islamism, 
integrism, neo-normative Islam, neo-traditional Islam, Islamic revivalism, and Islamic 
nativism” (Esposito 1995, 32). Also important to the nationalist debate from which the 
Palestinian Islamists have emerged is the difference between Islamist and Islamic. For 
example, drawing on central symbols, discourses and narratives specific to the Islamic 
religion, the Islamist outlook—as a specific type of religious-nationalist belief and 
political behavior—is different from those for whom Islam is a personal religious 
orientation (Lybarger 2007, 3). Not taken for granted in this is the fact that Palestinian 
Islamism fits into the broader spectrum of Islamist phenomena, while also having its 
own unique distinctions as well (Esposito 1995, 32-34, 250-251).   
 
Islamist Politics in the Muslim World 
It is beyond the scope of this dissertation to produce a comparative study of 
Palestinian Islamism to Islamist movements elsewhere. Nevertheless, it would be remiss 
not to briefly explicate the historical rise of political Islam and the significance of 
Palestine to Islamist movements in the greater Muslim world.   
                                                 
4 Italics are mine. 
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Like a study of women in any country or context, Islamism itself is not a 
monolith. Spanning the Middle East, North Africa, Central Europe and Asia, the modes 
of Islamist expression are fundamentally tied to time and place. In the Palestinian case, 
colonization, the dispersal of people and families, military occupation and neocolonial 
exploitation are each a part of the political and ideological elements of Palestinian 
Islamism. Similarly yet also distinctly, Islamist movements elsewhere are also a result of 
the clash of emergent social and political circumstances (Esposito 1995, 250-254). For 
example, Zubaida (2004) describes the earliest instantiation of the clash of Islam versus 
Christendom in the Ottoman, Persian and Indian worlds against the European powers in 
the nineteenth century as an example of politics becoming reduced to religious 
communitarianism (Zubaida 2004, 408). Using the case of Egypt, Zubaida cites Lufti al-
Sayid who saw the unity of Egypt’s Muslims as a protective stance against European 
hegemony. Of course, this use of religious faith as a tool for social and political 
solidarity at moments of instability is not a tool used by Islamists alone. Noting the 
history of nationalist movements in the Muslim world, Zubaida observes that Arab 
nationalists have often considered Islam as the most valuable element in the heritage of 
the Arab nation (Zubaida 2004, 407). Before the confrontation between Christian Europe 
and the Islamic realms of influence, religion was a centuries old, defining factor for local 
solidarities and conflicts. However, the rise of religious communalism since the 
nineteenth century has become a more generalized model of international relations 
(Zubaida 2004, 408). 
In sociological terms, the emergence of twentieth century Islamism is a “product 
of a religious crisis in authority, the failures of authoritarian nationalist governments, 
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and the socio-economic divisions that have been exacerbated by neo-liberal 
globalization” (Turner 2003, 140). It is argued that the development of Islamism stems 
from the frustrations of a specific social stratum of unpaid civil servants, overworked 
teachers, underemployed engineers and marginalized university educators, whose 
interests were not well served by the secular nationalism of Nasser, Muhammad Reza 
Shah, Suharto or Saddam Hussein (Turner 2003, 140). Additionally included in this wide 
sociological swath of Islamists is the fact that many nationalist-turned-Islamists are the 
product of a general disenchantment with the neoliberal ‘open-door’ policies of Anwar 
Saddat in Egypt, or Chadli Benjedid in Algeria (Turner 2003, 140). 
The label “Islamism” is a relatively recent term coined in the 1970s to describe 
the political ideology that gained ground after the death of pan-Arab dreams on the 
battlefields of the 1967 war between Israel and the neighboring states of Egypt, Jordan 
and Syria. As the Israelis celebrated their swift victory in the 1967 war, Islamist ideas 
infused the ideological vacuum left behind by the failure of pan-Arab aspirations. Thus, 
the more recent use of this term Islamism is used to refer to the “rise of movements and 
ideologies drawing on Islamic referents—terms, symbols and events taken from the 
Islamic tradition—in order to articulate a distinctly political agenda” (Denoeux 2002, 
61). Inherent to this Islamist ideology was a central reference to Islamic themes of 
collective injustice and equality. These themes where then mobilized against secular 
regimes perceived to be corrupt, bankrupt and authoritarian and often supported by the 
West in the Cold War confrontation with the Soviet empire (Turner 2003, 141).  
Putting Islamist ideology into greater historical context, Zubaida (2001) contrasts 
the current Islamist model with previous political models of Islamic history, thereby 
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situating modern Islamist movements as emergent with nationalist movements of the 
twentieth century. Notably, the “dynastic, patrimonial state (if it can be called a “state” 
at all, that being a Western concept for a different phenomenon), and the all-inclusive 
umma, which knows no territorial ‘national’ boundaries, but operates with the concept of 
dar-ul-Islam, (the house of Islam), which distinguishes the domains of Islam from those 
of the infidels” (Zubaida 2001, 129-130). To this, Zubaida adds that the new 
instantiation of modern political Islam is “not the product of a historical continuity with 
an essential Islam preserved in the hearts and minds of the people as ‘popular culture’, 
but quite the contrary, a modern ideological construction relating to current conjectures 
of nation state and international politics” (Zubaida 2001, 137). Thus, as the popular draw 
for secular ideologies declined in the Muslim world in response to the events of 1967 
and their aftermath, so came the claim that Islam was the “sole organic culture existing 
in the Arab world and the only cultural tradition whose symbols and values substantiate 
and give meaning to collective action” (Mishal and Sela 2000, 4). Like any other 
political project, an Islamist project provides “a comprehensive critique of the existing 
order, challenges it and aims to change it” (Denoeux 2002, 61). Yet, the most important 
aspect of Islamism is that it is a rational form of political instrumentalization of the 
religion of Islam used by individuals, groups and organizations in the pursuit of specific 
political objectives.  
However, no two “Islamisms” are alike because they are so largely determined 
by the context within which they operate. As Ayoob states: 
What works in Egypt will not work in Indonesia.  What works in Iran will 
not work in Turkey. Anyone familiar with the diversity of the Muslim 
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world—its socioeconomic characteristics, cultures, political systems, and 
trajectories of intellectual development—is bound to realize that the 
political manifestations of Islam, like the practice of Islam itself, are to a 
great extent context specific, the result of interpenetration of religious 
precepts and local culture, including political culture (Ayoob 2008, 15). 
 
Similarly, Denoeux illustrates this point in offering a descriptive distinction between 
certain “types” of Islamists. He writes that the “typical” Taliban Islamist—a “poor, 
largely uneducated Pashtun of peasant origin, born in a Pakistani refugee camp and with 
extremely limited horizons” is conspicuously different that the “typical” jihadist Salafi-
Arab who is “rather cosmopolitan, well-traveled and often well-educated” (Denoeux 
2002, 71). Adding another layer to these comparisons, what fuels Islamist groups and 
prompts individuals to join them differs greatly from one country and context to another.   
This is exemplified in the case of Palestinian Islamists versus Islamists elsewhere, where 
“those who have drifted into these movements primarily because of their aversion to 
Western forms of modernity may have little in common with Palestinians driven into 
Hamas cells because of their hatred of Israel, the occupation of Palestinian land, and the 
accumulated feelings of anger and humiliation crated by Israeli policies in the West Bank 
and Gaza” (Denoeux 2002, 68). 
As a broad spectrum of phenomena, Islamism and Islamist thought today refers 
to a hybrid of ideologies that borrow from and mix Islamic history, local traditions and 
ideas in a distinctly modern way. As previously mentioned, what is common to all forms 
of Islamism is what Denoeux describes as a form of instrumentalization of Islam by 
individuals, groups and organizations that pursue political objectives. Common to all 
Islamisms is that Islamist thought creates a political response to today’s societal 
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challenges by imagining a future, the foundations for which rest upon re-appropriated, 
reinvented concepts borrowed from Islamic tradition (Denoeux 2002, 61). Similarly, 
Mishal and Sela contend that political Islam in our time represents “an effort by social 
and political revisionist groups to articulate their grievances and redefine the national 
agenda accordingly” (Mishal and Sela 2000, 1).   
In recent years, however, Islamist movements have been frequently portrayed as 
a mass movement of enraged men (and their veiled and “victimized” women) intent on 
demonizing the West and dismantling Western influence in the Arab world. With this, 
Islamism is popularly understood as an anti-secular, and thus, “anti-modern” trend that 
only advocates a return to an age where, as Lybarger states, “social and political order 
based on despotic rule and barbarian practices” (Lybarger 2007, 2). Moreover, Zubaida 
notes that Muslim youth have increasingly “fallen for the idea that Arab and Middle 
Eastern cultures have always been dominated by religion, and that the ideas and attitudes 
associated with secular cosmopolitanism are completely alien, a corrosive import from 
the west” (Zubaida 2005). These interpretations, however, fail to account for the 
distinctly modern nature of the Islamist response, the popularity of Islamist groups, or 
the pragmatic orientations of Islamist political factions in local settings.5  Ultimately, 
dismissing Islamism as inherently backward or debased fails to produce an account of 
the actual migration of voting citizens (including women) from secular-nationalist 
                                                 
5 In his 2005 article for The New Humanist, Zubaida contrasts the “narrow, anachronistic, and putatively 
‘pure’ aspect of modern Islamist movements as alien to and bearing little resemblance to the historically 
“cosmopolitan” precedent of the Ottoman Empire, which was composed of broad mix ethnic groups and 
religions in a relatively peaceful and stable co-existence. He also cites Cairo as a center of Islamic 
cosmopolitanism in the first half of the twentieth century—as a “center of an unprecedented flourishing of 
intellectual and artistic movements.”  To this Zubaida adds, “In the first half of the 20th century a 
generation of outward-looking intellectual Muslim reformers was replaced by a generation of populist 
leaders interested in mass mobilisation, with a much more puritanical and nativist notion of Islam, inspired 
most notably by Hassan al-Banna’s Muslim Brotherhood.” 
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factions to Islamist political parties in recent years, in the Palestinian context and 
beyond. 
Mentioned earlier, the rise of Islamism was witnessed in the contexts of 
international conflicts in the 1980s and the ultimate collapse of the Soviet Union, which 
left another ideological vacuum for Islamists to fill. Following the success of the 1979 
Iranian Revolution led by Ayatollah Khomeini, the next decade was characterized by a 
struggle between Khomeini’s Shi’ite regime in Iran and the conservative Sunni 
monarchy in Saudi Arabia. Iran attempted to export its revolution abroad, while Saudi 
Arabia internally struggled to constrain a new wave of Islamist fervor coming from tens 
of thousands of young, middle-class urbanites led by preachers, teachers and students, 
mostly from religious universities (Dekmejian 1994, 629). Elsewhere, conservative 
governments in “Egypt, Pakistan, the Persian Gulf and Malaysia sought to encourage 
Muslim radicals in their struggles against communism and to contain Islamism through 
co-optation and concessions, primarily over the role of religious law (the Shar’ia)  
(Turner 2003, 141). By 1991, Islamist political success arrived in Algeria when the 
Front Islamique de Salut enjoyed a decisive democratic victory in the first free elections 
since independence from France. Prior to this, although many would argue that the peak 
of Islamism arrived with the Iranian Revolution in 1979, Turner contends that the 
demonstration of far-reaching political success for Islamism came in 1989 during the 
Palestinian intifada, a moment which marked the start of a real struggle for power 
between the Palestinian Liberation Organization and the newly formed Hamas (Turner 
2003, 141).  
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In his ‘Afterword’ to The War for Palestine: Rewriting the History of 1948, 
Edward Said writes, “For Palestinians, a vast collective feeling of injustice continues to 
hang over our lives with undiminished weight” (Said, Afterword 2001, 249). This 
feeling of collective injustice is not confined to the Palestinian people alone, but also felt 
by fellow Muslims—both Islamist and not—throughout the Islamic world. This by-
proxy sentiment for Palestine is buttressed by the fact that third most important mosque 
to the Islamic faith is located in Jerusalem. The Al-Aqsa Mosque and the Dome of the 
Rock are a central focus of all Muslims, and so a concern for Jerusalem as a holy center 
is not exclusive to the Palestinians alone. It is due to the widespread focus on the 
significance of Jerusalem to Islam that Tamimi writes that Muslim scholars have widely 
expressed their opposition to “any recognition of the legitimacy of the creation of a 
Jewish state in Palestine” (Tamimi 2007, 157). Moreover, Muslim scholars and jurists 
throughout the Islamic world have “issued numerous fatwas, or religious edicts, 
declaring null and void any agreement that legitimized the occupation of any part of 
Palestine” (Tamimi 2007, 157). Much of the defense of Muslim Palestine is manifested 
in hatred of Israeli Jewish Zionists and, thus, the modern existence of Israel (Ma'oz 
2010). This hatred is elaborated in speeches, writings, in schoolbooks, mass media and 
horrific terrorist actions. Separately and stemming from their independent political 
motivations, Iran’s current president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, former Iraqi president 
Saddam Hussein, former Al Qaeda ringleader Osama Bin Laden and the leaders of 
Hezbollah, have nevertheless used the rhetorical tool of calling for the destruction of 
Israel in the name of protecting and preserving the holy sites of Islam.   
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Added to this is the fact that Islamists propagate the basic message that the 
fundamental ills of the Muslim society are due to a deviation from the teachings and 
practices of Islam due to the fact that Muslim people around the world—and, most 
especially in Palestine—are occupied and/or ruled by outsiders (or “infidels”) of the 
Islamic faith. In order to establish a true Muslim society, Islamists leaders generally 
advocate the return to Islamic principles can be performed in a political sense through a 
struggle against the specific oppressors and enemies of Islam, otherwise known as 
jihad.6 In light of the failures of secular pan-Arabism and the seeming powerlessness in 
the face of continued Israeli occupation of the lands of historic Palestine, the Islamist 
message particularly reverberates. For example, Ayatollah Khomeini entreated Shi’ite 
Muslims to join the Islamic Revolution, but his appeal extended to Sunnis as well.  
Inasmuch as Khomeini’s cry was not only for Shi’ism, but also for the whole of Islam, 
his appeal extended to the Sunni masses and intellectuals in Palestine. Added to this was 
Khomeini’s invention of the annual Iranian holiday that takes place on the last Friday of 
Ramadan, “Quds Day” (officially known as “International Al Quds Day”) was a way of 
demonstrating pan-Muslim solidarity with the Palestinian people in opposition to Israeli 
Zionism and to Muslim claims on Jerusalem.7 The targets of Khomeini’s attacks 
included the world’s great powers, Zionism and politically corrupt Arab dynasties. As 
Palestinian historian Walid Khalidi writes, Khomeini’s “constant reference to the 
liberation of Jerusalem is as effective as it is deliberate” (Khalidi 1988, 776).  
                                                 
6 This is captured in Qutb’s Milestones (2007), in which he writes of jihad (“jihaad”) as a defense of the 
“true character of Islam”, which he defines as “a universal proclamation of the freedom of man from 
servitude to other men, the establishment of the sovereignty of God and His Lordship throughout the world, 
the end of man’s arrogance and selfishness, and the implementation of the rule of the Divine Shari’ah in 
human affairs” (Qtub 2007, 39).  
7 Al-Quds (literally translated as “The Holy”) is the Arabic and Islamic name for Jerusalem. 
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The sentiment is amplified by Sheikh Yusuf al-Qaradawi, one of the most 
authoritative Islamic scholars of the present time, who explains, “Palestine is an Islamic 
land that cannot be forfeited voluntarily” (Tamimi 2007, 157). This fact was notably 
illustrated by Al Qaeda leader, Osama Bin Laden, who specifically cited aggression 
against Muslims in Palestine in his list of reasons for Al Qaeda’s targeted terrorist 
attacks against the United States. In his 2002 “Letter to America”, which was originally 
posted in Arabic on Islamist websites, Bin Laden reportedly says to America: 
Why are we fighting and opposing you? The answer is very simple: You 
attacked us in Palestine: Palestine, which has sunk under military 
oppression for more than 80 years.  The British handed over Palestine, 
with your help and with your support, to the Jews, who have occupied it 
for more than 50 years: years overflowing with oppression, tyranny, 
crimes, killing, expulsion, destruction and devastation.  The creation and 
continuation of Israel is one of the greatest crimes, and you are the leaders 
of the criminals…The creation of Israel is a crime which must be erased. 
Each and every person whose hands have become polluted in the 
contribution towards this crime must pay its price and pay for it heavily 
[…] (Bin Laden 2007, 265).8  
 
Also beyond the borders of Palestine, another example of deep antipathy toward Israel on 
behalf of the Palestinian people lies in the Libyan leader Colonel Muammar al-Qaddafi, 
who reportedly spent his youth suffused with “anger at the perceived injustices suffered 
by the Palestinians” (Khalidi 1988, 774). With this, it is no coincidence that Khalidi 
wrote in 1988: “The rise of Middle Eastern radicalism, for example, is not altogether 
                                                 
8 See also Osama Bin Laden, Al Qaeda 2006 Yearbook: 2006 Messages from Al-Qaeda Leadership, ed. 
Laura Mansfield (N.L.: TLG Publications, 2007). 
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unconnected with the continued non-resolution of the Palestine problem” (Khalidi 1988, 
774). 
Across various Islamist contexts, the struggle for the liberation of Palestine has 
been the central and single most important issue sustaining political Islam in the late 
twentieth century until today. As Meir Litvak’s research indicates, a more radical Islamist 
reading of the Qu’ran leads some to a certain understanding of history which points to the 
idea that “Palestine is the focus of the religio-historical confrontation between the 
Muslims and their eternal enemies, the Jews” (Litvak 2003). According to this 
interpretation, the confrontation between Islam and the West began with Napoleon’s 
invasion of Egypt in 1798 and climaxed with the disintegration of the Ottoman Empire in 
1918, the symbol of Muslim unity (Litvak 2003). Litvak argues that this approach centers 
on the idea that “Palestine was the focus of Western imperialist designs and was meant to 
serve as a launch pad to take over other Muslim territories” (Litvak 2003). More than any 
other, the Palestinian problem resonates deeply and widely with Arab and Muslim 
peoples.9 
Related to Islamist sentiments concerning the land of Palestine is the concern that 
the irresolution of the Palestinian problem is derivative of nearly all of the conflicts in 
the region since 1948. As Schlomo Ben-Ami writes, “One does not have to second the 
cynical discourse of the Bin-Ladens and the Saddam Husseins, and of the many other 
much more benign figures throughout the region according to whom all the ills of the 
Arab world stem from Israel’s occupation of the West Bank” (Ben-Ami 2006, 292).  
                                                 
9 Roy (2002) cites a survey by journalist David Hirst, in which nearly 60 percent of the people of Saudi 
Arabia, Kuwait and the Gulf Emirates and Lebanon regard Palestine as the “single most important issue for 
them personally.  This figure increases in the Egyptian population to 79 percent. 
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Writing in 1985, Khalidi attributes all of the Arab-Israeli wars of the previous three 
decades to the irresolution of the Palestinian problem. Eerily foreshadowing the 
combination of current nuclear pursuits and virulent anti-Semitism of Iranian regime 
under Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, Khalidi wrote in 1985, “If some Arab regimes in one 
way or another go nuclear, one of their most powerful incentives (and alibis) will have 
been the non-resolution of the Palestine problem. Already, more than one nuclear alert 
has occurred in connection with an Arab-Israeli crisis” (Khalidi 1985, 37). Even 
Palestinian leader Yasser Arafat said in 1974 when he addressed the leaders of the Arab 
world at the Arab Summit in Morocco: “Palestine is the cement that holds the Arab 
world together, or it is the explosive that blows it apart” (Arafat 1974). 
The demonstration of a longstanding and unwavering commitment to the 
liberation of Palestine is employed as a rhetorical device by many Islamists and secular 
Muslim leaders around the world to promote the idea of universal Muslim solidarity. As 
Litvak notes, “Inasmuch as the Jewish presence in Palestine symbolizes Muslim 
inferiority in the modern age, commitment to Palestine cannot be framed in the narrow 
confines of Palestinian nationalism” (Litvak 2003). Thus, even from afar, the Islamist 
strategy of liberating Palestine is infused with the goal of a pan-Islamic revival.  
Important to note, however, is that the general underlying motive of Islamist’s alliance 
with the Palestinian cause is more political than religious. Denoeux writes, “Politics lies 
at the heart of Islamism, which ultimately has far more to do with power than with 
religion” (Denoeux 2002, 63). To this, Denoeux adds that Islam is more of a “blueprint” 
than a “faith” for Islamists, and so, “Islamist discourse is to a large extent a political 
discourse in religious garb” (Denoeux 2002, 63). By invoking concepts drawn from the 
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past of Islamic society, Islamists have effectively become “social and political activists 
intent on building a new type of society” (Denoeux 2002, 63). Ultimately, the aim of 
Islamists is to exercise political power, and although their vision of the future is 
reminiscent of a mostly mythical and invented past, they are modern and forward-
looking in intent, and their power lay in grassroots action (Denoeux 2002, 63-65). 
 
Palestinian Islamism 
While the strong revisionist opposition to the goals and means of the secular 
Palestinian nationalist movement can be viewed more broadly as typical of the 
widespread phenomenon of political Islam in our time, Palestinian Islamism is also an 
exception to the norm. Put into context, Palestinian Islamism grew out of a reaction to the 
type of multi-confessional, secular nationalism of the PLO that popularly constituted the 
Palestinian national movement from 1967 to the mid-1990s, and its perceived failure to 
adequately represent the will of the Palestinian people. As such, Palestinian Islamism is 
committed to its own particular banner of national liberation in direct competition with 
the secular-nationalist inclinations of the PLO. Until the more recent rise of Islamist 
groups in the West Bank and Gaza Strip in the late 1980s and early 1990s, the secular 
Palestinian nationalist movement embraced the Islamic orientation of the native 
Palestinian constituency, allowing the same symbols, discourses and narratives of Islamic 
faith to exist alongside, or secularly integrated within the framework of a multi-
confessional (mainly Muslim and Christian) secular nationalism (Lybarger 2007, 69-72). 
This is best exemplified in Arafat’s speeches and PLO-UNLU statements issued to the 
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Palestinian people, which were laced with Islamic references.10 The symbolic use of 
Islam is also documented in the 1988 Proclamation of the Palestinian State, which, while 
recognizing that Palestine is the land of three monotheistic faiths, begins and ends with 
the Qu’ranic reference, “In the name of God, the Compassionate, the Merciful” 
(Lockman and Beinin 1989, 395-399).    
More recently, adding to the decades long struggle for national self-
determination vis-à-vis Israel, the most contentious issue affecting the national struggle 
from within Palestinian society lies in the formidable political challenge that the 
Palestinian Islamists pose to the secular-nationalist groups primarily anchored by Fatah, 
and the disunity and internal instability this creates between opposing viewpoints and 
leaderships. To date, Palestinian Islamists have adopted the overriding message of Islam 
as central to the means and ends of this political movement. They have adroitly co-opted 
and re-appropriated the secular Islamic idiom of Palestinian nationalism for popular 
consumption. Through the development of parallel symbols, narratives and institutions 
to the secular model for nation building, the Palestinian Islamist have successfully 
created a counter model for the hope of Palestinian nationhood.   
Milton-Edwards writes that since Islamism is not a monolith, Palestinian Islamist 
groups are “not the reincarnation of the Khomeini-style rhetoric of the early 1980s, nor 
are they like the Wahhabi fundamentalists of Arabia, nor do they mirror the activities of 
the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt” (Milton-Edwards 1996, 4). Against this claim, 
however, Palestinian Islamism is also not an isolated phenomenon. While the means and 
ends of the Palestinian Islamists may not precisely mirror that of Islamists elsewhere, the 
                                                 
10 For communiqus issued by the Palestinian National Council see Laqueur and Rubin (2008) and 
Lockman and Beinin (1989). 
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structures and ethos of Palestinian Islamism are historically rooted in Islamist 
movements beyond the boundaries of historic Palestine. Specifically, the political 
ancestry of Palestinian Islamism today can be traced to the Muslim Brotherhood as it 
took form in Egypt in the 1920s and spread to the wider Arab and Muslim world 
(Lybarger 2007, 75). The movement was founded by Hassan al-Banna, who, in life 
charismatically projected the image of a “living manifestation of the spirit of the shari’a” 
(Lybarger 2007, 76). As Egypt’s leadership struggled with issues of colonialism, public 
health, social inequalities and secular conceptions of Arab nationalism, Banna offered an 
“up-to-date” nationalistic Islam that was tailor-made for the emerging proletariat and 
lower-middle-class groups. Emphasizing social and political concerns that appealed to a 
variety of constituencies, Banna’s appeal was widely felt across the layers of Egyptian 
society. Banna’s Islamist vision consisted of two equally important goals: First, the re-
Islamization of Egyptian society, which would liberate Egypt, and second, liberating the 
Muslim world more broadly from colonial rule (Gunning 2009, 26). Through his 
assassination in 1949, Banna became a symbol of militant jihad, as “the first Islamist 
martyr to fall at the hands of a repressive, seemingly apostate Muslim government” in 
Egypt (Lybarger 2007, 76).   
The second seminal figure of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt was Sayyid Qutb, 
described by John Calvert as “the influential Egyptian ideologue of Islamism” (Calvert 
2010, 1). Qutb joined the Muslim Brotherhood in the 1940s in his extensive writings 
about the downfalls of Egyptian society. According to Qutb, Egyptian society had 
regressed to the pre-Islamic condition of jahiliyya—a state of ignorance, lawlessness and 
polytheistic chaos—for adopting Western forms of secularization and modernization.  
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Qutb introduced the concept of purification and struggle, which inspired both radical and 
gradualist Islamists in the decades to come. He attained martyr status when Nasser 
ordered his execution in 1966. Revivalist in design, Qutb’s writings linked the renewal 
of Islam to the overall Islamization of society through preaching and education. 
Importantly, he suggested that a believer should “withdraw to separated communities of 
the faithful, purify his consciousness of foreign values, and then reengage society 
through missionary outreach and, when the moment was right, join in outright 
revolution” (Lybarger 2007, 77). According to Calvert, Qutb had no illusions as to the 
difficulty of the task ahead. Noting that the struggle would be long and difficult, Qutb 
wrote that, “the vanguard would have to deal with Islam’s traditional Christian and 
Jewish enemies, but also the legions of deceivers and hypocrites from within, the faux 
Muslims who fed from the troughs of Western-inspired barbarism” (Calvert 2010, 2).  
Qutb’s emphasis on gradualism— study and spiritual growth as a way of leading social 
and political change against the tide of an otherwise inimical world of enemies—later 
became a central element of Hamas’ social and political vision for Palestine.11    
The combination of Banna and Qutb’s writings (along with the writings of 
Pakistani intellectual Abu al-Ala al-Mawdudi) formed the core themes of Sunni Islamist 
ideology and practice later incorporated into Palestinian Islamism (Lybarger 2007, 77).  
Prioritizing the liberation of the Palestinian nation through Islamist ideology is the 
central component of contemporary Palestinian Islamism. Even today, Qutb’s ideas, 
commentaries and political tracts “suffuse Palestinian Islamist orientations”(Lybarger 
2007, 80), and Banna’s emphasis that the revival of Islam should be dependent on 
                                                 
11 For more on the significance of Qutb to the rise of Islamist movements, see Calvert (2010). 
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preaching and education and the Islamization of society is especially important to 
Palestinian Islamist activists (Milton-Edwards 1996, 123). Initially, these ideals were 
embraced by the Gazan revivalist leader of the Muslim Brotherhood, Sheikh Ahmad 
Yassin, who Milton-Edwards depicts as leading a generation of young activists into the 
heart of Gazan society and later into the realm of politics (Milton-Edwards 1996, 98).  
Undertaking the principles of the Muslim Brotherhood, Yassin became a founding leader 
of Hamas in his quest to bring Islam to the secularized youth of Gaza.12 He encouraged 
his followers to be “exemplary Muslims” by reading the Quran, praying five times daily 
and observing Ramadan. Recalling Qutb in Egypt, Yassin was a reformist who called for 
a gradual approach of Islamist politics. In this, he sought to encourage a return to Islam 
within society first before addressing wider political issues facing the Palestinian people 
(Milton-Edwards 1996, 99). While Yassin and his colleagues maintained a close 
association with the Muslim Brotherhood of Egypt and saw their activities in Palestine 
as an extension of the Muslim Brotherhood’s work, it is also roundly recognized that 
Yassin was the creator of the new Islamic movement in the Palestinian Territories 
(Milton-Edwards 1996, 100, 123). 
Although practically focused on education, social activities and Islamic learning, 
Yassin simultaneously kept a patient and pragmatic eye on politics. His pragmatism 
stemmed from an overarching wariness of the power struggle between the Egyptian 
                                                 
12 Led by Sheikh Ahmed Yassin, Hamas emerged from the Mujama movement, an offshoot of the Muslim 
Brotherhood in Gaza. By the start of the first intifada in 1987, Mujama had already mounted an Islamist 
challenge to the secular political monopoly of the PLO. Emerging with the same leadership of Mujama, 
Hamas was established in February 1988. The Hamas covenant describes itself ‘as a wing of the Muslim 
Brotherhood in Palestine’. Milton-Edwards argues, “It was clear from the outset that Hamas would find it 
hard to ignore its legacy and links with Mujama, and some nationalists have argued that the new 
organization was in fact just the old groups in a different guise”. See Milton-Edwards (2006, 146-7) and 
Gunning (2009). 
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Muslim Brotherhood and Egypt’s President, Gamal Nasser. Nasser was particularly 
hostile to the inclinations of autonomous Palestinian resistance groups under his watch 
in Gaza, which caused Yassin to focus on Islamic education in Gaza rather than violent 
or more direct military resistance to either Israel or Egyptian rule at the time. Yassin was 
once quoted as saying, “We have to be patient because Islam will spread sooner or later 
and will have control all over the world. Patience will shorten the journey of Islam” 
(Qutb, interview cited in Milton-Edwards 1996, 147). 
Yet, in spite of his professed patience, Yassin’s leadership of Hamas quickly 
added a new dimension to Palestinian politics as Hamas attracted (and rapidly amassed) 
a large following in Gaza and the West Bank the late 1980s. Opposed to the long-
standing political hegemony of the umbrella of secular nationalist organizations under 
the PLO, Hamas generated a unique appeal among the Palestinian population. In 
particular, young men “joined up in droves, many of them already Islamic activists, 
others disaffected supporters of PLO factions” (Milton-Edwards 1996, 147). As the 
second and third generation of Palestinian refugees, the new recruits and supporters of 
Hamas “saw an opportunity for self-identity and esteem vis-à-vis the rest of society 
through their association with this religious organization which put a mark of holiness on 
them” (Milton-Edwards 1996, 147). In addition to drawing considerable support from 
the extant refugee population, Hamas also gained popularity among non-refugee groups 
in the middle class and elite, as well as members from the far left groups of the Popular 
Front and Communist party, who migrated to the Islamist groups (Lybarger 2007).  
Hamas inevitably grew to become the greatest political challenge to secular Palestinian 
nationalism today, but it was not the only Islamist group in the Palestinian political 
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milieu with popular support and an agenda to challenge the PLO while confronting 
Israel. Formed in 1981 as another off shoot of the Muslim Brotherhood, al-Jihad al-
Islami or Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ)13 also politicized the struggle for Palestinian 
national identity and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Known as the “most radical terrorist 
organization operating in the Palestinian arena” (Litvak 2003), leaders of PIJ have 
routinely parted with other Islamist and secular groups alike over the political aspects of 
the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Crucial to this approach was PIJ’s departure from the 
mainstream Islamic approach taken by Yassin, which adhered to the notion that Islamic 
society must return to and revitalize Islam from within before turning outward and 
facing Israel (Litvak 2003). PIJ adopted a markedly less patient political stance of the 
mainstream Islamists by taking on a radical activist bent in order to achieve their 
political goals.   
As Milton-Edwards writes of the PIJ, “This independent, Islamist movement 
views itself as a vanguard for Islam in a battle to wrest control of Islamic land back from 
the Jewish people” (Milton-Edwards 1996, 116). Where the end objective of PIJ lay in 
liberation of the land and people of occupied Palestine, the means for achieving this 
objective rested in armed military struggle. Like Hamas, PIJ challenged the secular 
nationalist sentiments of the Palestinian struggle, appropriated them in Islamist 
terminology and used this to call for the liberation of Palestine and the Palestinian 
people. Indeed, the preeminent feature of PIJ’s call for liberation was the “end to Israeli 
                                                 
13 Milton-Edwards’ (1996, 116-121) extensive research on Palestinian Islamism cites four groups that 
emerged in the  early 1980s under the name of Palestinian Islamic Jihad.  They are: 1) Islamic Jihad 
(Shaqaqi-Auda faction, 2) Islamic Jihad Jerusalem Brigade, 3) Islamic Jihad Battalions, and 4) Islamic 
Jihad Palestine (Amar faction). Lybarger (2007, 83) notes that the PIJ was represented by the integration of 
these four factions as they broke away from the Muslim Brotherhood and also the Fatah movement. 
Esposito (1995, 374) adds that the organization was not revealed to the public until 1987. 
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occupation as a prerequisite for the transformation of society and Islamic ascendency” 
(Milton-Edwards 1996, 117). As Esposito writes of the PIJ, “For the movement, the 
struggle against Israel does not revolve around the question of the rightful ownership of 
the land, but over the religio-political duty of Muslims to fend off religious enemies” 
(Esposito 1995, 374). Unlike the deliberate emphasis on education and Islamic 
scholarship espoused by the leadership of Hamas, however, those of PIJ saw the 
gradualism of the Hamas approach as fundamentally distracting from the struggle for 
Palestine (Milton-Edwards 1996, 118). These dissatisfied members of the mainstream 
Islamic movement resented the political and military passivity of the Muslim 
Brotherhood (Esposito 1995, 374).14 Instead, the PIJ believed that “the creation of an 
Islamic state can only be attained as a result of armed confrontation with Israel” (Roy 
1991, 64).   
Indeed, the central difference between PIJ and the mainstream Islamist 
approaches of the Muslim Brotherhood and Hamas to Israel was a matter of means and 
not ends to its existence. On one hand, the mainstream Islamists felt that once Muslim 
unity was achieved, the destruction of Israel would occur quickly and inevitably. On the 
other hand, PIJ leaders argued that, “pan-Islamic unity would emerge on a mass level 
only through direct action to liberation the holy land, site of the third-holiest Muslim 
shrine, the Dome of the Rock, and al-Aqsa Mosque” (Lybarger 2007, 84). In this 
approach, PIJ leader Dr. Fathi Abd al Aziz argued that, “Israel, by its very existence, 
was a source of moral and spiritual corruption that prevented Muslims from remedying 
                                                 
14 Esposito (1995, 374) writes that the Islamic Jihad Movement considers itself a “continuation of a long 
line of Palestinian activists and martyrs who combined their anti-Zionist stances with a political ideology 
based on their interpretations of Islam.” He notes that the spiritual leader of the movement, Abd al-Aziz 
Awdah, “often expresses his firm belief in the efficacy of military combat against Israel.”   
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the malaise of their society”, and therefore had to be destroyed in order for Muslim unity 
to be achieved (Litvak 2003). Meanwhile Sheik Auda, the leader of the PIJ faction in the 
Gaza Strip, believed that infidel rulers seized the Islamic land of Palestine, and the only 
way to restore the land to Muslims was through direct and violent revolt against the 
occupiers. Thus, from the mindset of the PIJ: “to ignore Palestine was to ignore the call 
to jihad as a religious obligation” (Milton-Edwards 1996, 118). Recognizing the 
difficulty of any Palestinian movement going very far in political mobilization without 
reflecting the nationalistic sentiments of the Palestinian struggle, Esposito notes that 
PIJ’s leadership maintains that the Palestinian cause is not in the service of Islam, but 
that “Islam is to be used in the service of the Palestinian cause” (Esposito 1995, 374). 
With this the physical battle for Palestine has become no less synonymous with a battle 
for Islam. 
As separate entities, PIJ and Hamas were offshoots of the Egyptian Muslim 
Brotherhood, yet each group was respectively influenced and financially supported by 
Islamist forces elsewhere in the Muslim world. Despite these very practical 
commonalities, however, the Israeli authorities treated both groups very differently.    
For example, Hamas grew to be a strong force, especially in Gaza, due to the fact that 
the Israeli authorities effectively destroyed many PIJ cells and deported the bulk of its 
leadership (Roy 1991, 64). Sheikh Yassin shrewdly worked to distance his organization 
from the violence of the PIJ as well as its association with the Muslim Brotherhood in 
order to win permission from the Israeli authorities for the group’s activities at a time 
when Israel outlawed all levels of political organizing in the Palestinian Territories. As 
Milton-Edwards writes, “While the Israelis were happy to extend a license to the 
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organization with charitable status and to all intents and purposes dedicated to welfare 
and education work, they might have rejected an application from the Muslim 
Brotherhood” (Milton-Edwards 1996, 123). Thus, unlike all other Palestinian political 
groups at the time, the nascent Hamas was free to organize, recruit members and receive 
funds. The official registration of Hamas with the Israeli authorities as a “charitable 
society” enabled it to build its organizational base from which to officially launch the 
Islamist movement in Gaza (Milton-Edwards 1996, 124). Meanwhile, despite its 
commitment to violent struggle, PIJ’s organization ideals and objectives were never 
widely embraced by the local population (Milton-Edwards 1996, 121). Unlike Hamas’ 
careful focus on separate cultivation and recruitment of its member base, the PIJ also 
never “attempted to position itself as a replacement for the PLO; on the contrary, it saw 
itself as working in tandem with secular forces that sought to end the occupation and 
liberate historical Palestine through armed revolution” (Lybarger 2007, 84).  
Additionally, even though PIJ as an organization remained largely elusive, the Israeli 
authorities poured considerable effort into quelling the organization and dissolving its 
leadership and membership infrastructure by demolishing homes, making arrests and 
deporting leaders (Milton-Edwards 1996, 123).   
As Milton-Edwards notes, in the wake of the 1979 Iranian Revolution, a euphoria 
swept across the Muslim world. Following the formation of Hamas, its leadership 
initially declared support for the revolutionary ideals of Khomeini (Milton-Edwards 
1996, 119). However, it is reported that after Iranian attacks on the regimes in Saudi 
Arabia and other Gulf States that directly funded Hamas, the organization’s leadership 
encountered an ideological and practical dilemma. Milton-Edwards writes, “If the 
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Mujama (early Hamas leadership) in Gaza pledged its ideological support to Iran it 
would alienate its Gulf sources of funding; if, on the other hand, it criticized the Iranian 
Revolution, it was denying the important political and religious effects of the event on 
the entire Muslim world” (Milton-Edwards 1996, 119).15 As the story unfolds, it is 
suspected that Hamas was in the pocket of the Saudis, who, due to being directly 
threatened by Iran, denounced the 1979 revolution, causing Hamas to stop its own 
support for Khomeini (Milton-Edwards 1996, 119). Meanwhile, Palestinian Islamic 
Jihad leader, Sheikh Auda and his associates, saw the 1979 Iranian Revolution as a 
model for Palestine, and saw no contradiction in its message to the greater Muslim world 
(Milton-Edwards 1996, 119). Facilitated by the massive increase in oil prices, Saudi 
Arabia became a prime benefactor for Hamas. For Auda and the PIJ, however, the 
success of the Iranian Revolution gave greater merit to the moral obligation for jihad 
against Israeli occupation. Long before Hamas looked to armed resistance the PIJ began 
armed operations against Israeli targets in 1984 (Litvak 2003). In exchange, the new 
Iranian leadership supported PIJ in its call for an armed response to the Israeli 
occupation in Palestine as a way of countering the Saudi support of Hamas in addition to 
more secular leaderships in Syria, Iraq and Egypt.16    
                                                 
15  The parenthetical note here is mine. Al-Mujama al-Islami, or “Mujama” is the name used by Milton-
Edwards (1996) to describe the Hamas movement after it broke from the Muslim Brotherhood and before it 
was named Hamas. 
16 Litvak notes that while Hamas was always an independent movement in Palestine, PIJ largely took its 
direction from its ties to Iran and also Hezbollah in Lebanon.  In particular, Hezbollah provided weapons 
training and logistical aid, and thanks to this support, PIJ was able to expand its network into the 
Palestinian refugee camps in Lebanon.  More so than Hamas, Litvak notes that PIJ became an instrument of 
Iranian policy in the Arab-Israeli conflict (Litvak 2003).  Esposito (2005, 375) has also noted the ties 
between the PIJ and Iran, stating: “In recent times, the Islamic Jihad Movement failed to become the major 
political force that the Hamas organization has become.  It also suffers from a reputation of blind allegiance 
to the Iranian regime.  Information about the nature of financial, military, and political ties between the 
Palestinian Jihad movement and the Iranian regime are not easily verifiable.” 
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Without question, the 1979 Iranian Revolution became a powerful symbol for the 
Palestinian Islamists in the decade to come. The success of the Iranian Revolution 
became a pillar of hope to the Palestinian people as a testament to the fall of powerful 
regimes. With this, the sentiment became, “If the shah could be toppled, Israel could 
follow” (Milton-Edwards 1996, 119). At the same time, however, support for the Iranian 
Revolution was also one of the central sources of the deep split between the Palestinian 
Islamists in the 1980s. (In addition to tensions internal to Palestine, the split was also due 
to the tensions between Sunni and Shia groups and emerging neo-Salafi and Wahabi 
influences in the region.) Here, the inevitable split in the Palestinian Islamist camps 
came from the leaders of PIJ striving to establish themselves as the comparatively more 
militant and violent of the two Islamist organizations. Although smaller in numbers, PIJ 
directly challenged Hamas’ refusal to join the armed resistance under Yassin (Gunning 
2009, 36). Milton-Edwards writes that although the “ideals and objectives of the Islamic 
Jihad were never widely embraced, the organization did find support in the local 
community and was respected by the various factions of the national movement” 
(Milton-Edwards 1996, 121). Fiercely committed to military struggle against Israel, PIJ 
set the stage for such activities for the generation of Palestinians Islamists of Gaza to 
come. As Milton-Edwards notes, “The Israeli authorities appeared powerless to stop the 
wave of mass sentiment that gripped the Gaza Strip in November 1987, a sentiment that 
was empowered by political Islam” (Milton-Edwards 1996, 123). To this, Lybarger adds 




The Popularity of Hamas 
Hamas is the most popular and powerful Islamist voice in the Palestinian 
Territories today. It is a product of the unique and constantly changing internal and 
external circumstances of Palestinian politics. From its origins as a branch of the Muslim 
Brotherhood in the Gaza Strip to winning the 2006 Palestinian national elections, and its 
subsequent takeover of the Gaza Strip from Fatah in 2007, the organization (and its 
leadership) has displayed a rational and operational logic of social and political goals 
while navigating through the Palestinian political framework and gaining the support of 
men and women alike.17 In light of the noted history of Hamas’ rise to power, and 
looking ahead to the subsequent chapters of this project, the question readily becomes, 
Why did so many people embrace Islamist structures, and what are the effects of this 
mobilization on their political identities? 
A common misconception of Hamas is that it completely held the support of 
Palestinians in the Gaza Strip as early as the 1990s. While the organization was always 
stronger in Gaza than in the West Bank it remained a minority movement for much of 
next decade (Roy 1991, 64-65), especially as its attacks on the secular-national political 
left cost it political legitimacy in the eyes of many Palestinians (Esposito 1995, 94).  
Also during the early 1990s, Hamas angered many and alienated the movement when it 
allowed young men to patrol the streets of Gaza searching for inappropriately attired 
women. Threatening, name-calling and dousing the offenders with vegetable dye in 
punishment did little to increase its popularity among the local population. Yet, by the 
early 1990s, secular Palestinian nationalism was failing to deliver on its promises of 
                                                 
17 See Gunning, (2009), Milton-Edwards and Farrell (2010), and Milton-Edwards(1996). 
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Palestinian statehood and self-determination. A particular blow to secular nationalist 
identity emerged in the form of the Likud party in Israel, which maintained a deliberate 
strategy of weakening the PLO by suspending municipal elections and systematically 
removing local Palestinian leadership through imprisonment, deportation or 
assassination throughout the 1970s and 1980s (Gunning 2009, 33). Here, the Israeli 
leadership claimed that in order to ensure its security, it was necessary to hunt down 
secular Palestinian nationalists (Cypel 2006, 215). Yet, by strategically targeting the 
leadership of the PLO, it is widely recognized that the Israeli Likud tactically fostered 
the growth of Islamist groups as an alternative to Palestinian leadership (Gunning 2009, 
33-34). Israel’s promotion of the development of mosques and Hamas arrived at the 
moment when Palestinian secular nationalism happened to be the greatest existential 
threat to the Jewish state. As such, Israel’s divide-and-conquer policy toward the 
Palestinian political organizations directly benefitted Hamas at the time. Hamas was, at a 
maximum, directly encouraged by Israel to confront the secular nationalist leadership of 
the PLO, and, at a minimum, largely unmolested by the Israeli authorities, and so it grew 
in strength and numbers with relative impunity (Milton-Edwards and Farrell 2010, 210-
212, Higgins 2009, Mishal and Sela  2000, 21). As Amira Hass writes, “For several 
years the Israeli authorities had allowed the Islamic institutions almost free rein in their 
social, cultural, financial and religious activities in the hope that their influence would 
weaken the PLO” (Hass 1999, 36). 
In comparison to its more secular predecessor, the Labor Party, the Israeli Likud 
rose to prominence in Israel on the basis of increasingly religious claims to the West 
Bank and Gaza Strip, and this resulted in the rapid expansion of Jewish settlements in 
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these areas (Gunning 2009, 33).18 To counter the religiously inspired growth of Jewish 
settlements, the Palestinian people more generally began to long for an Islamic response 
(J. Gunning 2009, 33, Mishal and Sela 2000, 26). As Mishal and Sela write, the 
intensified struggle between the ultra-radical Jewish messianic groups over the religious 
shrines most sacred to both Judaism and Islam increasingly caused the Israeli-Palestinian 
conflict to be identified as religious rather than political (Mishal and Sela 2000, 26). 
With this, Hamas was in an advantageous position to reflect the mood of disillusionment 
among the Palestinians, strategically mobilizing the feelings of disappointment and 
discontent with the weaknesses and failures of the PLO and its inability to protect the 
Palestinian people from the daily abuses of occupation by the Israeli military and the 
influx of zealous, religio-nationalist settlers.      
As Gunning notes, the shared experience of military occupation, curfews and 
collective punishment, in addition to the “rapid expansion of Israeli settlements, 
                                                 
18  The rise of Likud in the 1977 Israeli elections represented an unprecedented ideological shift in Israeli 
politics. Referred to as “the revolution”, Likud’s success in the polls ended the almost thirty-year 
dominance of left-wing political alignments. (For the next twenty years, the left-wing and right-wing party 
blocs held roughly an equal amount of seats in the Israeli Knesset.) Important to the discussion here is that 
at the helm of the right-wing was the Gush Emunim, or “Bloc of the Faithful”-- a messianic political group 
committed to the establishment and strengthening of Jewish settlements in the West Bank, or the biblical 
land known as Judea and Samaria and the Gaza Strip. Historically, the Gush Emunim emerged in response 
to the 1967 war, when Israel gained control of the West Bank and Gaza Strip. However, the organization 
was not formally recognized until 1974, following the Yom Kippur War. The organization ceased to exist 
in the 1980s, but the political influence of its supporters became a central part of the Israel political process 
and remains so today. The movement’s ideology gave birth to the contemporary Israeli settler movement. 
The political legacy of Gush Emunim (as the settler movement) directly encourages Jewish settlement as a 
divinely inspired Jewish right, as interpreted from the Torah. Certainly, the inner machinations of Israeli 
politics are beyond the scope of the study at hand, yet it is interesting to observe the coincidence of the 
timing in terms of the rise of Gush Emunim and the ascendency of more religiously-infused, right-wing 
politics in Israel with the rise of Islamist politics in the Palestinian Territories. Without a doubt, the military 
superiority and ultimate triumph of Israel against the aggression of its Arab neighbors in 1967 marked the 
demise of Arab nationalism. However, it seems that the marriage between religion and politics that was 
engendered as a response to the events of the 1967 war was not exclusive to the Arab nationalists (or the 
Palestinian people) alone. Indeed, 1967 marked the rise of a new brand of nationalist groups on both sides 
of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, which infused the language of the conflict with a new, distinctly 
religious—if not divinely inspired—cast. For more on Gush Emunim, see Newman (2005). 
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competition over water resources, attacks on religious sites, and public calls for the 
transfer of Palestinians out of Palestine” fostered the emergence of a new Palestinian 
national consciousness where Palestinians feared that “both their land and their identity 
were under threat” (Gunning 2009, 39-40). Hamas appealed to the younger generation of 
Palestinians who had come of age during the Israeli occupation and, thus, challenged 
Sheikh Yassin’s embrace of patient and passive resistance in the Palestinian struggle.   
As the generational experiences and constituency of Palestinians changed hands, 
a shift in the Hamas movement occurred. Following the example of PIJ, Hamas 
operatives began attacking Israeli targets. With this, the prioritization of Islamic revival 
became synonymous with the privileging of armed struggle, and no longer were these 
two concepts mutually exclusive. The shift is poignantly reflected in the words of 
Ezzedine Khatib (a pseudonym), who was a student leader of Hamas in Gaza: “Zionism 
is a component of an imperialist project. Like all forms of colonialism, it will ultimately 
disappear. Freeing Palestine through armed struggle will be very hard, but reaching a 
just peace through negotiation is sheer utopia…Time is on our side. Whatever they do, 
we’re not going away” (Cypel 2006, 188). 
By the early 1990s, Palestinian Islamo-nationalism in the form of violent armed 
struggle against Israel rapidly accelerated Hamas’ popular position among the people as 
the only organization that would tirelessly promote the Palestinian people and their 
cause. The success of the organization came with its self-promotion as a credible 
alternative to the secular-nationalist agendas that many Palestinians considered bankrupt 
(Esposito 1995, 375). Created in 1992, Hamas’ military wing, Izz ad-Din al-Qassam 
Brigades, began to dispatch attacks against both Israeli soldiers and civilians in 1994. 
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Most famous among these early attacks are operations carried out in response to the 
February 1994 massacre of twenty-nine Muslim worshippers in al-Haram al-Ibrahimi 
Mosque in Hebron by an American-born Jewish settler named Baruch Goldstein. In 
response to Goldstein’s targeted killing of civilians in the West Bank, the Izz ad-Din al-
Qassam Brigades initiated a series of revenge attacks against Israeli civilians. The first 
attack occurred on 6 April 1994 when a member of Izz ad-Din al-Qassam Brigades 
drove an explosive-laden vehicle into the Afula bus station, and blew it up, killing nine 
Israelis and injuring more than one hundred and fifty (Tamimi 2007, 160). In the 
aftermath of the attacks, Izz ad-Din al-Qassam Brigades claimed responsibility and 
publically issued a stern warning to the Israelis to evacuate the settlements in the West 
Bank and Gaza Strip (Tamimi 2007, 160). Tamimi writes, “In a clear reference to 
Goldstein’s actions inside the mosque, Hamas vowed to make the Israelis pay for the 
pain and harassment Jewish settlers inflict on Palestinians under occupation” (Tamimi 
2007, 160). The next attack that Izz ad-Din al-Qassam Brigades carried out in response 
to the Hebron massacre was on 31 April 1994, when a male suicide bomber targeted an 
Israeli bus in Hadera bus station. The attack claimed five Israeli lives and wounded more 
than thirty others. As the decade stretched on, Izz ad-Din al-Qassam Brigades carried out 
many more violent attacks Israeli military and civilian targets, clearly pronouncing the 
attacks as revenge for attacks on Palestinian civilians carried out by Israeli troops or 
settlers (Tamimi 2007, 160).   
Still controversial among the population to this day, suicide missions or 
“martyrdom operations” were equally controversial when they first appeared in 
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Palestinian political forum.19 Although first unpopular among the majority of the 
Palestinian people, suicide bombing attacks became increasingly accepted, and seen as 
necessary to offset the imbalance of power between Israeli military forces and 
technology vis-à-vis a vastly unarmed Palestinian civilian population.20 As Tamimi 
writes, “Palestinians have generally approved of and admired the heroism and altruism 
of men and women who have volunteered their bodies and souls to go on sacrificial 
missions on behalf of the cause of Palestine” (Tamimi 2007, 161). Despite the fact that 
the act of suicide itself is forbidden in Islam, the Hamas leadership found a politically 
expedient way to honor an act of self-sacrifice in the name of the Palestinian cause.  
Accordingly, Islam and its politicization became truly integral to the politics of 
Palestine, and volunteers for suicide bombing missions flocked to Hamas and the other 
Islamist groups in record numbers. For those who supported suicide bomber missions, 
“the suicide bomb was the only means available to the Palestinians to deter those who 
might emulate the likes of Baruch Goldstein from launching further attacks on the 
defenseless Palestinian population” (Tamimi 2007, 161).   
 As support for Hamas grew, so, too, did the heterogeneity of its support. In 
particular, a younger generation of Palestinians was especially attracted to the 
                                                 
19 In Chapter Six, it will be more fully discussed that suicide bombing was alien to the Sunni Palestinian 
community until the early 1990s. Until then, it was more commonly associated with the Shi’ites in Iran.  
The Iranians are believed to be the first Muslims to employ it against Iraq in the 1980s. In Lebanon, the 
Shi’ite Lebanese used suicide attacks against the Israeli invasion in 1982. After this, suicide bombing 
became a routinely used tactic of Lebanese resistance against Israeli forces. Also discussed later, the 
Lebanese resistance also produced the first female suicide bomber, Sana’ Mhaidli. The secular Syrian 
Socialist Nationalist Party claimed Mhaidli’s car bombing attack on 9 April 1985. 
20 Fatah leadership opposed suicide bombing campaigns on the grounds of the Oslo Accords. With the 
“peace process” ongoing, it was clear that suicide bombings would compromise negotiations for statehood.  
Tamimi (2007, 161) indicates that public support for suicide bombing operations has varied.  He writes, 
“Polls conducted at different times have given different results, but rarely has support for these operations 
dropped below fifty percent.”  He goes on to cite various polls taken at times after the start of Al-Aqsa 
Intifada in 2000.  
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integration of Islam and nationalism that Hamas typified (Lybarger 2007, 85). As 
Lybarger notes, “The Islamist and secular-nationalist factions drew from, and competed 
for, the same kinds of constituencies” (Lybarger 2007, 85). However, as the 1990s 
stretched on, the failure of the secular-nationalist leadership to achieve a substantive 
framework for Palestinian statehood vis-à-vis Israel in the Oslo peace process can only 
be described as massively destabilizing to the already fragile infrastructure of internal 
Palestinian politics. This was not helped by Fatah’s growing reputation for 
“mismanagement, nepotism and corruption over its stewardship of the Palestinian 
Authority (PA) in the West Bank and Gaza” (Milton-Edwards and Farrell 2010, 2). It 
was this instability and chronic disunity that fostered an ever more profound popular 
wariness toward secular nationalism in general, which created the opportunity for Hamas 
to permanently secure its place in the story of Palestinian nationalism.     
Exerting itself as the alternative to the PLO, Hamas issued its own leaflets, 
organized its own strikes and carried out its own actions against Israeli military 
(Lybarger 2007, 85). In time, it came to represent a very heterogeneous body politic, 
ranging from a wide segment of the disenfranchised refugee population to urban classes 
in Gaza Strip and West Bank, respectively. In particular, Lybarger’s analysis of the 
shifts and mobilization of political identities in light of the competition between the 
secular nationalist and Islamists in Palestinian accounts for the idea that Islam—as 
infused in every aspect of existence—came to be seen by some as a complete and 
rational way of life (Lybarger 2007, 90). Lybarger observes that for many Palestinians 
who grew up in “traditionally Muslim” but not wholly observant homes, the Islamist 
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turn for them was facilitated by “the growth of institutions (the mosque, principally) that 
lay outside the family” (Lybarger 2007, 90).   
From here, the story follows that the transition between “traditional thinking” to 
“Islamic consciousness” lay in a re-appropriation of religion as a holistic and rational 
outlook that reoriented the Palestinian self-perception and way of life. Islamism infused 
everything from the micro level of science and education and professional life to the 
macro level of national identity. In doing so, Islamism reoriented followers toward the 
embrace of divinely established legal-moral principles adherent to Islam as not just a 
political system in itself, but a divinely inspired way of life. For believers, this 
reorientation was not so much a “return” to traditional thinking, but also the emergence 
of a new identity. For some, Islamism meant a break with the limitations of the parent’s 
traditional ways of thinking. For others, Islamism represented a distinct continuity with 
the peasant past as “an ideal period in which daily life was itself an expression of Islamic 
values” (Lybarger 2007, 91). In all, the embrace of specifically Islamist thought entailed 
the idea of an individual accepting elements of “essential Islam” in a deliberate, 
conscious, and rational way. As Lybarger writes, “The result was a new unity, a new 
sense of wholeness that replaced…traditionalism with a seemingly more authentic 
alternative: Islamic nationalism” (Lybarger 2007, 91). The ethos of Islamic nationalism 
placed the idea of “nation” firmly at the center of everyday life. In the embrace of this 
ethic, “Palestinians would regain the moral unity and purpose they required if they were 
ever to achieve the liberation they so intensely desired” (Lybarger 2007, 108).  
Here, Hamas’ domestic focus became particularly attuned to women and the 
promotion of the Palestinian family. By focusing on the traditional Palestinian family 
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unit that had been subjected to intense stress over the years of dislocation and 
occupation, the Hamas leadership offered Islam as a solution to the seemingly porous 
family security structure. Patriarchal and intensely conservative in this focus on the 
family, Hamas entreated Palestinian women to “return” to their homes as a way of 
embracing the Palestinian struggle in the name of Islam. As Sara Roy notes in 1991, the 
Islamist movement has been “particularly successful inside Gaza in exploiting the 
women’s issue to promote its own political agenda” (Roy 1991, 66). Yet, over time new 
loyalties became invested in the new structure of Hamas’ authority, assuring its 
ideological acceptance and success as a political movement. In more recent years, the 
huge female turnout in support of Hamas in the 2006 elections testifies to the fact that 
Hamas has “comprehensively outmaneuvered its secular opponents in the battle for the 
hearts, souls and votes of Palestinian women” (Milton-Edwards and Farrell 2010, 183). 
Between the genuine offer of authenticity in the face of profound ideological 
disillusionment and the tangible financial assistance and social networks it provided, 
support for Hamas grew. With this, the mantle of Islam provided “the requisite symbols 
and language for reigniting the Palestinian struggle on a much wider level” (Lybarger 
2007, 99). However, while the merging of nationalist and religious values produced a 
new political orientation, this is not to say that Hamas’ path to political participation was 
as deliberate or linear as its party platform appeared. Noting the combination of violence 
with Hamas’ new approach to politics, Ziad Abu-Amr writes: 
Hamas’s spectacular suicidal attacks inside Israel and its other resistance 
tactics capture the imagination and admiration of large sectors of 
Palestinians.  Scores of Palestinian youths joined the movement to become 
martyrs.  In light of an excessive Israeli use of military power against a 
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civilian population under occupation, which included the use of advanced 
jet fighters, Apache helicopters, and rockets, there was the risk of shaking 
the will and determination of the Palestinians.  With its lethal suicidal 
attacks inside Israel, Hamas may have provided Palestinians with a 
national projection of force to restore their psychological balance or 
equilibrium.  In additions, these attacks satisfied a desire for revenge for 
the heavy human losses the Palestinians sustained (Abu-Amr 2007, 169-
170). 
 
Indeed, much of Hamas’ initial popularity among hard liners was due to its 
intransigent stance toward the PLO for openly advocating a two-state solution in the 
Oslo Accords. Negotiating with Israel on the basis of a two-state solution was touted as a 
treasonous betrayal to the Palestinian people, and, as such, Hamas countered the PLO 
with the “revival of the original, maximalist objectives of national liberation” which did 
not involve recognizing or reconciling with the State of Israel (Lybarger 2007, 101).  
Moreover, Hamas won part of its legitimacy through the use of armed revolt. Marking 
the path of Hezbollah in Lebanon, armed struggle appeared to be the only direct means 
available to force Israel out of the zones it had militarily occupied. As the strength of the 
Islamist political approach gained ground in the Palestinian territories, so, too, did the 
message that political violence was becoming an increasingly viable option for the 
Palestinian nationalist struggle. 
However, as political circumstances changed, so, too, did the methods of Hamas’ 
political expression as the Palestinian Authority came to exist through the Oslo Accords.  
Hamas’ ultimate metamorphosis from a religious, social and voluntary movement into a 
democratically-elected political party ensured its survival and growth, in addition to 
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access to power and resources inside the PA (Mishal and Sela 2000, 118). As Mishal and 
Sela note, that although Hamas leadership “refused to veer from its dogmatic doctrine of 
armed struggle toward social and political action, they occasionally demonstrated 
openness, flexibility, and willingness to adopt new option in accordance with the 
changing political circumstances” (Mishal and Sela 2000, 120). Thus, without alienating 
its support base in the Gaza Strip, Hamas managed to replace the PLO as the sole 
symbol of Palestinian national identity.21 While it certainly co-opted the language of 
secular-nationalism, Hamas also carefully adapted its platform to echo the more violent 
ideological themes of Palestinian Islamic Jihad, all of the while insisting that its zero-
sum approach to the Palestinian question was in the name of Palestine and its people. In 
its charter, Hamas defined its goal as the “retrieval of “Muslim Palestine” through the 
overthrow of the Israeli state and the establishment of an Islamic one” (Lybarger 2007, 
85). Yet, as Gunning also notes Hamas cannot be reduced to its use of violence, but can 
be better understood through a nuanced look at its evolution as a product of its changing 
environment (Gunning 2009, 25). 
Still today, the central feature of Hamas’ political platform is the establishment 
of Islamic rule in Mandatory Palestine. In January 2006, the forty-year dominance of 
Fatah came to a surprising halt when Hamas party candidates won an overwhelming 
majority in the Palestinian Legislative Council (Lybarger 2007, 74). Despite a 
commitment to violence in defense of Palestine, Hamas’ sparkling reputation and image 
of integrity in the eyes of many Palestinian voters against the backdrop of political 
corruption and inefficiency that tarnished the Palestinian Authority is what inevitable 
                                                 
21 Although Hamas is yet to gain a firm political stronghold in the West Bank, it remains in power of the 
Gaza Strip since its overthrow of the PLO in 2007. 
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brought its leaders to power in Gaza. In the end, Hamas’ “austerity was usually 
compared to stories of extravagance and corruption of PA leaders and officials. It is 
suggested in this regard that the deep desire for change and reform was the primary 
factor for Hamas’ wide popularity” (Abu-Amr 2007, 171). 
 
Conclusion 
Particular to the Palestinian case as opposed to Islamist movements elsewhere is 
the fact that the struggle for statehood remains an unfinished project for Palestine and its 
people. The perpetuation of the Israeli-Palestinian political impasse and the lack of 
resolution for real Palestinian sovereignty have “imposed on Islamist politics in the 
Palestinian setting the necessity of framing issues in terms of the collective effort to 
achieve independence” (Lybarger 2007, 9). Adding to the uniqueness of the Palestinian 
case, Milton-Edwards adds that the political Islam of the Palestinian Islamists today 
should be seen in its historical context. Milton-Edwards contends that the present state of 
affairs is “shaped by the British colonization of Palestine in 1917, Zionist immigration, 
the refugee experience of 1948, the heritage of Jordanian and Egyptian rule from 1948-
67, the Israeli occupation in 1967, and the Palestinian nationalist experience of the 1970s 
and 1980s” (Milton-Edwards 1996, 4). The 1987 intifada and the failure of the Oslo 
Accords to procure peace for the establishment of a Palestine state equally shaped the 
current state of Palestinian Islamism. Indeed, the Islamist rise in the Palestinian case 
represents a very important shift in the story of the Palestinian national struggle. In light 
of the strong social hold that Islamists now maintain in Palestinian society, Hamas, as 
“the most important Palestinian Islamist organization in the occupied West Bank and 
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Gaza Strip” (Esposito 1995, 94) has emerged as the political force in Palestine whose 
social presence and communal activities certainly cannot be ignored. Yet, as Denoeux 
states, “Politics lies at the heart of Islamism, which ultimately has far more to do with 
power than with religion” (Denoeux 2002, 63). With this, it is vital to see the rise of 
Islamism in the Palestinian Territories for what it is—a rational political choice made 
amidst an unstable and uncertain atmosphere of longstanding corruption, abuse, 
exhaustion and seemingly unabated military occupation. The Palestinian Islamist 
movement is both a call to the restructuring of Palestinian nationalism and a response to 
the pressures surrounding and contained within the national struggle.   
 Demonstrating the inherent political elements contained within the regional and 
historical underpinnings of the Palestinian Islamist movement, the primary purpose of 
this chapter has been to outline the contemporary political landscape in which 
Palestinian women operated as citizens between 1987 and 2007. The relationship 
between women and the Islamist ideology in Palestine will be explored in the following 
chapters on Palestinian political motherhood, political representation, the rise of female 
suicide martyrs, and Palestinian women as non-violent political activists in a new era of 
nationalist struggle and political contestation. The chapter that follows begins with an 
exploration in the changes in the expression of political motherhood among Palestinian 
women as activists working within the pendulum of opportunity structures existing 













The tire burns in an empty square. 
One child, pockets filled with  
Carefully collected stones, 
Stares at the army patrol. 
 
At his funeral we chanted 
“Mother of the martyr rejoice, 
All youths are your children. 
 
          -Dr. HananAshrawi, “Demonstration” 
 
 
“Woman make up half of society and gives birth to the other half.” 
 
 -International Women’s Day (1999) slogan inscribed on 
a banner in several West Bank cities  
 
 
 Combining the politics of gender, identity, nationalism and religion, the 
“demographic race” between Israel and the Palestinians is one of the most interesting and 
multifaceted manifestations of the conflict. Within the first ten days of the establishment 
of the state of Israel, David Ben-Gurion established the precedent for the absolute need 
for a Jewish demographic majority by awarding the title of “Heroine Mothers” to Jewish 
women who bore more than ten children in Israel. In response to a long history of horrific 
pogroms and the genocide of six million Jews in Europe under the Nazi regime, the 
“populate or perish” ideology of Israel is deeply rooted to this day. As a pro-natalist 
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country, Israel provides strong incentives for Jewish immigration and reproduction.  
Israeli legislation encourages Jewish women to have large numbers of children through a 
variety of state policies, including child allowances, first-rate maternal care, generous 
maternity leave policies, subsidies for assisted reproduction methods such as in-vitro 
fertilization and cheaper housing for large families.  
For its part, the Palestinian response—to what is seen as the driving force behind 
Zionist expansionism—is to depict Palestinian women as both the “metaphorical 
‘mothers of the nation’ and the literal vessels through which the nation is reproduced 
(Collins 2004, 57). Going as far back as the Arab rebellion of 1936-1939, Palestinian 
women’s fertility is a celebrated element of the Palestinian nationalist discourse. For 
example, a recurring phrase in Palestinian newspapers in the 1930s is the expression, “the 
woman who rocks the baby’s cradle with one hand, rocks the nation with the other” 
(Greenberg 2002, 61). From the Palestinian standpoint in the decades since 1948, the act 
of having many children represents a political act of defiance to their situation of 
continued statelessness. In effect, bearing children a raw affirmation of their existence.22   
As a nation born of refugees, the act of bearing children for the perpetuation of 
the Palestinian identity signals an affirmation of the actual existence of the Palestinian 
people. The emphasis on female maternity and fecundity nationalizes the body of every 
Palestinian woman, man and child. As John Collins writes of the demographic struggle 
within these two conflicting nationalisms, “To be a child is to be, through the simple fact 
                                                 
22 In 2007, an elderly female resident of Azzeh Refugee Camp in Bethlehem with eight children and thirty-
two grandchildren told me that her desire to have many children (she gave birth to ten children—one died 
at birth and the other died from injuries received by IDF forces in 1988) stemmed from her ability to, 
“Show that Israeli woman—Golda Meir—that we Palestinians are here, but not that we are just here, but 
that we EXIST.”  The elderly woman said that having many children was her personal way of 
demonstrating her commitment to the Palestinian struggle, adding, “[They] will carry on our work and our 
memories after we are gone.”  
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of one’s birth and existence, a small but important addition to a statistical category with 
national importance” (Collins 2004, 58).   
Within the Palestinian nationalist discourse, women are the symbolic vessels of 
Palestinian identity. Their fertility is central to this discourse and seen as a crucial natural 
resource of the nation in light of the demographic struggle for land and national 
sovereignty vis-à-vis Israel. Exogenous to the Palestinian struggle is the Israeli fear of 
high levels of Palestinian reproduction, a political interest in limiting it, and the often-
violent steps undertaken to do so.23 Endogenous to the Palestinian struggle is the internal 
battle for hegemonic power between political factions, and particularly between the 
Islamists and the PLO. In these external and internal frameworks of Palestinian 
nationalism, the female body is often the terrain upon which there is a battle for control. 
Moreover, a distinct shift in the internal discourse of the struggle has taken place in light 
of the internecine competition and rise of Islamist political power in recent decades. The 
rise of the Islamists in the post-intifada years demonstrates how the Islamist reaction to 
                                                 
23 This point was most recently illustrated in Martin Kramer’s highly controversial remarks on February 3, 
2010 at the 2010 Herzliya Conference on the radicalization of the Arab/Muslim world.  See Martin Kramer, 
Video: "What Drives Radicalization?", February 3, 2010, 
http://www.martinkramer.org/sandbox/gallery/video/ (accessed October 10, 2010). Drawing a connection 
between high birth rates, younger populations and radical Islam, Kramer’s very ideologically slanted 
speech implores the West to stop providing “pro-natal subsidies for Palestinians with refugee status.”  In 
the online video of these remarks, Kramer continues, “Those subsidies are one reason why in the ten years 
1997-2007 Gaza’s population grew by an astonishing forty percent.  At that rate Gaza’s population will 
double by 2030 to three million.  Israel’s present sanctions on Gaza have a political aim: undermine the 
Hamas regime, but they also brake Gaza’s runaway population growth and there is some evidence that they 
have.  That might begin to crack the culture of martyrdom, which demands a constant supply of superfluous 
young men. That is rising to the real challenge of radical indoctrination and treating it at its root.”  With 
Kramer’s unabashed ideological support of Israeli policies of sanction and closure of Gaza clear, he later 
uses his on-line blog on February 22, 2010 to rebuff attacks that his remarks at the Herzliya Conference 
advocated the genocide of the Palestinian people of Gaza.  According to Kramer’s rebuttal, these “pro-natal 
subsidies” are assured by the UNWRA, in which every child with “refugee” status is fed and schooled 
regardless of the parents’ own resources.  Kramer points to the fact that the “refugee” status is passed from 
generation to generation in perpetuity, adds,  “Anywhere in the world, that would be called a deliberate 
pro-natal policy.”  For more on Martin Kramer’s openly racist attacks on the Palestinian people, see Smear 
Intifada, February 22, 2010, 
http://www.martinkramer.org/sandbox/2010/02/smear-intifada/ (accessed October 10, 2010). 
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the Oslo Accords and the consolidation of the Palestinian Authority first took place in the 
name of women’s wombs and continued to shape the Palestinian nationalist discourse in 
a highly gendered approach with its focus on Palestinian women-as-mothers. 
As Nira Yuval-Davis argues, to understand the gendered character of nations and 
nationalist struggles, it is important to understand their contextualization. She states,  
“Nations are situated in specific historical moments and are constructed by shifting 
nationalist discourses promoted by different groupings competing for hegemony” (Yuval-
Davis 1997, 4). Here, the question becomes if, as Israeli Prime Minister Shimon Peres 
has stated—“politics is a matter of demography not geography” (Yuval-Davis 1997, 30) 
—has the conservative Islamist shift in the Palestinian nationalist discourse also brought 
with it a conservative transformation in the meaning of female citizenship and political 
participation in terms of political motherhood? Palestinian feminist scholars, Penny 
Johnson and Eileen Kuttab observe that in both intifada periods, “informal women’s 
activism has taken the form of an extension of women’s roles, particularly ‘mother 
activism’” (Johnson and Kuttab 2001, 37). The long term economic effects of the Israeli 
military occupation added to the heightened levels of violence against Palestinian 
civilians in the second intifada causing an acute and pervasive sense of vulnerability, 
wherein male roles as heads of households were marginalized and radically destabilized 
(Johnson and Kuttab 2001, 33-34). This “crisis in paternity” can be seen as the point of 
origination for the Islamist response, where the Hamas movement, in particular, turned a 
point of crisis into political capital. 
Since 1948, the unique circumstances of statelessness and military occupation 
reinforced the significance of women-as-mothers to the Palestinian struggle. As such, the 
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depiction of women as “mothers of the nation” gained particular importance during the 
first intifada. Nahla Abdo writes,  
The construction of motherhood equals nationhood within the 
Palestinian context emerged as an expression of Palestinian lived 
reality.  Expulsion from the homeland and refugeeism in foreign 
territories provided the impetus for the mother-nation relationship 
(Abdo 1991, 25). 
 
However, in the Islamization of the Palestinian political struggle, the focus of the 
Islamists rested on forging an uncompromising stance on the link between governable 
norms of female modesty (through specific interpretations of Islamic law) and national 
honor, with particular attention paid to the fusing together of the biological, social and 
political implications of Palestinian women-as-mothers and motherhood. As Massad 
writes, “The new gender norms are modern inventions dressed up in traditional garb to 
satisfy nationalism’s claim of a national culture for which it states. These ideals are not so 
much traditional as they are traditionalized” (Massad 1995, 468). This point is especially 
pertinent in the examination of secular and Islamist approaches to the use of biological 
motherhood as a tool for female political activism and engagement, especially when 
considering Amal Amireh’s statement: “This brand of nationalism, where men bear arms 
and women bear children, is currently openly advocated by the Islamic movement in 
Palestine” (Amireh 2003, 757).  
Certainly, a discussion of how women are socially constituted as mothers is 
nothing new in feminist research. Nira Yuval-Davis has written extensively on this matter 
and how women in nationalist movements and pro-natalist countries are not only seen as 
reproducers of “the labor force and/or the future subjects of the state, but also as the 
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reproducers, biologically and ideologically of the national collective and its boundaries” 
(Yuval-Davis 1980, 15). Yuval-Davis is joined in this research by feminist scholars such 
as Enloe (1989), Jayawardena (1986), Kandiyoti (1991), Pateman (1988) and Yuval-
Davis and Anthias (1989) in the production of gendered understandings of nations, 
nationalisms and wars. In the Palestinian case, however, seeing the ‘naturalized’ roles of 
women as biological reproducers of the nation is especially useful in this investigation 
into the Islamization of the Palestinian struggle and its impact on the modes of female 
political participation as well as the gendered constructions of Palestinian citizenship in 
recent years.    
 
 
The Nationalist Weapon of Wombs 
 
On both sides of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, gendered imagery has long 
defined the physical land for which these two nationalist movements struggle. Similarly, 
each side heralds its female citizens for their biological, cultural and symbolic ability to 
perpetuate their respective ethnic and national collectivities. Long before the creation of 
Israel, the early Zionist idea of Jewish settlement and expansionism was filled with 
gendered images of fertilizing the virgin land of Palestine. For the early Zionists, the 
imagery of Palestine was simultaneously held as the “motherland” to which Jews needed 
to return and the virgin-land the Zionists needed to fertilize and make fruitful (Massad 
2006, 44). This view borrowed closely from the European colonial discourse of civilizing 
the untouched “New World.” In addition to borrowing from the European colonial 
discourse, the gendered Zionist narrative of Palestine also echoes European Orientalist 
inclinations in which the Orient is described as “feminine, its riches as fertile, its main 
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symbols the sensual woman, the harem, and the despotic—but curiously attractive—
ruler” (Massad 2006, 44).   
Of course, the portrayal of the Orient as female is not unique to the Zionist 
discourse, nor is the image of the contested land of Palestine as an iconic female/mother 
figure. Just as in the European tradition, Palestinian nationalism is expressed through 
gendered narratives. In addition, Nahla Abdo writes, “elements of the Palestinian national 
culture were formed in response to the Israeli political culture” (Abdo 1994). Here, the 
metaphor of nation as mother is a central and extremely important one for the creation of 
a national identity posited against the Israeli “other”, especially in terms of defense 
against encroachment and aggression. According to Massad, “the gendered strategies of 
reproducing not only the national and its nationalist agents but also the very culture 
defining it, were all constitutive of nationalist discourse” (Massad 2006, 40). For 
example, in 1974, then-PLO Chairman Arafat delivered a speech to the UN General 
Assembly in which the discussion of the 1947 UN Partition Plan was framed in gendered 
terms, and particularly in terms of Palestine being the “natural mother” of the land in 
question. Arafat stated that when the Palestinians rejected the UN Partition Plan at the 
same time that the Israelis embraced it, the Palestinian position “corresponded to that of 
the ‘natural mother’ who refused to permit King Solomon to cut her son in two when the 
‘unnatural mother’ claimed the child for herself and agreed to his dismemberment” 
(Arafat 2008, 173).   
Beginning in the early 1950s Israel’s first prime minister, David Ben-Gurion 
made the issue of Israeli fertility a national priority. Ben-Gurion connected the idea of 
Israel’s existence, not necessarily to its unwelcoming neighbors, but to its internal 
 103
reproductive fecundity with the argument that “increasing the Jewish birthrate is a vital 
need for the existence of Israel” (Hazleton 1977, 63). He added, “a Jewish woman who 
does not bring at least four children into the world is defrauding the Jewish mission” 
(Hazleton 1977, 63). Ben-Gurion’s act of honoring Jewish women as “Heroine Mothers” 
for giving birth to ten or more children became incorporated in the national discourse of 
Israel, along with an unequivocal message that abortion amounted to act of treason 
(Sharoni 1995, 120). Of course, turning the biological capacity of Israeli-Jewish women 
into national heroines for bearing more children for the national collective meant that 
Palestinian women were demonized in the Israeli public mind for their historically large 
broods.  As Prime Minister Golda Meir once reportedly said, “Peace will come when the 
Arabs start to love their children more than they hate us” (Levy 2004).24 Meir’s statement 
highlights the most insidious elements of racism in the Israeli portrayal of the Palestinian 
people through the crude allegation that Palestinian mothers send their children to die at 
checkpoints.   
Where children are the most basic and irrefutable constituents of the nation, 
Meir’s politics and blatant racism toward Palestinian mothers was undeniable. With this, 
however, Meir also reinforced the fundamental fear of the Palestinian “demographic 
bomb” among the Israeli constituency. For example, during a speech given on October 
25, 1972, Meir conceded her inability to sleep at night knowing that Arab babies were 
being born during the course of the same evening (Knopf-Newman 2006, 72). As one 
Israeli academic opined in 1986, “Sovereignty over the land of Israel will not be settled 
by guns and hand-grenades, but rather in two domains: the bedroom and the 
                                                 
24 Although this quote is disputed, it is sometimes cited as a statement to the National Press Club in 
Washington, D. C. in 1957. 
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universities—and it will not be long before the Palestinians surpass us in both” (Collins 
2004, 60). 
Since the Israeli military occupation of the West Bank and Gaza Strip in 1967, 
human rights groups have recorded extensive cases of abuse of Palestinian civilians by 
Israeli soldiers.25  During periods of heightened tensions in the first and second intifada 
years, some of the most horrific incidents arise from the cases of mothers and infants 
dying from exposure to tear gas, statistics of gas-related miscarriages and preventable 
maternal and infant deaths at military checkpoints.26 These statistics are produced 
alongside the numbers of deaths among the Palestinian civilian population caused by 
various forms of militarized violence, including gunshots and beatings. The correlation of 
infant and maternal deaths to the extreme levels of militarized violence reinforces the 
perception among Palestinians that Israel is “reaching into the womb to prevent the 
production of more Palestinian nationals” (Collins 2004, 60). This point is especially 
relevant when considering the high rates of preventable infant and maternal deaths when 
Palestinian women are forced to give birth at Israeli military checkpoints (B’tselem 2007, 
21). Despite these humanitarian tragedies, however, the Palestinian response to Israel’s 
longstanding aversion to its natural growth is to reinforce Israel’s greatest existential fear 
by boasting one of the highest birth rates in the world. Where reproduction is propagated 
                                                 
25 Accounts of Israeli violations of Palestinian human rights can be found in the annual reports B’tselem, 
Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International and the United Nations Human Rights Council.  On 
September 15, 2009, the United Nations Human Rights Council has published its report, “HUMAN 
RIGHTS IN PALESTINE AND OTHER OCCUPIED ARAB TERRITORIES: Report of the United 
Nations Fact Finding Mission on the Gaza Conflict”, documents Israel’s targeted violence against 
Palestinian civilians. 
26 Since the Oslo Accords, Israel’s policy of closure and complete control of the Palestinian Territories 
leaves not only women, but also the general population extremely vulnerable in cases of medical 
emergency and when in need of treatment for long term illness.  In particular, the human rights group, 
Amnesty International has called on both sides of the conflict to take steps to alleviate the suffering of 
women.     
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as a patriotic political tool available to every person of childbearing age, one popular 
Palestinian expression that captures the irony and darkness of the situation is, “The 
Israelis beat us at the borders but we beat them in the bedrooms” (Anthias and Yuval-
Davis 1983, 70). 
 
 
Political Motherhood, the PLO-UNLU, and the First Intifada 
 
When it came to investing national resources into making “their” woman as fertile 
as possible, Israeli leaders were joined by Yasser Arafat and the official communiqués 
issued by the PLO by way of the Unified National Leadership of the Uprising in the 
Occupied Territories (UNLU) during the first intifada.27  By the 1980s, an Israeli 
demographer and political consultant named Arnon Soffer (whose nickname was “Arnon 
the Arab Counter”) reputedly made the statement that the “Palestinian womb is a 
biological weapon” (Joyce 2009, 33). Arafat picked up this statement and used it to 
formulate his famous proclamation that “the womb of the Palestinian woman” was his 
greatest weapon in winning the war against Israel (Joyce 2009, 33). However, this was 
not the first or only time that Palestinian women were revered for their reproductive roles 
in the progressive-nationalist movement. The November 1988 Palestinian National 
                                                 
27 During the 1980s, the leadership of the PLO operated outside of the Palestinian Territories, but its 
organizational influence in the Palestinian Territories rested in the UNLU, on the “inside”.  Since political 
organizing was banned under Israeli authority, the UNLU operated clandestinely as a direct conduit of 
communication between the PLO and the Palestinian citizens living in the Territories.  In doing so, the 
UNLU secretly printed and distributed a series of public announcements, or communiqués, beginning in 
1988. The communiqués were also read on radio stations from Baghdad and Damascus, and signed by the 
“Palestinian Liberation Organization—Unified Leadership of the Palestinian Uprising in the Occupied 
Territories”, which indicates that these organizations were largely one in the same.  The primary source for 
nearly all of the communiqués comes from the Foreign Broadcast Service, an arm of the Central 
Intelligence Agency, which monitors radio stations worldwide and publishes these broadcasts in 
translation.  They are reprinted in Lockman and Beinin, eds. (1989), and are also translated and employed 
extensively by Joseph Massad (1995, 2006) in his research on the elements of gendered politics in the 
Palestinian struggle.   My research draws from Massad’s translations. 
 106
Council Declaration of Independence states, “We render special tribute to that brave 
Palestinian woman, guardian of sustenance of life, keeper of our people’s perennial 
flame” (Palestinian National Council 2008, 357). Celebrating the Palestinian Declaration 
of Independence, UNLU Communiqué No. 29, entitled, “The Call of the Wedding of the 
Palestinian Independent State,” congratulated Palestinian women in their roles as mothers 
in the nationalist movement. However, the celebratory tone of the communiqué takes the 
role of Palestinian political motherhood one step further by specifically highlighting the 
mother of sons who fell in the name of Palestinian nationalism. The communiqué honors 
“the mother of the martyr and her celebratory ululations, for she has ululated twice, the 
day her son when to fight and was martyred, and the day the state was declared” (Massad 
2006, 46). 
Another important citation referring to Palestinian women’s biological 
contributions to Palestinian nationalism during the first intifada is found in UNLU 
Communiqué No. 5, which describes Palestinian women, sisters and daughters as 
“manabit”, which, in Arabic literally means plant nurseries, or places that encourage the 
proper soil, light and water for plant growth.28 The communiqué describes the Palestinian 
female as the soil for producing manhood, or the social place from which manhood, 
respect and dignity form and grow. This imagery also harkens back to the Palestinian 
Declaration of Independence, insofar as Palestinian women are seen as the “guardians” of 
Palestinian lives and survival (Massad 1995, 474). Issued during the first years of the 
1987 intifada, the UNLU communiqués continually highlight Palestinian women’s 
reproductive roles, and also describe female suffering at the hands of the Israeli occupier 
                                                 
28 This communiqué and translation of the term “manabit” is taken from Massad (1995). 
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in terms of pregnancy miscarriages. UNLU Communiqué No. 12, states that when 
pregnant Palestinian women miscarry their babies at the hands of poison gas and tear gas 
grenades, their suffering is likened to “those women whose sons and husbands were 
thrown in the Nazi prisons” (Massad 1995, 475). The implication of this phrase is that 
Palestinian women suffer for their failure to produce more nationalist (male) fighters due 
to the human rights violations incurred by the Israeli occupation. 
Adding to the emphasis on female nurturing and biological reproduction seen in 
the official speeches and political communiqués of the PLO-UNLU, various legends 
surrounding Palestinian motherhood became well known during this time. Among them 
is the tale of a young Palestinian mother with a baby in her arms who rushed up to a 
young man in a jeep as Israeli soldiers were arresting him. She threw her baby into the 
arms of the young man while screaming at him for neglecting her as his wife and his 
fatherly responsibilities to their infant. Then, she ran away. Dumbfounded by the infant 
that remained in the young man’s arms, the Israeli soldiers promptly released the man on 
the street. The young mother reappeared from a nearby hiding spot, reclaimed her infant 
from the released man, and carried on with her day (Amireh 2003). As legend from the 
time of the first intifada, this story anecdotally emphasizes the Palestinian female’s 
unique social and political positioning as a young mother. It also highlights her role as a 
presumed “equal” to her male counterpart in the nationalist struggle, even if this 
translates into utilizing her biological and social position as a mother in this context. As it 
is told, this narrative of the first intifada highlights a political parity between male and 
female activists, in spite of the social differences that are sustained in their society to 
separate them. Important to note is that the story would not seem as “natural” or effective 
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if the female was being arrested for her political activism and the male appeared in the 
story to save her from a potentially long imprisonment by virtue of his biological and 
social duties as a father. 
The story also demonstrates that women regularly used their social and biological 
positions as mothers as a tool for confronting the Israeli army. Some women even 
referred to their confrontations with Israeli soldiers as  “a profession” in the sense of 
being ready at all times to confront the Israeli military in the street (Giacaman and 
Johnson 1989, 161). Another familiar account of celebrated Palestinian “mother 
activism” during this time is the common refrain “He’s my son!" used by women as they 
attempted to snatch youths from the clutches of Israeli soldiers (Giacaman and Johnson 
1989, 161). From this comes an account of a middle-aged woman named Jamila who 
struggled to free her son from a group Israeli soldiers who surrounded him and were 
kicking him with their boots and pounding him with the butts of their rifles. Suddenly, an 
elderly woman in peasant dress appeared and got hold of Jamila’s son, whereupon she 
smothered him in a motherly embrace. When the elderly woman told the soldiers that the 
young man was her son, and they responded by calling her a liar, the elderly woman 
retorted, “They are all my children, not like you motherless lot!” (Giacaman and Johnson 
1989, 161).  
However anecdotal, these stories bring to light the social and political geography 
of the Palestinian people during the first intifada, when Palestinian women were fighting 
the collective enemy, the Israeli “other”, and patriotically using their biology as a 
political weapon to do so. As a result of this, one of the most universal and enduring 
images of the 1987 intifada was that of the “mother” saving young boys and men from 
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the blows of Israeli soldiers (Peteet 1994). This classic image is typically represented as a 
middle-aged to elderly woman, dressed in traditional Palestinian garb, evoking her status 
as an uneducated refugee.29  This is held in contrast to the alternative image of the 
intifada of the celebrated young boy or man, dressed in Western-style blue jeans and a t-
shirt, his face shrouded in a scarf, suspended in the active motion of symbolically 
throwing a rock at the occupation. These images in contrast illustrate the fact that the 
intifada mobilized all sectors of Palestinian society against a common enemy. 
Meanwhile, however, the secular and progressive discourse coming from the leadership 
of the intifada was contradicted by a traditional view of women and their role in the 
nationalist struggle. Where aspects of leadership were concerned, Palestinian women and 
girls were held as passive rather than active subjects of the struggle. In effect, this 
contradictory approach predetermined the continuation of the traditional duties of 
Palestinian women as giving birth to, caring for, and educating children. Ultimately, this   
excluded women “from what was considered the loftiest possible contribution to the 
national struggle: participation in military activities against the enemy, which sometimes 
ended in the sacrifice of one’s life” (Tzoreff 2006, 14).  For example, the danger that a 
Palestinian woman might die in a military action in the name of Palestinian self-
determination meant that, “her womb would no longer be able to serve the nation’s need” 
(Tzoreff 2006, 14). Thus, Palestinian women were “equal” to men in their collective 
                                                 
29 Loren Lybarger gives a similar account of the images of the intifada captured in poster art of the “peasant 
woman dressed in a thawb (embroidered dress) holding on to her children as she remained rooted to the 
land” (Lybarger 2007, 24).  He adds, “Such symbols tapped into patriarchal notions of honor and the 
necessity to redeem it when it became violated.  These ideas had been part of the ethos of village and small-
town life and continued as values within the refugee communities” (Lybarger 2007, 24).  
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struggle against Israeli oppression, insofar as they produced more fighting men for the 
revolution. 
In the context of the first intifada, the central feature of Palestinian womanhood 
was sacrifice, yet the ultimate sacrifice was not the life of the individual female fighter, 
but that of her (male) child in the name of the nationalist cause. Between the rhetoric and 
social traditions of the Palestinian struggle, the mainstream secular nationalism of the 
PLO promoted a pro-natalist policy wherein population growth and demographic 
pressure was seen as an instrument through which to achieve liberation (Giacaman and 
Johnson 1989, 153). On the one hand, in the secular-nationalist discourse, Palestinian 
women were seen as equals to men, despite the prevailing pro-natalist bent of the 
movement. One the other hand, feminist political platforms seeking greater political 
representation and equality for Palestinian women were regularly dismissed as inherently 
selfish and detracting from the idea of Palestinian freedom (Peteet 1991, 96-99). As 
Peteet writes, “Women’s position is conceptualized as inextricably embedded in the 
larger national question” (Peteet 1991, 97). In a 1969 interview, Yasser Arafat elaborates 
on the emphasis of gender equality within the nationalist struggle.  He states: 
 
As a progressive revolution, we consider that all members of our society, 
whether men or women, should enjoy equal rights.  We therefore 
encourage the total emancipation of all our women and we endeavor to 
give them every opportunity to participate actively in our struggle.  The 
Palestinian woman has since the days of the Mandate fought side by side 
with our men.  In the occupied territories at present, it is our valiant sisters 
who are leading the civilian resistance against the occupying forces 
(Arafat 2008, 135). 
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Yet, Arafat’s statement above, and the advancement of a women’s agenda within the 
inner machinations of the PLO was not seen as a “contribution to national liberation but 
as a threat to it” (Hammami and Kuttab 1999, 1). Moreover, as Arafat’s regime became 
consolidated through the establishment of the Palestinian Authority, observers have noted 
a profound lack of democratic space and rise of male-centric, authoritarian rule within the 
new governing structure. At a minimum, Palestinian women were praised for their 
contributions in the 1987 intifada, yet in the name of the sacrifices made across society 
for the intifada to succeed, even the secularist organizations of the intifada cautioned 
Palestinian women against “excess” and derided them for ‘excessive vanity’ or the use of 
‘cosmetics’ while the Palestinian population suffered in poverty (Milton-Edwards and 
Farrell 2010, 191). Even with the establishment of the PA, female leaders of the 1987 
intifada were met with strong opposition from PA officials for seeking to secure women’s 
social rights through the creation of new state institutions (Hammami and Kuttab 1997, 
4).   
Certainly, the most effective way to undermine the potentially disruptive social 
implications of a feminist movement within Palestinian society was to conflate female 
activism and motherhood and a feminist struggle for gender equality with the continued 
struggle for Palestinian statehood. This is illustrated in the 1990 UNLU Communiqué 
named “The Woman’s Call”, issued on International Women’s Day (March 8th): 
 
Progressive nations celebrate International Women’s Day on 8 March as a 
day of struggle for the world’s women’s masses.  While celebrating this 
great day, in the name of all the sons of our people, we congratulate the 
world’s women’s masses and the masses of the Palestinian women’s 
 112
movement and its vanguard organizations, hailing every working woman, 
woman struggler, and housewife, especially of our imprisoned strugglers.  
We also pay tribute to the struggle role of the Palestinian uprising’s 
women’s movement, to every mother who has lost a son, daughter, 
husband, or brother, and to every woman who meets with a struggling 
daughter or a heroic son from behind the Bastille of the Zionist enemy 
(Massad 1995). 
 
By recognizing and saluting Palestinian women for their heroism in the nationalist 
struggle, and then proceeding to praise the Palestinian people for making history 
“through the blood of their sons” (Massad 1995) the UNLU communiqué adroitly 
circumvents the discussion of female subjugation in the first intifada. Ultimately, the 
praise of sacrificial motherhood proves adversarial to the development of gender-based 
equality initiatives later undertaken by the secular female leaders of the first intifada.30  
These female political activists recognized that the small window in which Palestinian 
women could challenge the discourses of Palestinian nationalism and female agency 
during the first intifada was swiftly coming to a close. As Massad writes in 1995, 
“Unfortunately, however, the strength and resilience of the masculinist axioms 
buttressing Palestinian nationalist thought are yet to be dented in any major way” 
(Massad 1995, 481). 
Even at the time and in the language of secular nationalism, mother-activist 
political participation and mobilization in support of the 1987 Palestinian uprising 
                                                 
30 In the aftermath of the 1987 intifada—particularly at the time of the signing of the Declaration of 
Principles—Giacaman and Johnson (1994) write of the concern among the female leaders of the Palestinian 
women’s movement “that any gains by women in general, or as political leaders, will be ignored by the 
patriarchal character of the coming authority” (23-24). They add, “The atmosphere of diminishing hopes 
and anxiety over the future deeply affects both activists and ordinary women.”  When authority was 
transferred to the male leadership in Tunis during the Olso years, Palestinian women more imminently saw 
their social gains during the first intifada threatened.  
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produced no clear vision or policy for the elevation of Palestinian women’s rights in the 
discourse of Palestinian nationalism. On the one hand, the nationalist project held 
women’s political mobilization as mothers as an indispensible element of the Palestinian 
struggle against Israel. On the other, this particular form of participation exacerbated the 
deep contradictions between Palestinian society and the secular-nationalist leadership 
concerning gender relations.   
During the Oslo years that followed, specific recommendations were made to 
amend existing aspects of Islamic (shar’ia) law (Barron 2002, 74-79). Within the 
framework of creating norms and institutions in support of gender equality, members of 
the Palestinian women’s movement reviewed and proposed amendments to existing and 
new legislation in the Palestinian Authority as a way of encouraging stronger democratic 
practices to include women at the decision-making level of Palestinian self-governance.  
However, given that even the most progressive male leaders of the newly forming PA felt 
pressured to acquiesce to conservative Islamist political pressure, advocacy for gender 
equality for Palestinian women fell into a state of limbo (Milton-Edwards and Farrell 
2010, 191, Hammami 1990).31 As the struggle between secular nationalism and feminism 
unfolded, Islamist groups, including Hamas, “excoriated secular Palestinian women’s 
movements, denigrating them as anti-nationalist and pro-Western” (Milton-Edwards and 
Farrell 2010, 185). These women, including Dr. Hanan Ashrawi, a highly prominent 
Palestinian woman from Ramallah who served as the “face of the PLO” during the peace 
talks in the early 1990s, were seen as “part of a liberal feminist plot to undermine the 
                                                 
31 Milton-Edwards and Farrell (2010, 191) add that the secular mainstream in the PLO was slow to realize 
and respond to Islamist pressures on women due to its overall lack of an agenda for women. To this the 
Islamist focus on women dovetailed perfectly with a political and religious platform that emphasized 
traditional patriarchal values. 
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Muslim family” (Milton-Edwards and Farrell 2010, 189). Given the fact that Islamic law 
had a “legally defined model of family and gender relations based on complementary 
male and female roles rather than equality” (Giacaman and Johnson 1989, 148), even the 
strongest advocates of gender equality under a secular legal system were stymied. By this 
point in the nationalist struggle, Hammami and Kuttab argue that the Palestinian 
women’s movement had paid a heavy price for its part in enabling the secular nationalist 
movement to prioritize the objective of Palestinian statehood over concerns for gender.  
According to Hammami and Kuttab, the secular-nationalist movement depoliticized 
gender, marginalized women’s social rights and considered “women’s political activism 
not as a contribution to national liberation but as a threat to it” (Hammami and Kuttab 
1999).   
 
 
Political Motherhood and the Islamist Response 
 
 Against the gendered underpinnings of Palestinian nationalist discourse, the post-
1987 intifada experience of Palestinian women became that of increasing social 
restrictions on female freedom of movement, dress and behavior due to the rise of 
Hamas’ social and political pressure, particularly in the streets. Milton-Edwards and 
Farrell write that one factor that aided Hamas’ campaign was “the tardiness of the secular 
political establishment to realize the significance of the new drive to social conformity, 
the targeting and attacks on women, and its unwillingness to stand against it” (Milton-
Edwards and Farrell 2010, 19). Gluck writes that Palestinian women who “engaged in the 
range of intifada activities felt that they had a stake in a future Palestinian state and 
assumed their roles would continue” (Gluck 1995, 9). At the same time while many were 
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hopeful that the post-intifada era of peace negotiations would bring the space to freely 
address women’s issues, others doubted that the consolidation of the Palestinian 
Authority would transfer the leaders of women’s committees into well-earned positions 
of influence and power in the state building project (Giacaman and Johnson 1994). Even 
though a heightened social and political consciousness was the legacy of the 1987 
intifada, the struggle for hegemonic power between the sharpening political factions in 
the Palestinian Territories set a new stage of internal struggle for power and control. In 
particular, the Hamas movement focused on the uncompromising link between the norms 
of feminine modesty and the honor of fallen martyrs as a way of asserting its place in the 
nationalist discourse. Originally published on 18 August 1988, the primacy and 
immediacy of the connection between women-as-mothers and the Palestinian struggle 
was focused on in Article 17 of the Hamas charter, which states, “The Muslim woman 
has a role in the battle for liberation which is no less than the role of the man, for she is 
the factory of men. Her role in direction generations and training this is a big role.” 
(Islamic Resistance Movement (Hamas) 2003, 127). Additionally, Article 18 of the 
Hamas Charter enumerates the domestic role of women as a continuing duty of the 
Palestinian struggle:  
 
The women in the house of the Mujahid (and the striving family), be she a 
mother or sister, has the most important role in taking care of the home 
and raising the children of ethical character and understanding that comes 
from Islam, and training her children to perform the religious obligations 
to prepare them for the Jihadic role that awaits them.  From this 
perspective it is necessary to take care of schools and the curricula that 
educate the Muslim girl to become a righteous mother aware of her role in 
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the battle of liberation (Islamic Resistance Movement (Hamas) 1993, 
128). 
 
Not unlike the PLO, the leadership of Hamas continued to politically frame Palestinian 
gender relations in terms where women would contribute to the nationalist cause as 
domestic warriors, rather than militants in the streets. 
Even before the end of the 1987 intifada, the Hamas hijab campaign swept the 
streets of Gaza. Utilizing the “crises of paternity”—or the destabilized male roles that 
emerged from the constellation of effects of the Israeli occupation mentioned earlier—
Hamas found a strong support base of religious conservatives among a weak and 
fragmented opposition. Uncovered women were portrayed as symbols of corruption and 
national betrayal (Milton-Edwards and Farrell 2010, 189). Hamas issued communiqués 
and leaflets into the streets, warning that “beauty salons, hairdressing salons and dress 
shops were dens of inequity where Israeli intelligence operatives ensnared Palestinian 
women, then used their sexuality to lure Palestinian men into becoming collaborators” 
(Milton-Edwards and Farrell 2010, 189).32 As Hammami writes, “Social acquiescence, 
political inaction, family pressure and a concurrent ideological transformation created a 
situation in which only a few committed women in Gaza, one year into the intifada, 
continued not to wear the headscarf” (Hammami 1990, 24). Moreover, as uncovered 
women were harassed and attacked on the streets by self-appointed groups of young boys 
and men as a way to demonstrate their nationalist affiliation with the Islamist movement, 
progressive men and the PLO-UNLU remained silent.   
                                                 
32 The threat of women (and men) being turned by Israeli forces and becoming spies or collaborators 
bordered on hysteria during the time of the 1987 intifada and since. Milton-Edwards and Farrell  (2010, 
189) add that Hamas propagated the image of the Palestinian collaborator as  “bare-headed, loose and 
morally bankrupt woman tricked into submitting to Israel for the thrill of illicit sex, alcohol or drugs.” 
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The fundamental purpose of the campaign was to demonstrate Hamas’s power by 
disciplining women’s bodies and physical comportment. Yet what began as random acts 
of violence against women developed into a comprehensive campaign of cultural 
dominance. The wearing of the hijab signified Hamas’ power insofar as modest female 
attire became synonymous with women’s political commitment to the continuation of the 
Palestinian struggle in Islamist terms. As Hammami writes, “By this logic, “bare-headed” 
women became considered vain and frivolous or, at worst, anti-nationalist” (Hammami 
1990, 26). Importantly, in seeking to  “nationalize” the hijab, the most prominent 
definition put forth by Hamas was that wearing a headscarf was a sign of cultural 
struggle, an assertion of nationalist heritage, and above all else, a symbol of respect for 
fallen martyr-sons. In the span of a year, Hammami writes that it was “almost impossible 
for women to walk around Gaza without wearing some form of head cover” (Hammami 
1990, 25). In effect, Hamas successfully infused the call for women to cover their heads 
and return to modest attire as a sign of identification with the martyrs, or sanctified dead 
sons, of the Palestinian nationalist movement (Tzoreff 2006, 14-15). 
 Like so many other contemporary political movements, the Hamas hijab 
campaign assigned every Palestinian woman with the role of “bearers of cultural values, 
carriers of tradition, and symbols of the community” (Moghadam 1994). Additionally, 
the heightened Islamist focus on women-as-mothers was another way to undermine the 
momentum of the women’s movement in establishing secular-based gender equality laws 
within the new system of Palestinian self-governance (Hammami 1990). In this period, 
the Islamist organizations made it clear that the preservation of Islamic law was a 
“redline” in their relations with the Palestinian Authority (Jad, Johnson and Giacaman 
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2000, 150). In addition to organizing attacks in mosques and public meetings, the 
Islamists targeted the Palestinian women’s organizations for their commitment to amend 
Islamic law in the interest of a secular code of gender equality. Interestingly, while the 
Islamists denounced secular Palestinian feminism and the women’s organizations of the 
intifada movement, there was an unequivocal defense of Palestinian “womanhood” 
(albeit as motherhood) launched from a conservative platform from which Islamist 
women’s organizations proliferated.   
In two cases, the attack against secular women came directly from Islamist 
women themselves, who claimed to more authentically represent Palestinian women for 
their social and political interests as Muslim women and as mothers. Despite a few 
obvious contradictions in application, these organizations held that “Islam gives women 
her full rights but may be open to dialogue on issues were these rights are not 
implemented in society” (Jad, Johnson and Giacaman 2000, 150). One Islamic women’s 
organization—Al-Hoda Women’s Society—was formed in 1997 with the aim of 
providing an Islamic counterweight to the Palestinian women’s movement and its secular 
programs (Jad, Johnson and Giacaman 2000, 150). A year after its creation, Al-Hoda 
sponsored its first publication entitled, “The Palestinian Women and the Conspiracy of 
Secular Feminists”, which cited the immorality of the West as corrupting and treasonous 
elements of the secular Palestinian women’s movement (Jad, Johnson and Giacaman 
2000, 150). The following year, another Islamic women’s organization formed by the 
name of Al-Khansa Islamic Association, and also stressed women’s rights and 
participation from an Islamic perspective. Importantly, the namesake “Al-Khansa” recalls 
the 7th century Arabian female poet, Tumadir bint Amr—a very famous historical female 
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figure in the Islamic tradition for her well-known encouragement of “war in the name of 
Islam in the battle of the Qadisiyya, and for articulating the a desire to be congratulated 
rather than consoled at the death of her sons, since she became the mother of martyrs for 
Islam” (Hasso 2005, 23). The choice of the name “Al-Khansa” for the Palestinian 
Islamist women’s organization was to connect female political participation to traditional 
female roles within family and society in order to most effectively bridge the Islamist 
standpoint that women participate as mothers and nurturers of Palestinian society within 
the larger framework of political jihad—now formed against the secular elements of the 
Palestinian political realm and Israel itself. 
 As an aside, “Khansa” is a popular name for Muslim girls as a symbol of female 
heroism and maternal sacrifice. More recently, however it has also become the name 
given to an on-line women’s magazine, “Al-Khansa”, sponsored by Al Qaeda and hosted 
by several extremist Islamist websites. The magazine itself is reportedly published by an 
Al Qaeda organization known as the Women’s Information Bureau of Al Qaeda in the 
Arabian Peninsula, and serves Islamist women throughout the Muslim world, including 
Palestine. Additionally, the magazine claims to be founded by Al Qaeda founders, Abdul 
Aziz-al-Muqrin and Issa Saad Mohammed bin Oushan (Ramachandran 2004). A more 
direct link between Al-Qaeda and the Palestinian Islamist movement is regularly 
suspected. The on-line magazine addresses the politicization of motherhood in the 
context of jihad, which is one commonality between the groups.33 For example, the 
editorial in the magazine’s first issue states that the goal of women should be “martyrdom 
for the sake of Allah” and states: 
 
                                                 
33 In his 2009 article, “Islamization or Secularization of the Palestinian case, Jonathan Fighel cites 
Muhammad Dahlan, a Fatah leader and the former head of the Palestinian Preventative Security Force in 
the Gaza Strip as saying, “There is no difference between Al-Qaeda and Hamas” (Fighel 2009).  Although 
this may be an overstatement driven by Dahlan’s political motivations, Fighel makes the connection to the 
idea that Hamas represents a direct threat to political moderation both locally and globally, and notes the 
influence of Al-Qaeda, particularly in the Gaza Strip.  I find this a riveting area for future research.  
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We will stand covered by our veils and wrapped in our robes, weapons in 
hand, our children in our laps, with the Koran and the Sunna of the 
Prophet of Allah directing and guiding us.  The blood of our husbands and 
the body parts of our children are the sacrifice by means of which we draw 
closer to Allah, so that through us, Allah will cause the martyrdom for His 
sake to succeed (Ramachandran 2004).  
 
The magazine’s rhetorical use of the female traditional role in the family and society 
serves as an operating tool in the broader Islamist framework. In the Palestinian case, 
Hamas’ backing of the Islamic women’s organizations reflects the Al-Qaeda-backed 
women’s movement abroad in its use the same rhetorical device for generating female 
participation in the larger movement in the nationalized “jihad” against Israel and other 
“infidels”.  In both cases, women-as-mothers are simultaneously the symbols of this 
political jihad and the social-structural lynchpins of the campaign itself.   
Also germane to both cases, is that female participants see themselves as the co-
constructors of the Islamist movement and emancipated in their participation. In the 
Palestinian case, Caron Gentry focuses on how this represents both an “active” and 
“passive” maternalist politics, where the passive act of “raising” or giving birth to future 
martyrs is no less politically engaged than the active act of “defending the nation” 
(Gentry 2009). As Jad more recently writes, “Islamist women have created space for the 
actions and activities of groups of women, mostly well-educated from displaced and poor 
families, who are thus bestowed with an air of moral legitimacy in all spheres of public 
life” (Jad 2010, 11). Inter alia, in the historical and socially driven context of the 
Palestinian struggle, there is no higher claim to moral legitimacy and superiority than that 
of a pious and sacrificial mother. Peteet adds that in the Palestinian case—particularly 
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among the refugee community—the “mother of the martyr” represents a “supreme 
political act that translates into respect and prominent community stature. She is often 
invited to attend resistance events in the camp with the leadership, and they visit her” 
(Peteet 1986, 24).   
In a striking contrast to the iconic mother figure of the secular-nationalist 
Palestinian movement from the late 1960s through 1980s, which evokes Palestinian 
women dressed in traditional garb as symbolic of their refugee status and lack of formal 
education, the iconic mother figure of the Islamist movement is no less maternal in 
design, but now dressed in traditionalized “Islamic” wear and heralded for her 
emblematic status as a pious, highly-educated and a refined woman of Islam. A moral 
and political role model for other Palestinian women, this “new” Palestinian woman 
represents the migration of younger Palestinians to more self-consciously religio-
nationalist Islamist groups, Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad. By virtue of her dress 
and comportment, she represents a continuation of traditional social values, even while 
this mother-woman-activist serves her family and her community in a public and highly 
political functions. The emergence of this new compatibility between tradition and 
modernity cannot be more evident than in the Islamist female political candidates in the 
2006 Palestinian Legislative Elections. As Jad stated in an interview at the time of the 
elections, “Before, the women were glorifying martyrs and martyrdom; now, they speak 
about their power themselves as women” (McCarthy 2006).   
Lybarger argues that the Islamist refusal to be subordinated by the PLO or the 
UNLU gave way to a fundamental cultural and political divide within Palestinian society.  
As the Palestinian Authority failed at either “integrating or isolating” the Islamists, the 
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secular-Islamist division became manifest in the “Intifada Generation” and deepened 
during the Oslo Process from 1993 to 2000 (Lybarger 2007). However, as Lybarger also 
argues, the Islamists did not escape the Oslo process unchanged. The 1996 elections that 
came after the establishment of the PA encouraged Islamist leaders to consider a political 
transformation in order to be more in tune with the generational shift of allegiances. As 
Gunning writes, for Hamas, “the process of election appears to be central to the 
acquisition of legitimate authority” (Gunning 2009, 137). More recently, the evolution of 
the new Palestinian female figure has been central to the growth of Hamas’s political 
legitimacy, and evidenced by the fact that women’s votes contributed decisively to 
Hamas’s 2006 electoral victory in Gaza.  
Several of the most high-profile woman figures in contemporary Palestinian 
society are highly educated, mothers, and female leaders of the Islamist movement. For 
example, Mariam Farhat, (“Umm Nidal”) was elected as Hamas MP after three of her 
sons died as suicide bombers. Sameer Al-Halayka, another elected member of the 
Palestinian Legislative Council in the 2006 elections, is widely respected as a journalist, 
scholar of Islamic Jurisprudence and as a mother of seven children. Huda Naim is another 
leading activist in Hamas’ Islamic Women’s Department and is the Head of the Board of 
Trustees of the Thorayya Multimedia Center in Gaza. As a mother with five sons, she 
was also elected in 2006 as the representative of the Bureij Refugee Camp, where she 
lives. Finally, Jamila Shanti is a former head of the Women’s Department in Hamas, is 
widely considered to be one of the most influential women in the Hamas movement today 
and widely considered a “pioneer” in Muslim women’s activism. In the 2006 election, 
Shanti’s popularity put her in the third slate on Hamas’ electoral list, meaning that her 
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votes fell just short of high profile Hamas leaders, Ismael Haniyya and Muhammed Abu 
Tir. In addition to being a former lecturer at the Islamic University in Gaza, Shanti 
represents a break from the image of revered mother-woman, as she is unmarried (and 
childless), despite rumors that she was the wife of the co-founder of Hamas, Abed Aziz 
al-Rantissi. Nevertheless, at 51 years old at the time of the 2006 elections, it can be said 
that Shanti’s age, piety and considerable organizing experience as a leading female figure 
in Hamas patterned her in the same maternalist tradition of reverence and respect for the 
politically engaged, mother-women of the Islamist movement. 
Impressively, the 2006 Palestinian Legislative election brought more Islamist 
women to the forefront of political influence than ever before on the basis of their 
maternity, piety and embrace of gender equality in the name of Islam and Islamic law.  
While secular Palestinian feminists would point to the fact that this was largely due to 
their years of campaigning to change the quota system in the Palestinian Legislature to 
bring more female representatives into the system of representation itself, the fact 
remains that fundamentally more mothers were elected to serve in the Palestinian 
political arena than ever before, and on the Islamist ticket, no less.34 For this, Hamas MP 
Shanti credits the “advanced standing” of women in Hamas to a central philosophy in 
Islam, which “gives women their rights and dignity” (Shanti 2010). Ironically, despite 
maintaining an openly Islamist stance and staunch support of Islamic law that is criticized 
for compromising women’s rights, Shanti embraces the longstanding sentiment among 
feminists alike, that education is the key to female empowerment and equality.  In her 
explanation of why Palestinian women are more socially and politically progressive 
compared to other women throughout the Arab world, Shanti says: 
 
                                                 
34 PA elections law guaranteed women twenty percent of seats on the national list.  Of the 314 candidates 
running in the election, the number of female candidates amounted to 71, which comprised 22.6 percent of 
the overall number of candidates.  In the district elections, only 15 female candidates ran in the total of 414 
candidates overall, comprising only 3.6 percent of those running for election.  The Hamas “Change and 
Reform” Party had 13 female candidates on the ballot, and Fatah had 12 female candidates overall 
(Rahman 2006, 3). 
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Our refugee status, coupled with unmitigated suffering, convinced us that 
no one would help us if we didn’t help ourselves.  And the first step was 
women’s empowerment, which couldn’t be realized without proper 
education and political involvement.  In addition, the Islamic education 
that we received in mosques through the Islamic movement empowered 
women and gave them a sense of being in control (Shanti 2010). 
 
Shanti boasts that Hamas gives more representation to women than any other Palestinian 
political movement, and, despite Hamas’ open aversion to secular feminism, she makes a 
strong argument for Hamas’ apparent openness to Palestinian women, insofar as they 
ideologically conform to Islamist gender norms. Shanti adds, “Our political activism as 
women appeared first in the context of the debate about Islam and modernity which 
impelled us to stand up in defense of Islam in the face of secular assaults” (Shanti 2010).   
The social acceptability of Hamas women today cannot be better summed by a 
statement made by a young woman named Intisar, who expressed her admiration for the 
female activists of Hamas because “their adherence to religious strictures, as the Islamist 
defined them, did not seem to interfere with taking on public roles and responsibilities” 
(Lybarger 2007). Intisar, who first became politically active in the 1987 intifada adds a 
personal account of the rise of Hamas female role models among younger Palestinian 
women. She says: 
 
I have a lot of respect for people who conform to all aspects of religion 
because they are genuinely convinced of the principles set down in the 
Qur’an and sunna. I admired the Hamas and Jihad girls at the university.  
There were well organized and together.  There was no contradiction 
between their political work and religious principles.  There were limits.  
Women and men had separate roles, they organized themselves in separate 
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units, but they worked toward the same end.  Girls in Fatah and the other 
blocs, on the other hand, were still taking refuge in the traditional ideas 
about what women’s roles were.  These ideas blocked them in their 
political work.  But, the Hamas girls were free of these blocks (Lybarger 
2007).   
 
One important inference that can be taken from Intisar’s statement is the idea that unlike 
the secular-nationalist movement, which utilized the nationalist struggle itself as a mode 
of female political mobilization the Islamist movement has successfully used Islam as a 
tool for nationalist struggle, thereby enabling Palestinian females to also use religion as 
tool for gender equality within the national struggle. Once inside this reconstructed 
approach to Palestinian nationalism, Islamist women resolve the social crisis in gender 
norms (as previously experienced by their secular counterparts) through an understanding 
of freedom that is found in the conflation of piety and politics as a central element of 
Islamist ideology. Ultimately, it is within this framework that Islamist women-as-mothers 
continue to negotiate their full participation as citizens in the Palestinian struggle. 
 
Conclusion 
As Lybarger writes, “By the 1980s, to identify as Palestinian was to be a 
supporter, passive or active, of the P.L.O.” (Lybarger 2007).  Since the 1990s, however, 
this sentiment has dramatically changed, illustrating the rise of the Islamist alternative in 
Palestinian politics. Where what I refer to as the “exogenous” element of the Palestinian 
struggle vis-à-vis Israel remains as ever before a political and existential struggle for 
recognition and existence, the politically gendered elements of Palestinian nationalism 
remain unchanged. Thus, despite the Islamization of the Palestinian struggle, the 
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emphasis on traditional female roles on mothers of the Israeli-coined, “demographic 
bomb” persists as a central element in the Palestinian nationalist discourse. However, 
within what I call the “endogenous” struggle, i.e. the battle for hegemonic control and 
influence between the secular-nationalists and Islamists within the Palestinian society, a 
comparable evolution in the imagery of the Palestinian activist mother has taken place.  
Where participation in the national struggle remains for Palestinian women a basis for 
demanding gender equality in a range of institutional settings, Islamist women have 
worked to create a space where they are heard for their unique contributions to the 
Palestinian struggle, in spite of how naturalized this may appear. Using the tools of 
religion and the highly respected social element of political motherhood, it seems that 
these women are beyond social and political reproach, unlike their secular and feminist 
counterparts who have been historically stymied by the contradictions between 
progressive political agendas and misogynistic social traditions concerning women’s 
roles. As Hammami and Kuttub demonstrate, “motherhood as a symbolic force can 
sometimes be very effective in challenging voices of oppression” (Hammami and Kuttab 
1999, 9). They cite the example of the Argentine mothers of political prisoners who were 
capable of openly demonstrating and challenging the Pinochet regime due to the social 
and political liability in traditional societies that comes with violently targeting women.  
As Hammami and Kuttab state, “no one wants to be seen attacking mothers” (Hammami 
and Kuttab 1999, 9). 
The politicization of Palestinian mothers during the 1987 intifada attracted the 
attention of feminist scholars who looked to Palestinian women as being more actively 
engaged in the process of reconstituting the meaning of motherhood itself. For example, 
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rather than seeing women as passive recipients and mere reproductive wombs of the 
Palestinian struggle, Peteet’s approach to “Palestinian activist mothering” sees a 
potentially transformative element for women within the paradox of agency and 
complicity in the Palestinian woman-mother icon.  Peteet writes: 
 
When they engaged in the defense of their communities as mothers they 
acted in reference to culturally dominant and highly charged symbols of 
maternal sentiment and behavior.  Yet a transformation in meaning was 
occasioned by a praxis that, while culturally sanctioned, subverted the 
space and meaning traditionally associated with maternal practice (Peteet 
1997, 104). 
 
Adding to Peteet’s view that an emancipatory space for women is created through the act 
of Palestinian maternal activism is Abdo’s simple yet elegant observation that “national 
culture produced in the course of struggle has the potential to be emancipatory and 
progressive” where women are concerned (Abdo 1994). Of course, as Abdo points out, 
emancipation largely depends on the extent of women’s involvement and their success in 
pushing women’s issues to the forefront of the national agenda (Abdo 1994). Finally, 
Sharoni, another expert of Palestinian motherhood writes, the political discourse 
surrounding Palestinian motherhood “embodied both the steadfastness and cultural 
continuity associated with Palestinian national liberation and the warmth, care and 
compassion associated with traditional womanhood” (Sharoni 1995, 120). Writing before 
the rise of Islamist politics in Palestine, it is likely that these scholars did not anticipate 
the likes of contemporary Islamist female leaders, Jamila Shanti and Umm Nidal, who 
have found social and political acceptance within the Islamist leadership. However, 
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before the outbreak of the Al-Aqsa Intifada in 2000, Palestinian feminist scholars 
Hammami and Kuttab argued that the then-stagnant Palestinian women’s movement 
needed to exploit the moral symbolism of Palestinian mothers as a way to mobilize a 
broader base Palestinian women, including the Islamists (Hammami and Kuttab 1999).  
Indeed, whether secular or Islamist in origin, certainly the ongoing effects and 
experiences of Israeli occupation on women-as-mothers can potentially serve as a 
unifying platform for all Palestinian women regardless of class, religious or political 
affiliation. Finally, if—as Abdo’s work indicates—nationalism can as easily become a 
mechanism of domination and oppression as it can be a potential force for gender and 
social liberation, Palestinian mother-activism remains a vital conduit for representing and 
serving the political demands of Palestinian women (Abdo 1994).   
 The primary conclusion of this chapter is that the moral symbolism of Palestinian 
motherhood is among the foremost defining features of female political activism. 
However essentialized this role may be, it is a resilient and enduringly powerful feature 
of Palestinian female political identity. In light of the strength and popularity of mother-
candidates of the political process in the Palestinian Authority, it is unlikely that this 
political role for women will be eclipsed. At the same time, however, the rise to power of 
women-as-mothers in the Islamist movement bears on the important ways in which the 
role of Palestinian women as political mothers (and mother-candidates) has perceptible 
changed by way of directing women to act in accordance with Islamic law. By embracing 
the Islamo-nationalist platform for women’s roles in accordance with Islamic law, the 
question becomes one of whether these women are being co-opted or rigorously engaging 
Islamist ideology to further the social and political rights of Palestinian women in such a 
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highly conservative political setting.  Building upon this question, the following chapter 













Palestinian women developed the sharp fierceness of a denied but not 
broken spirit. Subjected to the dual discrimination of gender and 
national identity, those who did not lash out in defiance adopted the 
deceptive demeanor of the subdued. Beneath that lay the smoldering 
embers of a guarded fire. Nourished in secret in its dormant state, it 
would flare up at the first signs of interference.  Since the early days 
of the occupation, it was the women who took to the streets and 
challenged the army. The women also had taken the initiative of 
establishing popular committees and alternative structures. They 
were the ones who would wrestle with the soldiers to rescue their 
offspring or the children of other women. 
 
   –Dr. Hanan Ashrawi        
 
Palestinian women have long played an important role as political activists and 
organizers on behalf of the nationalist struggle. In the initial development of Palestinian 
nationalism in the 1920s, upper class urban women and kinswomen of prominent male 
leaders emerged as the first advocates for Palestinian independence under British colonial 
rule. These women formed local charitable organizations and women’s associations as a 
way of assisting in the national endeavor.35 But the Palestinian women’s organizations at 
this time lacked any discussion and demands for improvements to women’s positions or 
women’s rights (Peteet 1986, 20). Instead the primary goal of the Palestinian women’s 
organizations of the 1920s was to support the realization of Palestinian self-determination 
                                                 
35 For a complete history on the Palestinian women’s movement in the 1920s, see Ellen L. Fleischmann 
(2003).   
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under the British Mandate. Questions of women’s domestic roles or subordinate legal 
status under Ottoman and Islamic law were not linked with a Palestinian notion of 
statehood more broadly. As Peteet writes, “Palestinian women were aware of the organic 
links binding their movement to the national movement and made little attempt to extract 
their own problems and prospects from those of the larger social body” (Peteet 1986, 20). 
While women did not presume to act upon the principles of gender equality per se, 
organizing and rallying Palestinian women in the name of Palestinian self-determination 
presented a non-traditional activity for women in an otherwise very traditional society, 
governed by patriarchal structures resting on principles of family honor and female 
modesty. Thus, female participation in the nationalist struggle opened the way for greater 
opportunities for Palestinian women to operate in public spaces as political activists 
alongside men. Beyond the boundaries of their traditional home life, Palestinian women 
increasingly appeared at protests and rallies as public advocates of the Palestinian cause. 
Marching alongside and in front of their men, Palestinian women played a significant role 
in physically protecting them from coming under fire from British authorities hesitant to 
fire upon women in a crowd.   
As a consequence of Palestinian women’s activism in the earliest days of the 
Palestinian nationalist struggle, a common theme of engaged activism through the 
generations of Palestinian women produces a spirit of continuity that unites Palestinian 
women. Yet, the historic rise of Palestinian Islamist groups in the late 1980s complicates 
this story. In effect, the emergence of female Islamic organizations tied to the Islamist 
political factions directly challenges and confronts the secular-nationalist character of 
female participation. Analyzing the evolution of the Palestinian struggle from its 
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longstanding secular-nationalist ideology to the rise of alternative Islamist groups, this 
chapter tells the story of Palestinian women’s organizations and in the rise of Islamo-
nationalist politics between 1987 and 2007.  
 
Reflections on Palestinian Women and the First Intifada 
When speaking with Palestinian women today who remember the era of the 1987 
intifada, personal insights into a forgone sense of hope and communalism are roundly 
offered with more regularity than cups of mint-infused tea.36 It is said that the common 
theme of “shaking off” the oppressive policies of the Israeli military created a common 
bond for the Palestinian community that was remarkably coherent and cohesive in 
comparison to Palestinian society today. Johnson and Kuttab note, “…the site of struggle 
was the community, its stress, neighborhoods and homes, the ‘stone’ was the main 
weapon in defending the dignity of the community” (Johnson and Kuttab 2001, 31).  
During this time, women from every sector of society spontaneously participated in 
confrontations with the Israeli army. In these activities, Palestinian women marched as 
demonstrators, colluded as stone-throwers, and were often seen as impromptu rescuers of 
young men from the hands of the Israeli forces (Johnson and Kuttab 2001, 31). 
According to Jad, Palestinian women’s actions were sometimes violent, and they were 
often involved in more extreme confrontations with the Israeli military forces (Jad 1999, 
224). Meanwhile, against the abnormal backdrop of military occupation, Palestinian 
women were responsible for maintaining a sense of conventional normalcy in daily life.  
A 64-year-old retired school teacher from Beit Jala said, “Every day of the intifada, I felt 
                                                 
36 Notes from fieldwork 2009. 
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alive with hope, even if teaching the children at school and protecting them as we tried to 
walk home under the Israelis with their guns meant that I could face my death.”37 In these 
infamous years of struggle, the nationalist slogan, “To exist is to resist” inspired the 
whole of Palestinian society to shoulder the task of living through extremely harsh 
conditions of Israeli military incursions into towns and homes, as well as closures of 
schools and businesses. Since the establishment of Israel and the catastrophic dispersion 
of the Palestinian people after 1948, the Palestinian people continued to hope that their 
fundamental struggle “to exist” would eventually lead to the establishment of a 
Palestinian state. Even without a state in hand, the climate of Palestinian nationalist 
efforts was one of mass-based organizations, which were rigorously fueled by collective, 
grassroots endeavors.  
Organized at the grassroots level, the collective frustrations of the Palestinian 
people erupted in the 1987 intifada after more than a decade of democratic activism in the 
West Bank and Gaza Strip. Influenced by post-colonial struggles elsewhere, Palestinian 
mass-based organizations under the PLO dominated the political landscape at the time, 
and each organization included an array of auxiliary political women’s committees, 
constituting an extensive mobilization of the Palestinian population. Palestinian women 
of all ages and social classes became the major actors in mobilizing and sustaining the 
1987 intifada (Johnson and Kuttab 2001, 26). According to Hammami, this made the 
West Bank and Gaza Strip “among the few areas in the Middle East where a political 
space was available for the emergence of a strong, pluralistic infrastructure” (Hammami 
2000, 17). 
                                                 
37 Notes from fieldwork, 2007. 
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The female activists of the 1987 intifada were the second and third generations of 
Palestinian women to participate in the Palestinian struggle. Those hailing from refugee 
camps in the West Bank and Gaza Strip were the daughters and granddaughters of 
women who were permanently dislocated from their homes and villages upon the 
establishment of Israel 1948, and through the traumatic events of the Nakba. The 
Palestinian refugee camps had also become home to more Palestinian refugees of the 
1967 Arab-Israeli war. Also, in non-refugee and elite circles of Palestinian society, the 
female participants of the first intifada were the women who came of age watching their 
mothers and grandmothers mobilize on behalf of the Palestinian cause. By the start of the 
1987 intifada, every Palestinian woman had an intimate and personal connection to the 
collective Palestinian experience of living through war, physical dislocation, economic 
disenfranchisement, and military occupation. More than a wife or a mother, these women 
were “fighters, leaders, workers, students, activists, cadres and martyrs” (Peteet 1986, 
21). Comprising the newest generation of Palestinian struggle, younger activist females 
of the 1987 intifada were a product of a proud and protracted nationalist struggle for 
existence and self-determination.     
   Importantly, Palestinian women’s participation in the intifada rapidly became 
more than a means to rally for the sake of the nationalist struggle. Under the direction of 
the women’s mass-based organizations, Palestinian women began to organize locally.  
They formed more intimate neighborhood committees, which were specifically able to 
respond to the needs of their communities under siege by Israeli forces. Among these 
efforts were the organization of food supplies, education and child-care, all of which 
came to be seen as the extension of women’s domestic labor. More widely, these 
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activities coincided with the vibrant sector of women’s committees, which served as 
“vehicles to promote social and political consciousness to sustain the intifada” (Johnson 
and Kuttab 2001, 27).   
Through their participation in these endeavors, the evolution of Palestinian 
women’s social and political consciousness led to a demand for social and political 
equality in their own right. As it rapidly became apparent that Palestinian women were 
defying the constructs of traditional society in a revolutionary way, Manar Hassan, 
cofounder of Al Fanar, a Palestinian feminist organization writes: 
In its beginning, the Intifada was not only a political issue; a social 
revolution was taking place.  Women began to get out of the house, from 
their cocoon, from the kitchen and washing dishes, and go out and 
participate with men.  As if she has forgotten the whole history of 
patriarchal oppression.  She could now lead popular committees, build 
other committees, and participate in decision-making.  This was not only 
nationalism.  Here the linkage was being made unconsciously (Abdulhadi 
1998, 656-657). 
 
In these local contexts, decentralized forms of organization such as women’s 
neighborhood and popular committees were led by women to meet the needs of the 
community. Day care centers and income-generating projects for women became the 
most popular tool for female mobilization. Other activities included teaching children 
when all Palestinian schools were closed by Israeli military order. Alongside men, 
Palestinian women were also responsible for guarding neighborhoods, but they were 
especially encouraged to develop their own home economies and help to organize food 
supplies for others in need (Johnson and Kuttab 2001, 27). While Palestinian women’s 
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responsibilities in and outside of the home grew, the consciousness of their place in 
traditional society led to the desire to work for women’s rights by way of Palestinian self-
determination.     
 
Palestinian Women’s Organizations in the First Intifada 
Prior to and during the 1987 intifada, the organization and proliferation of the 
Palestinian secular-nationalist women’s committees led to an entrenched involvement of 
Palestinian women in the national struggle. In fact, nearly a decade before the events 
leading to the 1987 intifada, International Women’s Day on the March 8, 1978 marked 
the solid presence of the Palestinian women’s organizations and their activities in the 
Palestinian resistance. Noting the importance of this day, Jad writes that some activist 
women held a meeting, which resulted in the creation of the Women’s Work Committee 
(lajnet al-‘amal al-nissaei). The membership of the committee was composed of a 
generation of secular-nationalist women who had become politically active through their 
affiliation to the left-wing parties, most notably the Democratic Front for the Liberation 
of Palestine (DFLP), Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), the 
Communist Party and Fatah (Jad 2008, 34). The Palestinian women’s movement 
consisted of an array of different types of women’s organizations, including a “general 
union, committees affiliated to political parties, independent women’s NGOs, charitable 
societies and women’s studies and research centres” (Allabadi 2008, 181). But the 
Palestinian Federation of Women's Action Committees (PFWAC)—whose parent party 
was the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP) —eventually grew to 
become the largest and most powerful women’s mass-based organization during the 1987 
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intifada years. With an combined nationalist and feminist agenda, PFWAC was 
“committed to the mass mobilization of women in the Occupied Palestinian Territories 
for the dual purposes of gaining national liberation and improving women’s gender status 
nationalist-feminist organization with an agenda to attain equal rights for women with 
men in the public sphere” (Hasso 2001, 590). The PFWAC was not only responsible for 
providing a place for women to organize politically for the Palestinian movement, but 
also a forum to build upon the issues of social and political matters impacting gender 
equality. According to Hasso, female involvement in the organizational aspects of the 
PFWAC during the 1987 intifada can largely be seen as contributing to the creation of a 
wider, “feminist generation” of Palestinian women that persisted for years after the end of 
the first intifada (Hasso 2001, 588). 
Palestinian women’s deep political engagement as citizens and participants in the 
secular-nationalist movement prompted many women to embrace an ideological point of 
view that linked female social and political liberation to the liberation of the Palestinian 
people. In contrast to the Palestinian women’s charitable societies which were limited in 
membership to elite circles, the mass-based organizations of the women’s movement 
focused on involving the greatest number of women in the nationalist movement, and 
therefore welcomed Palestinian women from every sector of society (Taraki 1983, 62, 
Jad 2008, 34). As Jad writes, “All projects undertaken by the women’s committees 
provided a permanent pool of recruits, whether in the villages, refugee camps or cities.  
The process in itself helped many women cadres to develop an understanding of the 
needs and demands of women with whom they worked” (Jad 2008, 34). From this, the 
goal of recognizing and furthering the rights of Palestinian women as participants in the 
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national struggle evolved to mobilize the mass of Palestinian women around the dual 
issues of national rights and women’s rights (Allabadi 2008, 182). As a result, the women 
of these committees came to strongly believe that the Palestinian leadership could not 
ignore the role of Palestinian women in the resistance and the need to address social 
change in the new laws of the future Palestinian state.  
The first Palestinian’s women’s committee was established nearly a decade before 
the outbreak of the 1987 intifada. The Union of Women’s Work Committee (PUWWC) 
was established in 1978 in an initiative undertaken by the Palestinian left.38 The PUWWC 
soon split into three separate committees: the Union of Palestinian Working Women’s 
Committees (UPWWC), the Union of Palestinian Women’s Committees (UPWC) and the 
Federation of Palestinian Women’s Action Committees  (FPWAC) (Connell 2002, 140). 
In 1983, the Women’s Committee for Social Work (WCSW) was established under 
Fatah. These four organizations became the predominant secular-nationalist women’s 
organizations of the 1980s.  
The split of the PUWWC into the separate women’s committees came as a result 
of acute and seemingly insurmountable ideological divisions from within the mainstream 
secular-nationalist factions of the Palestinian struggle. Each of the women’s committees 
was affiliated with the most active and predominant political parties of the West Bank 
and Gaza Strip at the time. Unlike women’s charitable societies, the new Palestinian 
                                                 
38 The PUWWC has also been referred to simply as the Women’s Work Committee (WWC).  According to 
Hiltermann, in 1989it was re-named the Federation of Palestinian Women’s Action Committees (FPWAC).  
The founders of this organization were primarily women from petit-bourgeois families.  They sought to 
break with past charitable work performed by women of upper classes and addressed the problems of 
working women, such as village women working in the agricultural sector, students and housewives. See 
Hiltermann (1991). 
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women’s committees derived their cadres and membership from across the spectrum of 
Palestinian society. They were as follows: 
1. Federation of Palestinian Women’s Action Committees (FPWAC), affiliated with 
the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP)—initially the Union of 
Women’s Work Committees until 1989. 
2. Union of Palestinian Working Women’s Committees (UPWWC), affiliated with 
the former Communist Party, now called the “People’s Party”, and associated initially 
with women from Bethlehem. 
3. Union of Palestinian Women’s Committees (UPWC), affiliated with the Popular 
Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP). 
4. Women’s Committee for Social Work (WCSW), affiliated with Fatah, the largest 
mainstream political group at the time.39 
 
Additionally, the General Union of Palestinian Women (GUPW), which was 
established with the founding of the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) in 1964, 
sought to represent the interests of women in the Palestinian refugee camps outside of the 
West Bank and Gaza Strip and also in the international arena (Holt 1996, 191). 
Independently, each committee focused on a targeted demographic of Palestinian 
women to mobilize and support. For example, the Fatah-based, Women’s Committee for 
Social Work (WCSW) maintained an ideological commitment to charitable services, 
most closely in line with earlier women’s charitable societies. The WCSW broadly 
provided social services to women rather than mobilized them (Hiltermann 1991, 50).  
The other three women’s committees were similar to the WCSW in their organizing and 
charitable work, while also trying to focus on the specific needs of Palestinian women.  
Specifically, the Union of Palestinian Women’s Committees (UPWC) was organized 
                                                 
39 For more on how the Palestinian women’s committees divided along factional lines, see Hiltermann 
(1991), Holt (1996). Jad (1990), Peteet (1991), Sayigh (1987), Sabbagh. (1998), Taraki (1983).  
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around supporting the needs of working women, where the Federation of Palestinian 
Women’s Action Committees (PFWAC) developed a clear feminist orientation while 
primarily focusing on women in the home. Finally, the Union of Palestinian Women’s 
Committees (UPWC) focused on its more educated, urban middle-class membership and 
young female students coming out of the student movement (Hiltermann 1991, 52). 
Despite the factionalism that prevailed in the broader Palestinian movement, what was 
vitally common to each of these approaches was an overriding commitment to the 
realization of a leftist, politically secular, democratic state called Palestine. In the spirit of 
democratic socialism associated with the secular-nationalist movement of the time, each 
committee drafted its own internal bylaws with an eye to maintaining and promoting a 
rigorous atmosphere of pluralism and debate.   
However, to the extent that political factionalism threatened the cohesion of the 
Palestinian nationalist movement, the same is true of nearly all efforts to organize 
Palestinian women beyond their local committee engagement. Each of the women’s 
committees sought to represent a specific population of women according to various 
ideological frameworks and approaches to the Palestinian question. While they tended to 
focus on different locations and demographic categories of women for recruitment, their 
overall activities—in terms of mobilizing and supporting women—were similar, 
overlapping and complementary (Hiltermann 1998, 43). For example, every committee 
sought ways to support women through the creation of childcare centers to accommodate 
activist women. Kindergartens, training programs for girls, sewing centers, and other 
means of “self-help” work was provided for women (Connell 2002, 141). Moreover, the 
women’s committees turned to focus on health education classes for women as primary 
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caregivers, especially as “casualties mounted in the neighborhoods, as a result of beatings 
and tear gas” administered by the IDF (Hiltermann 1998, 43). According to a Christian 
woman from Beit Sahour who independently founded a private, Fatah-based women’s 
non-profit organization, the Palestinian women’s committees have always done much of 
the same work. “We are all women. We all have the same problems with family and no 
money. But we are divided by ideology,” she said.40 
Although structurally disjointed and unevenly coordinated, the Palestinian 
women’s movement was nevertheless a nationwide endeavor, and the women involved in 
it were primarily motivated by national interest (Kamal 1998, 88). However, unlike the 
ideology of women’s organizational efforts before it, the women’s committees of the 
Palestinian women’s movement of the 1987 intifada were emboldened by specific 
elements of feminist ideology that attached the struggle for gender liberation to the 
national question. The leadership of the women’s committees saw the goal of national 
liberation as a means to achieving social and political equality for women, and widely 
promoted the idea that women were also the co-builders of a future democratic 
Palestinian state (Kamal 1998, 87). Holt adds that in the first two years of the 1987 
intifada, “the four women’s committees changed the focus of their activities, which had 
previously concentrated on the provision of such basic services as nurseries, literacy 
classes and training centres” (Holt 1996, 194). As the initial enthusiasm of the intifada 
progressed into years of struggle and hardship, the women’s committees began to shift 
their organizational emphasis and subsequently swelled in numbers (Holt 1996, 194). 
                                                 
40 Notes from fieldwork 2007. 
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In 1988, a fleeting moment of formal cooperation between the four main women’s 
committees led to the establishment of the Higher Women’s Council (HWC). The 
HWC’s aim was to unite the four main women’s groups into one forum in order to 
enhance the political legitimacy of women’s work on behalf of the nationalist struggle.  
The HWC’s unifying message was to promote “the women’s movement around the twin 
themes of women’s social struggle and the struggle for national liberation” (Hiltermann 
1998, 47). The goal of the HWC was the consolidation of scarce human and financial 
resources and to avoid competition among women’s groups within the struggle for gender 
equality. The HWC had two strategic missions: 1) to address the issue of gender and 
equality, and 2) to address the issue of national liberation. In this forum, the crucial issues 
of female education and their legal situation under pre-existing religious laws were 
central concerns of the HWC (Kamal 1998). Importantly, however, the consolidation of 
women’s organizational efforts did not mean that factional differences between the 
women’s committees were resolved. The HWC was later renamed the Unified Women’s 
Council (UWC), and remained plagued by the factional political differences that 
emanated from the committee representatives’ ideological approaches to the Palestinian 
question (Afshar 1996, 181). 
Regardless of social and political affiliation, Palestinian women were equally 
affected by military occupation as they poured into the streets in protest. Particularly 
during the first two years of the 1987 intifada, Palestinian women entered the public 
sphere in protest and defiance of both Israeli troops and traditional gender roles. Due to 
this prevailing trend, worldwide observers noted women’s participation in these highly 
visible confrontations and even touted this as “evidence that the Palestinian national 
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movement had made great strides in the liberation of women” (Connell 2002, 141).  
Described as “heady and exuberant” times, the first two years of the 1987 intifada 
attracted the attention of women activists and commentators around the world who wrote 
of “a transformation within Palestinian society in general and women’s role and position 
within it” (Glavanis-Grantham 1996, 175). At home and within the broader international 
community, Palestinian women of the first intifada years were heralded for breaking 
traditional patriarchal barriers and “challenging the predominant stereotype of the 
domesticated and repressed Arab woman” (Glavanis-Grantham 1996, 175). 
Strategically and ideologically, the social and political agenda framed by 
Palestinian women’s committees explicitly linked sexual liberation to political liberation 
for Palestinian women and Palestinian people more broadly. This resulted in an 
immediate outpouring of enthusiastic scholarly articles and accounts of Palestinian 
women that attested to the social and political space more or less “claimed” by women in 
Palestinian society at this time. Yet, almost as soon as the 1987 intifada and the women’s 
agenda within it began to build in speed and popularity, the goal of establishing a secular 
state attentive to social and political equality for women was sharply contested by the 
growth of the Islamist opposition. Here, it appears that despite the great strides made by 
secularist women in the nationalist movement, a general survey of women’s political 
views taken by the Women’s Action Committee in 1988 showed that a majority of 
Palestinian women favored the establishment of an Islamic state based on the principles 
of religious Islam as a traditional and, hence, favorable means to restore the rights of all 
Palestinian people (Connell 2002, 141). The rise to power of Islamist political groups 
confronted the strides made by the secular women. Only later would it appear that for all 
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of the applause given to the conscious-raising agenda of the female leaders of the 
Palestinian women’s movement in the international community, these initiatives grew 
increasingly unpopular as Islamists gained a wide base of support as an alternative to the 
secular-nationalist political framework of the Palestinian struggle. 
 
The Disintegration of the Women’s Movement in the Rise of Islamo-Nationalism 
From the start of the 1987 intifada, the women’s committees in the Gaza Strip 
faced harsher repression by local Islamist forces, which began to gain ground in 1988.  
Analysts have noted that during this time, Palestinian women’s political participation 
dwindled as the intifada began to lose its spontaneous nature and became institutionalized 
(Sabbagh 1998, 3). The declining participation of Palestinian women came at a time 
when all of the Palestinian political committees were declared illegal under the Israeli 
military authority in 1988. This occurred as the Islamist factional groups, Hamas and 
Palestinian Islamic Jihad, began to organize and influence local politics. By September 
1989, mass involvement in the intifada was beginning to recede due to the Israeli 
repression of the main political parties. Within a few months, the mass protests against 
the Israeli occupation began to be systemized through tightly controlled all-male units 
that ran the streets, and specifically excluded women from their ranks (Connell 2002, 
142).  Left out of the process, the mass coordination of Palestinian woman declined. 
According to Sabbagh, there were two main reasons for the decline of women’s 
participation in the leftist women’s committees. First, a male-led (Islamist) backlash 
against the progress made by women in the political sphere made it increasingly difficult 
for women and sympathetic Palestinian men to rally behind issues of women’s rights and 
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gender equality. Second, the related failure of the 1987 intifada to achieve a political 
solution to occupation led to the disintegration of the nationalist movement more broadly 
(Sabbagh 1998, 11). In light of these issues, the decline of the secular-nationalist 
women’s movement as a whole led to the inability of the women’s committees to 
“articulate a specific program for women beyond participation in production projects and 
cooperatives” (Strum 1998, 73). Illustrating this point is a 1989 letter to its membership, 
in which the Union of Palestinian Working Women’s Committees (UPWWC), states: 
Has the intifada changed the perception of women’s role in Palestinian 
society?  Has it changed the way women themselves perceive their roles?  
These questions have to be reckoned with by the Palestinian women’s 
movement to enable it to keep pace with the fast-moving events of the 
intifada….What assurances do women have that they will not be asked to 
return to their traditional, domestic roles if and when independence is 
achieved? (Hiltermann 1998, 49). 
 
By 1989, the previously heady and optimistic moment of the first intifada had since 
passed into what Holt describes as a final phase of the intifada period, when hope for a 
successful outcome had been destroyed (Holt 1996, 195). More precisely, a broader loss 
of confidence in the leftist, secular-national parties and their abilities to effectively bring 
the hopes for Palestinian statehood to its realization was imminent. Ultimately, the 
feelings of frustration caused by this realization that the intifada had produced nothing 
resembling peace or political autonomy, prompted many Palestinians, including women, 
to see political action inspired by Islamist groups as an alternative, and possibly a more 
effective approach to the nationalist struggle (Holt 1996, 195).    
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By 1991, the spirit the Palestinian struggle was replaced by a psychologically 
exhausted and shattered social and political culture. This mood was deepened in the 
Madrid phase of the 1990s Oslo peace process, which further marginalized the mass 
mobilization of the intifada. Palestinian academic and feminist activist, Eileen Kuttab 
says that the initiation of the peace process began to shift the Palestinian struggle away 
from grassroots mobilization, where the vast majority of female political activity was 
located towards diplomacy, which marginalized it.41 Kuttab is quoted in Giacaman and 
Johnson (1995) as saying that with the advent of the 1990s peace process, “Women’s 
skills, developed in informal settings, were not utilizable. The political conditions became 
confusing and women could not get back into action” (Giacaman and Johnson 1994, 24).   
Added to this is the fact that the Oslo peace process elicited a sharp outcry from 
many of the political groups that once supported the 1987 intifada. From the standpoint 
of the Islamists, the Oslo peace process (which only engaged the PLO in Tunis with the 
representatives of Israel) represented the continued imposition of a Western form of 
“modernization” on the sanctity of Palestinian cultural life. From this Islamist 
perspective, the Oslo Accords compromised and muddied the purity of Palestinian 
political demands. Among the most ardent responses from the groups opposed to 
Palestinian reconciliation with Israel was that of Hamas, which staged a series of suicide 
attacks against Israeli civilian and military targets so as to undermine the peace process 
(Gunning 2009, 195). At a time when Palestinian women were already on the margins of 
the secular-nationalist peace negotiations with Israel, Hamas’ strong revisionist version 
                                                 
41 Discussion with Eileen Kuttab at the YWCA in East Jerusalem, notes from fieldwork 8/21/2009. 
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of the Palestinian struggle included an intense focus on the role of women and their 
incorporation into the Islamist national vision of Palestine.   
By 1995, assessments of the strength of the leftist, secular-nationalist base of the 
women’s movement varied substantially due to the fact that data on committee 
membership and participation levels was unreliable or non-existent (Giacaman and 
Johnson 1994, 24). However, a survey conducted by Palestinian and Norwegian social 
scientists in 1993 revealed a consistently more socially and politically conservative 
stance among younger Palestinian women aged 15-19 compared to women in the their 
twenties (Heiberg and Overnsen 1993). Importantly, the findings of this survey suggest 
that particularly among the youngest age group of Palestinians in the early 1990s, the 
gender divisions in society were under a process of an Islamist redefinition and 
reinforcement, and this phenomenon was most present in the Gaza Strip (Heiberg and 
Overnsen 1993). In light of the rise of Islamist forces in the Palestinian political terrain, 
Abdulhadi notes, "because communist and nationalist groups had championed the cause 
of women's liberation, their gender programs, grounded as they were in "Western" and 
"modernist" notions, could not be salvaged from the blow dealt to their political 
platforms"(Abdulhadi 1998, 659). Within the Gaza Strip, the secular and Marxist 
ideology of the left came to be seen as a liability in the nationalist project, which was 
weakened by the rise and increasing credibility of Islamist forces.  
As an alternative to the mainstream leftist parties, the Islamic vision of Palestinian 
nationalism produced by Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad, was both empowering and 
exciting to a population losing hope. Central to this approach was a sharpened focus on 
women and family honor through a nostalgic return to an “authentic” way of Palestinian 
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life. The Islamists focused on the issue of restoration of Palestinian honor through a 
“return” to traditional Palestinian social structures. These social structures are especially 
reliant on family honor as a symbol of Palestinian pride. Similar to religious revivalists 
and cultural revisionist movements elsewhere, the Hamas leadership quickly capitalized 
on the opportunity to preserve women’s traditional roles as a way of portraying Hamas 
itself as the sole defender of cultural authenticity (Connell 2002, 142). In doing so, 
Hamas’ first step was to challenge the authority of the secular-nationalist women’s 
committees and their emphasis on Western-inspired notions of gender equality by 
inciting a sweeping campaign to impose the hijab (headscarf) on all women in the Gaza 
Strip (Abdulhadi 1998, Hammami 1990).     
Highlighted in the previous chapter, the hijab campaign was a way to directly re-
privatize women and the gains they had made as visible participants in the Palestinian 
struggle. More broadly, it was a way to discipline women’s bodies for Hamas’ political 
goal of increasing the local credibility on the Palestinian street. Through intimidation and 
threats, small, semi-military bands of young men attacked uncovered women with acid, 
stones, tomatoes and eggs to enforce women’s compliance (Abdulhadi 1998, 657). 
Specifically the Hamas directive was aimed at the women of Gaza who hailed from 
educated, urban and petit bourgeois backgrounds and occupied leadership roles as 
secular-leaning women in the nationalist struggle (Hammami 1990, 25). As a result, 
women who did not comply with the order to wear the hijab were portrayed as “symbols 
of corruption and national betrayal” (Milton-Edwards and Farrell 2010, 189). By 
cultivating the image of the Palestinian collaborator as “the bareheaded, loose and 
morally bankrupt woman” (Milton-Edwards and Farrell 2010, 189), Hamas attempted to 
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extract women away from the public realm of Palestinian politics, and nearly succeeded 
through the support of social acquiescence, political inaction and local family pressure.   
As a result of this violence against Palestinian women, Hammami writes that one 
year into the intifada, only a few committed women in Gaza remained openly opposed 
the Hamas campaign (Hammami 1990, 24). Yet, even the most politically active women 
of the leftist movement were increasingly disillusioned by the male leadership of the 
leftist political parties who remained silent in an effort not to alienate their individual 
party platforms from the Islamists and their leadership. Hammami adds that as increasing 
numbers of women in Gaza were attacked in the streets, the leftist male leadership stood 
by in silence out of fear of further disrupting their conservative support base. 
As Hammami suggests, very little was said or done by the male leadership of the 
left to stop the violence against women in Gaza until it was far too late. Once women 
began to cover out of fear for their safety, it seemed that there was “no going back.” 
Unlike the revolutionary spirit of the early days of the first intifada, Palestinian women 
began increasingly to confront the Islamist agenda to circumscribe Palestinian feminist 
activism and beliefs. Concurrently, it was difficult to argue against Hamas’ attacks on 
women, especially as it appealed to the least rational of Palestinian fears: the corruption 
of female honor by the Israeli enemy. The appeal to this fear was clearly told in Article 
17 of the Hamas Charter: 
The enemies have realized her role: they think that if they are able to 
direct her and raise her the way they want, far from Islam, then they have 
won the battle…The Islamist should play his role in confronting the plans 
of those destroyers. When the day comes and Islam has its way in 
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directing life, it shall eliminate [those organizations] which are opposed to 
humanity and Islam (Islamic Resistance Movement (Hamas) 1993, 128). 
 
In effect, Hamas’ order for the veiling of Palestine’s women was seen as not only 
protecting Palestinian women from social corruption from within society, but the 
Palestinian people from the dangers of the greater struggle for self-determination vis-à-
vis Israel.  
As Milton-Edwards and Farrell write, “The propagation of the canard that women 
are weak and vulnerable to exploitation by Israel through seduction…provided Hamas 
with yet another rationalization to exert greater control (Milton-Edwards and Farrell 
2010, 189). Ultimately, in the state of despair that prevailed as the leadership of the first 
intifada failed to achieve a political solution with Israel, the emergence of the Islamist 
movement was powerful enough to put many of Palestinians into a state of reactionary 
defensiveness and inward looking reproach against the leftist political establishment. 
Similarly, where the leftist Palestinian women’s movement was concerned, the failures of 
the 1987 intifada “put the most optimistic advocate of women’s rights in a state of 
despair that sometimes translated into self-reproach” (Sabbagh 1998, 12).  
 
Significance of the Hamas Hijab Campaign in Gaza 
Both symbolically and literally, the Hamas hijab campaign can be largely 
attributed to a reactionary ideology of women’s role in society, no doubt buttressed by 
the transcendence of Palestinian women from their traditional roles in the private sphere 
into the public realm of political demonstration and rigorously engaged activism prior to 
and during the 1987 intifada. As a reinforced symbol of Islamist nationalism, the hijab 
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became both a symbol of Islamic values and nationalist sentiment as well as a visible 
indicator of the strength of Hamas.42 The campaign became most effective through the 
actions of young Palestinian men in Gaza, who found violent ways to express their 
frustrations with the Israeli occupation and the seeming failures of the intifada to achieve 
a clear end, by attacking and harassing uncovered women. As Hammami states, "If there 
were no soldiers to throw stones at, women without headscarves made good targets" 
(Hammami 1990, 26).    
Taken as a whole, however, the Hamas campaign to cover the heads of the 
women of Gaza explicitly placed women within a tightly circumscribed social artifice of 
cultural struggle (between the openly-Western, secular-nationalist elements of Palestinian 
nationalist and regressive politics of the Islamist groups) by conflating long-standing 
traditional values of family honor and Palestinian femininity with an explicitly political 
Islamist agenda. Where uncovered women were considered vain, frivolous and, at best, 
onerous to the nationalist cause, wearing the hijab became a Palestinian woman’s only 
public way of expressing her piety and political commitment, and therefore ensuring her 
physical security in the street (Hammami 1990, 26). Of course, even as a mere symbol of 
piety and tradition, enforced “hijabization” was not widely accepted by all Palestinian 
women in Gaza or the Palestinian Territories more generally. Former Palestinian 
spokeswoman, Dr. Hanan Ashrawi is quoted in Abdulhadi (1998) as saying: 
The most visible aspect of this victimization is the Hijab.  To me, this 
sums up the way you view a woman: as a sex object, as shameful, so you 
cover her up; as a commodity, the possession of the man; as a secondary 
member of society--she is supposed to stay at home and support the 
                                                 
42 The hijab campaign is also discussed again in relation to issues of political motherhood in Chapter Four. 
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master...The dress code reinforces the invisibility of women (Abdulhadi 
1998, 657). 
 
As one woman noted, the problem of hijab was not the issue of covering for the sake of 
cultural or social modesty, but due to the fact that young men were given license to 
threaten, harm and mistreat women who chose not to cover in the name of Palestinian 
pride (Hammami 1990, 26). To the degree that Palestinian women were forced to cover 
under the tenets of Hamas’ de facto Islamist jurisdiction, the “intifada hijab” was not 
about modesty, piety or nationalism. As Hammami states, the hijab was about “the power 
of religious groups to impose themselves by attacking secularism and nationalism at their 
most vulnerable points: over issues of women's liberation" (Hammami 1990, 26).  
By conflating Palestinian culture and traditional religious convictions with a 
nationalist political agenda, Hamas leadership successfully cultivated its ‘indigenous’ 
support base in the Palestinian Territories. Contrary to the secular-nationalist 
organizations of the Palestinian nationalist movement, Hamas seemingly offered an 
alternative, ‘authentic’ space for women who could organize politically without having to 
worry about violating social norms such as family honor and female docility through a 
nostalgic conception of the passive Palestinian woman (Abdulhadi 1998, 659, Connell 
2002, 143). Rhetorically and through prominent social welfare programs, Hamas was 
even seen to support, protect and value Palestinian women. Moreover, the Islamist 
imperative for women to wear the hijab was defended by Hamas as not only a religious 
injunction of Islam, but a way of enabling women to “operate more freely in a male-
dominated public space, while at the same time averting social corruption” (Gunning 
2009, 79). In the interplay between religious and nationalist discourse, women are upheld 
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as the basis of the organic (‘natural’) relationship between the home and the nation.  
Here, the rhetoric of Islam is used to serve as the conceptual basis of Palestinian women’s 
separate-but-equal status to men. In this, women are invited to identify as political by 
wearing the costume of piety as a “good” Islamic woman of Palestine. They symbolically 
cover their bodies and modestly conduct themselves in public space so that a sense of 
order can be delivered/restored to the Palestinian public space to prevail over the disorder 
that Islamists associate with secular-nationalism and Israeli military control. 
 
Emergence of the Palestinian Women’s Islamist Movement 
The rise of a “new brand of feminism” in the early 1990s predated the recent 
evolution of Palestinian women’s political behavior, which it is not without impact and 
influence in the Palestinian context (Allabadi 2008, 183). Islamic feminism emerged 
from the streets of post-Khomeini Iran, when Iranian women recognized that their rights 
as citizens in the Islamic Republic were being infringed upon or rolled back (Badran 
2006). As Mir-Hosseini explains, the Islamic Republic’s failure to deliver on its promise 
to honor and protect is female constituents incited Iranian women. Their response 
represented  “an indigenous, locally produced, feminist consciousness” (Mir-Hosseini 
1996). From this, Iranian women began to ground their arguments for social and political 
rights in readings of the Qur'an, which stands as the “virtual constitution” of the republic 
(Badran 2006).   
According to Badran, Islamic feminism contains two principle tasks. First, it 
seeks to expose and eradicate patriarchal ideas and practices that are commonly 
“naturalized” and, thus, falsely portrayed as “Islamic.” Second, from the perspective that 
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gender equality is indivisible with human equality, Islamic feminism attempts to 
recuperate core ideas of gender equality contained in Islam (Badran 2006). Central to the 
movement is an adherence to strict religious beliefs. As Tohidi writes, the phenomenon 
consists of a movement of women who “have maintained their religious beliefs while 
trying to promote egalitarian ethics of Islam by using the female supportive verses of the 
Qur’an in their fight for women’s right” (Tohidi 1998). Tohidi also adds that while some 
women join the movement on behalf of furthering the right for female education, others 
“actively join Islamist/fundamentalist movements despite the latter’s patriarchal and 
sexist views and practices” (Tohidi 1998).43   
In this context, the most paradoxical and perplexing aspect of this movement is 
the brand of “Islamic feminism” that emerges from participation in Islamist movements. 
Tohidi adds that many women, “even among those initially standing by the Islamists in 
their protests, have not succumbed to all aspects of their leader’s patriarchal agenda” 
(Tohidi 1998).  For example, even in Iran where Islamists effectively control the state and 
violently enforce a patriarchal mandate over women, they have also not “succeeded in 
subjugating all women or completing eliminating women’s social agency” (Tohidi 
1998). The women in Iran serve as an example of remarkable resilience in maintaining 
their social presence and agency. Their active participation in the 1979 Islamic 
Revolution made their “re-domestication” impossible in the decades since, which perhaps 
now serves as a mirror to the Palestinian case.  
 Similarly confounding secular feminists and scholars alike the rise the number of 
Islamic women’s organizations in the Palestinian Territories proliferated through an 
                                                 
43 For more views on Islamic feminism, see Badran (1996, 1999), Hammami and Rieker (1988), 
Moghadam (2002), Shahidian (1997). 
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affiliation with Hamas and to a lesser extent Islamic Jihad in the 1990s. Unlike the 
secular-nationalist women’s committees before them, these organizations attracted 
massive numbers of devout female followers of Islam who more closely identified with 
the brand of politics offered up by the Islamist organizations. Like the secular-nationalist 
women’s organizations at their peak, Palestinian female recruits of the Islamist groups 
were encouraged to finish school and attend university, and were also introduced to job-
training programs  (Allabadi 2008, 183). Indeed, the contemporary Palestinian Islamist 
women’s movement first gained ground among young female students at conservative 
Palestinian universities and expanded from there. 
Prior to the emergence of Hamas in 1987, its predecessor, the Muslim 
Brotherhood focused on the development of educational, social and welfare activities in 
otherwise neglected areas of Palestinian civil society, which were found in poor urban 
quarters and refugee camps (Gunning 2009, 30). In 1978, the Muslim Brother (Mujama) 
took over the Islamic University in Gaza from Egyptian control following the Egypt-
Israel Peace Treaty. This was a first important step in spreading the influence of Islamist 
ideals, especially as the faculty and student body of the Islamic University became a 
“hotbed of Hamas support in Gaza” (Robinson 2004, 127). Next, in 1981, the Muslim 
Brotherhood helped to create the first Islamic women’s organization in the Palestinian 
Territories, the Young Women’s Islamic Association (al-Jam’iyyah al-Jam’iyyat al-
Shabbat al Muslimat). As Gunning writes, the creation of the Young Women’s Islamic 
Association effectively laid “the foundations for the popularity Hamas was later to enjoy 
among women” (Gunning 2009, 30). While Hamas denounced secular Palestinian 
women’s organizations as being “part of a liberal feminist plot to undermine the Muslim 
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family” (Milton-Edwards and Farrell 2010, 189), it focused on a return to Islamic values 
through the hearts and minds of the coming-of-age women of Palestine.   
Throughout the 1980s, the Islamist movement widened through a growing 
presence of Islamic students on university campuses. Like the hijab campaign in Gaza, 
Milton-Edwards and Farrell write that Palestinian women were pressured to abandon 
their short skirts and bare heads in “favour of what became known as shari’a dress—the 
hijabs and jilbabs which became ubiquitous symbols at educational institutions such as 
the Islamic University of Gaza (IUG) and Hebron Polytechnic in the West Bank” 
(Milton-Edwards and Farrell 2010, 186). Gender segregation between students was 
enforced by generous donations from patrons in the Gulf, by way of providing poorer 
female students with free clothing coupons that could be redeemed at local shops for 
clothing that followed the strict forms of Islamic dress (Milton-Edwards and Farrell 2010, 
186).  Subsequently, the Islamist student political parties or “Islamic blocs” at Palestinian 
universities attracted significant support among the student body (Robinson 2004, 128).  
As Robinson writes, in many ways the Palestinian universities came to be more important 
than mosques to the Islamist movement for their atmosphere of greater autonomy under 
the Israeli occupation (Robinson 2004, 128).  
By the late 1990s, Ahmed Atawneh, the head of the Islamic Student bloc at Bir 
Zeit University, attracted the attention of the Islamists with his call for “the importance of 
the women’s vote and how crucial the recruitment of female students is to the support of 
the Islamic blocs” (Jad 2005, 176). Seeking to organize younger female students was an 
unprecedented move, never before done under the name of the Muslim Brotherhood, 
Hamas or the Salvation Party. According to Jad, these groups historically “celebrated the 
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banner of conservative gender ideology, especially when it came to the exclusion of 
young, unmarried women” (Jad 2005, 183). However, with the greater inclusion of 
women, the Islamist movement also could not ignore the powerful elements of the 
younger female constituency. Ironically, in their competition with secular and nationalist 
political groups, the Islamists learned to adjust their appeal to a wider constituency by 
emulating them (Jad 2005, 173). As Jad writes, “By emulating the secular and leftist 
political groups and in relation to them, the Islamists learned to ‘adjust’ their appeal to 
attract a wider constituency” (Jad 2004, 200). This expanded constituency came with the 
direct appeal to women. 
Demonstrating Hamas’ flexibility in its ability to gradually reinvent itself as a 
mainstream nationalist movement, the subtle integration of more liberal Islamic themes in 
the realm of university students is what drew young people, including women, to the 
movement. For some young people, the Islamic Bloc represented the “new, more militant 
Islamist movements”, which seemed—in sharp contrast to the widespread corruption of 
the secularist factions —to be more genuinely and altruistically concerned with people’s 
needs  (Lybarger 2005, 151). For example, Lybarger’s interview of a young woman 
named Amal demonstrates the migration of young women to the Islamist movement. 
Lybarger writes that Amal discarded her mini-skirt for the scarf and long coat of the 
Islamic Bloc women during the course of her university studies, and she considers the 
Islamist movement both progressive and female-friendly (Lybarger 2005, 151). As a 
young female who once supported Fatah, Amal’s migration to the Islamic Bloc women’s 
groups coincided with her view that Hamas espoused an “authentic Islam”, which 
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progressively “empowered young women to decide on marriage partners, propose 
marriage themselves, and seek an education and career”  (Lybarger 2005, 151). 
  
Evolution of Hamas and Its Women 
As early as 1992, the leadership of Hamas considered establishing an independent 
political party as a way of participating indirectly in the elections to the PA council 
(Mishal and Sela 2000, 140). However, it was not until the signing of the Oslo agreement 
that Hamas began to seriously reconsider a new political strategy in which “a legal party 
could better serve the Islamic movement’s interests and preserve its achievements” 
(Mishal and Sela 2000, 141). With this, the creation of the Islamic Salvation Party was 
not intended to replace Hamas, but rather “to serve as its instrument, just like the Islamic 
University in education and charity associations in the welfare sphere” (Mishal and Sela 
2000, 141). By 1995, the National Islamic Salvation Party was established, and with it 
came the establishment of the Women’s Action Department. As an auxiliary organization 
to the National Islamic Salvation Party, the Women’s Action Department represented the 
Islamist way of “incorporating women into politics with the aim of creating the image of 
the ‘new Islamic woman’” (Jad 2005, 177). According to Jad, the “new Islamic woman” 
of Hamas is “highly educated, outspoken, moltazemah (veiled), and modern (a new form 
of veiling)” (Jad 2005, 177). Against the idea that the veil is a symbol of repression 
(associated with the 1988 hijab campaign in Gaza), among the Islamist movement and 
the women now wearing it, the veil was a new signifier of modernity, especially since it 
was also a departure from the thawb, or traditional peasant woman’s dress used by 
previous generations of Palestinian women. As Jad writes, the new Islamic dress was 
 159
seen as a “uniform of conviction” of Islamist female political activists, who paradoxically 
challenged the previous image of the Palestinian Islamist female as model mothers and 
obedient wives (Jad 2005, 177). As Keddie suggests, the actual veiling of women may be 
a way of asserting communal identity rather than religious creed or code (Keddie 1988, 
696-723). However, this in no way diminishes the more recent phenomenon of 
Palestinian women’s veiling as a “tool in the Islamists’ rivalry with secular, non-veiled 
groups” (Jad 2005, 181).     
Thus, as the status quo of Hamas’ political strategy and relationship to the 
Palestinian Authority began to evolve, so did female participation in the Islamist 
movement. Hamas’ political participation in the 2003 elections indicated a growing 
popular will to continue the Palestinian struggle, as well as a consensus that Hamas was 
able to reform itself while also preventing further corruption in the Palestinian political 
arena (Kuttab 2008, 106). Moving beyond university campuses, the Salvation Party 
began to “widen its popular support base more systematically by recruiting women” (Jad 
2005, 178). This came at a time when Palestinian women’s NGOs emerged as a quasi-
replacement for the secular-nationalist women’s movement that formed the backbone of 
the 1987 intifada. The growth of professional women’s NGOs effectively transformed the 
structural landscape of female political activism, which not only detached women’s 
issues from broader national issues, but further alienated Palestinian women from the 
secular feminist platform of the Palestinian women’s organizations (Kuttab 2008, 106). 
Notably however, the migration of Palestinian women to the Women’s Action 
Department of the National Islamic Salvation Party meant that Hamas felt the pressure to 
deal with women’s issues. While the movement strenuously attacked their opposition (in 
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the form of nationalist and secularist women’s organizations), it was also forced to 
reconcile feminist demands and the discourse on gender equality with the Islamist vision 
and agenda. Like other national and secular organizations, Hamas was forced to tackle 
the legal political struggle in the Palestinian Authority. In doing so, Hamas could not 
“ignore the conditions in which women lived or prevent them from joining political life” 
(Jad 2005, 184). 
  The growing attraction of Palestinian women to the Islamist movement brought 
their migration to the movement. With this came an energetic and engaged atmosphere 
and the emergence of a newly defined gender ideology within the movement. 
Specifically, the development of more Islamic women’s organizations in the late 1990s, 
such as Al Hoda Women’s Society and Al Khansa Islamic Action brought with it the 
need to clearly develop a platform on women’s rights from the Islamic perspective. A 
large component of the Islamic women’s organizations engagement in contemporary 
politics translated into slandering secular women’s organizations as part of an 
international conspiracy and releasing publications to the Palestinian public with a focus 
on the ideological emptiness of the feminist ideals of the organizations of the Palestinian 
women’s movement (Jad, Johnson and Giacaman 2000, 150). As Jad writes, this charged 
atmosphere of contestation between Islamist women and secular women’s groups led to a 
series of workshops and conferences initiated to bring Palestinian female leaders together 
and diffuse their emerging polarities. According to Jad, the proceedings of the first 
conference broadly focused on “one women’s group delegitimizing others to present 
itself as the “true” and “authentic” voices for women’s interests” (Jad 2005, 184-185). 
The second conference led to an admission that the Islamists had no vision or agenda for 
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women’s issues, with attempts made to reinterpret religious texts as a way of 
incorporating female achievements and interests in the Islamist modernization process 
(Jad 2005, 185). Taken as a whole, Jad writes that these conferences were “landmarks” 
for the evolution of Hamas’ gender ideology, from its utter rejection of the principles of 
feminism to “borrowing and selectively incorporating positions advocated by feminists” 
(Jad 2005, 185).   
Beyond the ugly denigration of non-Islamic women’s groups, the women of the 
Islamist movement increasingly came to see their role as Palestinian women as a 
distinguished position in which they worked side by side with Palestinian men in the 
nationalist struggle (Jad 2005, 185). In doing so, the Islamist women’s organizations 
formulated a political platform that appropriated the secular feminists’ demands for 
gender equality and presented them according to the commandments and laws of Islam 
(Tzoreff 2006, 17). Jad cites the example of a paper presented by an Islamist woman 
named Khitam Abu Musa, who inverts the gender vision of the Hamas Chapter by 
interpreting Islam as “the religion that gives the woman all her rights: education, free 
choice of husband, inheritance (widely denied by custom), mobility (to participate in the 
call for the rule of God in Jihad), proselytizing, and social or professional work” (Jad 
2005, 186). In this direct confrontation with the voices of feminism and secularism, the 
growing influence of scholarly and religious experts of Islam in the swelling ranks of the 
Islamist women’s movement began to shift the formal gender ideology of the Islamists.  
It was through direct female involvement in the Islamist movement that women were able 
to change the Islamist vision and “make a space” for women within the same political 
terrain that otherwise shunned the involvement of secular Palestinian feminists (Jad 2005, 
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188). As a result of the dialogue occurring between Islamist and secular women regarding 
gender equality, it was the increasing number of Islamist women who successfully 
pressured Hamas to integrate gender issues into its political platform.   
Simultaneously, the power and influence of the Islamist women’s movement 
expanded Hamas’s ideological platform on gender equality through a rigorous 
reinterpretation of women’s rights within Islamic law. Where the secular women’s 
committees of the 1980s failed to develop a strategic vision and legal framework for 
gender equality in the post-Oslo era, Hammami asserts that if anything created a 
women’s identity in the post-Oslo era, it was the Islamists (Connell 2002, 143). Most 
significantly, Islamist women can be seen as “empowered by their skills, their education, 
and the newly acquired legitimacy opened by reinterpreting the Qur’an” (Jad 2005, 188).  
In effect, the staunchly conservative approach to confining women to the domestic sphere 
as the reproducers of a “moral” nation evolved in many respects, giving way to “more 
open-ended interpretations of texts, enabling women to occupy a wider space in the 
public arena” (Jad 2005, 174). In contrast to the secular movement, the Islamist feminists 
of the Palestinian Islamist movement developed a coherent gender platform, reliant on 
scholarly interpretations in the text of the Qu’ran for more concrete evidence of women’s 
equality in the Islamic religious tradition. For example, the phrase “the text does not 
prohibit” is a recurrent theme in Islamist feminists’ use of the Qu’ran to legitimate the 
rights of women in local contexts, and the breaking with social customs of female 
subjugation is done so with the observation that “religious texts are open-ended, making 
it possible to forge a wider legitimate space for women in the public arenas” (Jad 2005, 
184).   
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By the time of the 2006 Palestinian legislative elections, a growing number of 
Palestinian women saw the benefit of supporting Hamas as a means of not only engaging 
in a democratic process in the Palestinian Territories, but also as a way of bringing the 
benevolent aspects of Islam into the nationalist question. By this point, an Islamic stance 
on Palestinian self-governance under Hamas came to be seen as the homegrown 
alternative to corrupt governance of the Palestinian Authority and the continued Israeli 
military occupation. While Hamas prepared for a sweeping electoral victory, thousands 
of women were “repeatedly canvassed and huge amounts were spent organizing women-
only Hamas rallies and festivals” (Milton-Edwards and Farrell 2010, 202). With a 
Hamas-backed female candidate pool of 13 women on the party’s “Change and Reform” 
ballot (Rahman 2006, 3), Milton-Edwards and Farrell write that the “women candidates 
were a mixture of seasoned politicians, technocrats and cult figures” (Milton-Edwards 
and Farrell 2010, 202). The two most prominent of these candidates was a well-known 
academic and administrator who had worked for years as a female leader of Hamas, 
Jamila al-Shanti, and Mariam Farhat, known as Umm Nidal (Mother of Struggle) who 
had no political experience, but was a local “folk heroine” after her three sons died as 
martyrs in actions against Israel (Milton-Edwards and Farrell 2010, 202). 
On January 25, 2006, Hamas won a landslide victory over Fatah in the Palestinian 
legislative elections. As a result, the rise of the Islamist party to legislative political 
power is emblematic of the changing composition of the Palestinian national struggle in 
the post-Oslo period, and the women within it. That day, voters heading to the polls were 
reportedly confronted with “droves of Hamas women activists, all wearing green sashes 
and green and white headbands, chanting and carrying posters and leaflets” (Milton-
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Edwards and Farrell 2010, 202-203). Observing the emergence of the Hamas women in 
green, Dr. Hanan Ashrawi, who also won a seat as an independent in the “Third Way” 
party, commented, “At every polling station the Hamas women were there, dressed 
almost in uniform. All of them! And not shy or demure—out there lobbying, asking you 
to vote, vote for Hamas, and so on. And they went from house to house to bring out the 
votes” (Milton-Edwards and Farrell 2010, 203). 
Ultimately, scores of Palestinian women come to relate to their citizenship in the 
Palestinian Authority through the Islamist orientation of Hamas, and, most important, the 
female Palestinian vote in the 2006 elections dramatically altered the political 
composition of the Palestinian National Authority by voting Hamas party members into 
the Palestinian Parliament. Under the quota system of the Palestinian elections, the race 
for Parliament required a minimum of two women candidates per local constituency. As 
such, Hamas was compelled to promote female political candidates. However, in an overt 
effort not to be seen as straying from the conservative Islamist agenda with regard to 
gender, female candidates for Hamas were notably treated far differently than their male 
counterparts. For example, the images of female candidates were not permitted by Hamas 
leadership to be pictured in campaign posters or party advertisements. Instead, Hamas 
women were represented on election posters by the image of a red rose alongside the 
portraits of the male candidates (Milton-Edwards 2005, 324). Additionally, Hamas 
female representatives did not attend mixed election campaign meetings or political 
rallies, but specialized in more effective ways of gaining local support. To this end, they 
visited women privately, going from home to home. As one candidate related: “We have 
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a good reputation as Muslim sisters so we went from house to house to speak to the 
women” (Milton-Edwards 2005, 324). 
 For the female supporters of Hamas, the 2006 electoral victory seemingly 
brought them closer to their desired goal of ending the Israeli occupation, establishing a 
true Muslim society, and Palestinian statehood  (Milton-Edwards and Farrell 2010, 206). 
In the fatal rise of internecine violence that ensued between the rival parties of Fatah and 
Hamas, and Hamas’ ultimate takeover of the Gaza Strip in the summer of 2007, it 
remains to be discovered whether the Hamas government and officials now in power in 
Gaza will continue to address the issues of gender equality on behalf of the female voters 
who supported their rise. By the summer of 2007, a group of female supporters of Hamas 
who I met in Hebron categorically denied that Hamas would repeal the rights of women 
as the Islamic Republic of Iran had done to women after the rise of Khomeini.44 Yet, as 
of International Women’s Day in 2007, the Hamas government in Gaza made no 
statement on gender equality, and the Hamas head of the Palestinian Legislative Council 
“refused to meet the annual delegation of women handing in their petition for equal 
rights” (Milton-Edwards and Farrell 2010, 204). 
 Like the secular-nationalist forms of feminist political activism that arose as a 
product of the leftist Palestinian politics of the 1970s, the ideological vision of Islamist 
female political activists has evolved out from the rise of revolutionary Islamist politics 
in the Palestinian political arena since the mid-1980s. Unlike the female activists of the 
secular-nationalist era, the female advocates of the Islamist movement are now a 
generation of women born in the aftermath of the first intifada and raised in the 
                                                 
44 Notes from fieldwork 2007. 
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increasingly religious and politically unstable years since. One of Hamas’ leading female 
representatives is Jamila Al-Shanti, credits the Palestinian Islamist movement with using 
Islam to unblock social boundaries for women in Palestinian society, and effectively 
provide them with employment and social opportunities. Referring to Hamas’ ability to 
improve Palestinian society for women, she said, "There are traditions here that say that a 
woman should take a secondary role—that she should be at the back…but that is not 
Islam. Hamas will scrap many of these traditions. You will find women going out and 
participating"  (Johnston 2006).  Carefully, Al-Shanti adds that a Hamas-governed 
Palestinian state will not depart from Islamic law. Al-Shanti’s words appear very similar 




The main point of this chapter is to explore how the paradox of the widespread 
popularity of the Islamist agenda through the prevailing changes in Palestinian women’s 
relationship to their citizenship in the Palestinian Authority. At the root of this paradox 
are conventional understandings of female honor, which lie at the heart of Palestinian 
culture. Honor is a central theme in the loss of Palestinian land due to Israeli invasion and 
subsequent occupation.  Historically, the theme of restoring Palestinian honor has been 
transmitted through the bodies of its women by way of their biological ability to 
reproduce and nourish young nationalists for the cause. More recently, the hijab 
campaign in Gaza was popularized as a direct (and easy) way for Islamists to their claims 
to Palestinian nationalism. Islamically dressed women were symbols of strength for the 
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factionalized Palestinian community that had long suffered under outside influences. This 
reconfiguration of women as representing a return to more authentic Islamic tradition 
polarized Palestinian society and politics. Most importantly, through the use of Islamic 
symbols and rhetoric, Hamas became a primary and guiding alternative to secular 
nationalist regimes, international NGOs and secular women’s organization, which were 
exposed for their political ineffectiveness and corruption or their inability to be 
responsive to the local agenda.    
While the outward changes in the appearance of Palestinian women is indicative 
of the changes taking place at the societal level, what is more important is that the 
emerging “culture of modesty” for women prevented them from being able to seriously 
challenge threats to their honor, let alone their feminist or even nationalist aspirations.  
The imperative of resisting the Israeli military occupation and the lack of social and 
political cohesion within the West Bank and Gaza Strip strengthened Islamist forces, 
which, in turn, pressured Palestinian women to return to traditional roles. At the same 
time, however, it is important not to overlook the achievements of Islamist women and 
what has more recently been called the “Islamist women’s movement” in Palestine (Jad 
2009, 1). Jad contends that the Islamist women's movement has critically added to a 
transformation of Hamas' ideology concerning women and gender equality. In this, 
Islamist women work to bring their demands to light in the local context. Like the women 
of the leftist movement before them, they continue to mobilize Palestinian women in the 
name of the national struggle. In this, it is important to note that these women do not 
perceive themselves as victims of Islamization, but rather as fully endowed agents in 
disseminating its principles (Jad 2005, 180). Much of the popularity of the Islamist way 
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of organizing was based in the precedent of strong Muslim women in the Qur’an and the 
teachings of Muhammad. At the same time, the Palestinian women who form the Islamist 
women’s organizations do not consider themselves a part of the secular Palestinian 
women’s movement, even if they may be involved in several of the remaining programs 
for women that were built by the secular women’s organizations, such as those related to 
women’s education, health and poverty (Allabadi 2008, 181-201). 
Since the late 1980s and early 1990s, the growing cultural strength and political 
popularity of the Islamist leadership of the Hamas movement can no longer be denied or 
overlooked as a fringe, extremist group that is incapable of motivating or captivating 
widespread support in the Palestinian Territories. To the contrary, the Islamist leadership 
has come to be regarded by an ever-expanding number of Palestinians as the only true 
and effective representative of the Palestinian people and the nationalist cause. As an 
alternative to the secular-nationalist leadership of the PLO, Hamas’ strength grew in its 
ability to bolster the grassroots by providing welfare to the poor and criticizing the 
corruption of the Palestinian Authority. In doing so, the Hamas leadership has sought to 
silence the traditionally secular and leftist approaches to Palestinian nationalism, 
including the cadres of women in its ranks. This chapter has focused on the historical 
emergence of a new generation of politically mobilized Palestinian women within the 
cultural and political rise of the Palestinian Islamist movement, which has paradoxically 
promoted women’s education and job training opportunities on one hand, while insisting 
on the subordination of women’s legal status on the other. Active in an array of 
governmental activities and grass-roots endeavors, the new Islamist Palestinian woman 
has evolved along with Hamas as political activists and party candidates no less engaged 
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in the unfolding of the nationalist struggle, albeit in a markedly less secular, 
prescriptively “feminist” and politically “leftist” way.   
Where Islam is the unifying force for the people in an otherwise extremely 
repressive social and political situation, the development of the Islamo-nationalist agenda 
continues to ask Palestinian women “to serve the nation, à la Islamism this time” (Jad 
2005, 188). Beyond the long history of grassroots organizing, one emergent example of 
female service to the Palestinian nation now appears in the form of female suicide 
bombing of Israeli targets. This political role for Palestinian women is the subject of 










Oh my homeland! My love, my only love! I shall revolt against thine 
enemies, all enemies. I shall make bombs from the atoms of my body 
and weave a new Palestine from the fabric of my soul. With all my 
power and the power of my sisters, we shall convert our existence into 
bombs to redeem the land, the coast, the mountain. We shall fight and 
fight… 
 
                                -Leila Khaled 
 
On 27 January 2002, an educated, professional 28-year-old Palestinian woman 
named Wafa Idris permanently changed the face of the Palestinian national struggle and 
the political role of women in it by becoming the first female Palestinian suicide bomber 
in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Years after her act, speculations persist that the cause of 
Idris’ death may have been unintended because there was no official letter or video 
message of intent left behind in the wake of her death (Brunner 2005). One prevailing 
assumption is that Idris, like many Palestinian female militants before her, may have been 
working as a transporter of the bomb for a male suicide bomber, and not actually 
dispatched to detonate the bomb herself. Undetected, Idris blew herself up on Yaffa 
Road, a busy pedestrian street in downtown Jerusalem, killing herself, an elderly Israeli 
man and wounding scores of others in front of a shoe store.45  
                                                 
45 Wafa Idris’ death occurred the day after Yasser Arafat reportedly addressed a large group of women 
from his compound in Ramallah.  This speech is central and titular to Barbara Victor’s (2003) claim that 
Arafat invited Palestinian women to join the ranks of men in undertaking suicide missions against Israel 
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As a hallmark of the Al-Aqsa intifada, the rise of the Palestinian female suicide 
bomber casts light on the changes in Palestinian women’s political involvement in the 
national struggle since well before 1987.46 At the heart of this story is the rise of Islamist 
political extremism and its impact on the secular leadership that responded to street 
pressure to remain in control of political events by creating the previously unthinkable: 
the mobilization of female Palestinian civilians as suicide bombers. This move by the 
political affiliates of the secular Fatah leadership, effectively cast asunder masculinist 
preconceptions of Palestinian women as facile, nonviolent and obedient to patriarchal 
norms. In doing so, the images of Palestinian females willing and able to kill themselves 
while butchering others in cold blood imposed an extremely cost-effective pale of terror 
in the hearts and minds of the Israeli people and their leadership. However, the key to 
understanding the social legitimacy of the female suicide bomber directly stems from the 
                                                                                                                                                 
and the military occupation.  Victor writes that in his speech, Arafat called for an entirely female wing 
under the Al-Aqsa Martyr’s Brigades to be designated as his “Army of Roses”, and referred to Palestinian 
women as the “hope of Palestine.” Reportedly, Arafat said to the crowd, “You will liberate your husbands, 
fathers, and sons from oppression. You will sacrifice the way you women have always sacrificed for your 
family” (Victor 2003, 20).  Unfortunately, however, while Victor appears to directly quote Arafat, she fails 
to cite her source for this claim.  I have fruitlessly scoured evidence of Arafat’s speech on this occasion and 
found nothing to substantiate Victor’s quotations. While I do not prefer to disregard Victor’s claims 
entirely, I think it is useful to note that the ideological shift in Arafat’s speech reflects a very marked shift 
in the gendered role of women in the Palestinian struggle and a transitional moment in the Palestinian use 
of force against the continued Israeli occupation in the failure of the Oslo agreements in the 1990s and the 
Camp David Accords (2000). 
46 Claudia Brunner notes: “Suicide bombers is the most common term applied for those who would never 
call themselves such” (Brunner 2005). Widely recognized in the West as “suicide bomber”, the term 
connotes an individual willing to blow oneself up in order to destroy property and/or kill people for a 
political cause.  The world has seen a wide range of suicide bombing tactics used by terrorist organizations 
involving the use of vehicles to create lethal explosions.  The infamous September 11th hijackers flew 
planes into the World Trade Center and the Pentagon.  Critics add that "suicide bombing" should be called 
"homicide bombing" in order to emphasize the fact that the human bombers themselves are killing others.  
Equally, the use of this low-cost tactic for mass destruction and murder has been described as “human 
missiles”, “human bombs”, “suicide killers”, “Palestinian H-bombs”, and “suicide terrorism” (See Laqueur 
1987; Luft 2002; Pape 2003, 2010). Suicide bombers may be motivated by religious beliefs that they will 
be rewarded in heaven for sacrificing their lives for their beliefs, while other religions consider it suicide, 
which is not allowed under their beliefs.  Used here, “suicide bombing” is seen as political term used to 
describe the use of individuals by secular and Islamist political organizations (in this case Palestinian) for 
the purpose of ending the Israeli military occupation and establishing a Palestinian state  
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competition for political legitimacy between leaders of the Islamist movement and their 
rival secular-nationalist parties. In fact, to the surprise of many, it was the secular-
nationalist military wing of Fatah, Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades, which dispatched the most 
female suicide bombers between 2001 and 2007.  
This chapter examines the complex phenomenon of female suicide bombers by 
first exploring the history of this form of political terrorism in Palestine and the often 
overlooked political tensions between the secularists and Islamists, which provided the 
opportunity structure for this emergence of female militarism and violence. The evolution 
of the Islamist commentary on the role of Palestinian women in the national struggle will 
also be explored. Finally, a look into the voices of Palestinian women themselves will 
demonstrate how this widely recognized shift in the political behavior of Palestinian 
women in the Al-Aqsa intifada was—for the female suicide bombers and their collective 
group of sisters—just as much political as it was personal. Was the rise of Palestinian 
female suicide bombers a new resistance strategy for those challenging the gender norms 
of the national struggle itself, an inevitable aspect of the all-consuming political violence, 
produced from within the prevailing rivalry between secularists and Islamists, or simply a 
new strategy to fight the Israeli occupation?    
 
Suicide Bombing in the Palestinian Struggle 
 The willingness to sacrifice one’s life in the name of a political cause is nothing 
new in the history of warfare. Perhaps the most famous wartime image of soldiers 
deliberately sacrificing their lives for their cause appears in Japanese kamikaze soldiers 
during the Second World War. Suicide as a political tool or tactic of war is also not 
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unique to the Middle East, nor is it a recent phenomenon specific to the post-Oslo years.47 
The suicide bomber as a "modern" expression of political struggle emerged in Lebanon in 
1983, when two separate attacks on US diplomatic and military targets left over 300 
people dead and many more wounded. The attacks heralded the rise in the Middle East of 
a deadly tool in the arsenal of political radicals and non-state actors. While gaining 
international attention, successful suicide bombing campaigns engendered considerable 
prestige for the individuals who perished while committing such acts as well as for the 
organizations supporting them (Schweitzer 2004). Hizbollah, a militant Islamist Shi’ite 
group backed by Iran was later indicted in court for having a role in the American 
embassy and Marine barracks bombing attacks, while Islamic Jihad (a previously 
unknown entity) also claimed responsibility in the embassy attack (Daragahi 2008, 
Macaron 2008). In the years that followed, these Islamist organizations specifically 
cultivated the image of the male suicide bomber as a symbol of spiritual martyrdom in a 
context of social and political struggle specifically against Israel. Ever since, the “poor 
man’s smart bomb” became a source of inspiration for individuals and worldwide terror 
organizations alike. 
As Pape and Feldman write in their recent book, Cutting the Fuse: The Explosion 
of Global Suicide Terrorism and How to Stop It, one of the most critical elements in the 
rise of suicide terrorism around the world is the military occupation of one country (or 
                                                 
47  The Human Security Report (2005) indicates that conflict as a whole is on the decline in every sector of 
the world with terrorism being the only exception.  In particular, suicide bombing is the most utilized tactic 
for non-state actors and terrorist organizations.  The report states that since 1985, suicide bombing has 
become the modus operandi of these organizations in locations as diverse as Iraq, Afghanistan, Indonesia, 
Iran, Israel/Palestine, Sri Lanka, Russia, United Kingdom, United States, Spain, India and Turkey. Human 
Security Report 2005, "Human Security Report: War and Peace in the 21st Century," Human Security 
Report Project, Human Security Research Group, 2005, 
http://www.humansecurityreport.info/index.php?option=content&task=view&id=28&Itemid=63 (accessed 
February 1, 2010). 
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people) by an outside power (Pape and Feldman 2010, 19-42). This is especially true 
when the occupying power’s control depends on coercive means, such as deploying 
troops, police and security forces. At issue is the fact that these coercive means of control 
often exact collateral damage on local civilians, but are not held accountable for their 
actions, and therefore, seemingly impervious to the law (Pape and Feldman 2010, 21). As 
a result, the people of the local community feel as though they are under a constant state 
of threat from the occupying power, which has the military strength to invade their 
territory and coercively subdue the local population. Pape and Feldman write, “Among 
members of the local community, foreign occupation can create fear that they would lose 
the ability to perpetuate their political, social, economic, and religious institutions, 
leading some members to make extreme sacrifices to prevent the loss of their 
community’s way of life” (Pape and Feldman 2010, 21).  
Pape and Feldman’s description could not more aptly assess the state of affairs 
from which Palestinian suicide attacks emerged in the 1990s. As a state of dissent and 
opposition to the 1993 Oslo Accords, male suicide bombers became the modus operandi 
of the Islamist movement of the 1990s. During this time, the secular PLO leadership 
under Yasser Arafat formally recognized Israel’s right to exist as a sovereign state in the 
Oslo Accords. Meanwhile, the Islamist groups radically opposed any formal or informal 
diplomatic recognition of the existence of the Israeli occupier, and denounced the Oslo 
Accords as “a betrayal of God’s will” (Eager 2008, 181).48 For the Islamist leadership, 
                                                 
48 At the time of its founding, Hamas called for the establishment of an Islamic Palestinian state to 
territorially cover all of Mandatory Palestine, where much of present-day Israel now exists.  As an 
alternative to the PLO’s acceptance of a two-state solution with the State of Israel, Hamas called for an all-
or-nothing solution to the Palestinian problem by way of armed struggle against Israel.  However, it has 
been noted that Hamas’ position vis-à-vis Israel has evolved through the years from initially protesting the 
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male suicide bombing attacks on Israeli military and civilian targets became the strategic 
weapon with two simultaneous political goals in mind. First, suicide attacks were the 
cheapest way to gain international attention while inflicting the most direct damage on 
Israeli authorities. Second, the success of the attacks against Israel immediately bolstered 
Islamist popularity within the Palestinian Territories. Despite the fact that the Fatah 
leadership was the only internationally recognized representative voice of the Palestinian 
people, the success of the Islamist suicide campaigns led to a fundamental questioning of 
Fatah’s bankruptcy as an effective representative of the Palestinian people. The rise in 
local popularity of the Islamist organizations further deepened the bitter, longstanding 
rivalry for social and political control between the secularists and Islamists that remain to 
the present day. Despite that fact that Fatah leadership was (and remains) the only 
internationally recognized political representative of the Palestinian people, local 
opinions and support proved far more divisive.    
Even as the Palestinian Authority (PA) came into existence through the Oslo 
Accords, Yasser Arafat and the leadership of the PA struggled to maintain control over 
an increasingly disenfranchised and disillusioned population.49 On one hand, the PA was 
obliged by the Oslo Accords to suppress anti-Israeli terrorism stemming from areas under 
                                                                                                                                                 
Oslo peace process and the establishment of the PA, to participating in the electoral politics of the PA and 
gaining the “votes among those who support the peace process and are willing to recognize Israel alongside 
a Palestinian state” (Gunning 2009, 269). 
49 Between the early and mid-1990s, unemployment in the West Bank and Gaza Strip jumped from under 
5% to over 20%. Yet from 1997 until 2000, the economic situation generally improved.  However, the 
outbreak of the second intifada drastically worsened the economic situation for the over 3 million 
Palestinians living in the West Bank and Gaza  (See Moghadam 2003). Given this severe state of economic 
distress, Assaf Moghadam notes that this may have been a cause of the increase interest in suicide bombing 
campaigns as a way of seeking revenge against those that the Palestinians held responsible for their 
economic situation.  While economics is certainly one important factor of this story, I argue that the 
increase popularity in suicide bombing campaigns led by the Islamists was both a reaction to Israeli 
military and economic aggression as well as the secularist Fatah party being seen unable to safeguard 
Palestinian safety (and dignity) as a result. 
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Palestinian control. This included suppressing the political activities of Hamas and 
Islamic Jihad to the extent possible (Hafez 2006, 18). On the other hand, the leadership of 
the PA found it difficult to take drastic and unpopular measures against the Islamist 
groups, especially when they appeared to be defending the Palestinian people (Hafez 
2006, 19). Arafat struggled to effectively govern the PA while navigating between 
external political pressure from abroad and internal pressure from within the secular and 
Islamist groups of the Palestinian Territories. The horrific scenes and specter of the 
militant, Islamist—and, importantly, male—Palestinian suicide bomber garnered a 
newfound level of admiration among Palestinians for the daring achievements of their 
“martyrs” and the Islamist organizations that supported them as emblematic heroes of the 
Palestinian struggle. To many Palestinians, these young men were seen as proud and 
patriotic soldiers of the nation. They were the champions and heroes of the Palestinian 
cause, willing to stand up to the Israeli occupation, even if this meant dying a horrific 
death. Meanwhile, however, Hamas and Islamic Jihad instrumentally framed the suicide 
attacks as acts in accordance with religious and national revival. Religiously and 
politically, Palestinian “salvation” depended on these men.50 As Milton-Edwards and 
Farrell quote Hamas leader Khaled Meshal, “There is no path except that of martyrdom—
armed resistance and martyrdom operations. This is what will support Gaza. This is what 
will lift the oppression on you” (Milton-Edwards and Farrell 2010, 135). With this, 
suicide martyrdom was seen as the ultimate form of personal sacrifice and resistance 
against the Israeli occupation. 
                                                 
50 Islamic Jihad was the first of the Islamist organizations to dispatch a (male) suicide attack in Gaza in 
April 1993 after the Oslo Peace Accord. 
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While Arafat was increasingly losing power and popularity at home, the United 
States and Israel continued to pressure the PA to internally suppress and publically reject 
Islamist extremism and the anti-Israeli terrorist organizational networks that were not 
firmly entrenched within the Palestinian Territories. 51 At the same time, wealthy 
benefactors beyond the Palestinian Territories and throughout the Muslim world lent 
powerful economic incentives to the Islamist groups for the continuation of the 
Palestinian struggle against Israel. Among the most famous proponents of male 
Palestinian suicide bombers was Saddam Hussein. By 2003, it was reported that Hussein 
distributed $260,000 to 26 families of Palestinians killed in 29 months of fighting with 
Israel, including a $10,000 check to the family of a Hamas suicide bomber (Murphy 
2003). According to the report, the families of male suicide bombers individually 
received their $10,000 checks at a large banquet hall in the Gaza Strip under a large 
banner, which read: "The Arab Baath Party Welcomes the Families of the Martyrs for the 
Distribution of Blessings of Saddam Hussein" (Murphy 2003). Among the families 
receiving checks from the Iraqi leader's charity were those whose children and relatives 
were killed in PIJ and Hamas attacks. Other families receiving money had relatives killed 
during Israeli raids on Palestinian towns and refugee camps (Murphy 2003). Not 
coincidentally, Saddam Hussein once declared his intent to build a monument to 
memorialize Wafa Idris as a symbol of all Palestinian freedom fighters as martyrs in the 
name of Islam (Beyler 2003). 
                                                 
51 Hillel Frisch (2005) notes that support for Arafat declined from 40 percent before the outbreak of the 
second intifada in 2000 to 24.5 percent in June 2002. He adds, “the very emergence of Fatah’s major 
fighting arm, called the Al-Aqsa Martyr’s Brigades, has suggested that not only has the arena as a whole 
become Islamized but the very organization that bore the banner of Palestinian nationalism itself is 
conforming to the winds of change”.    
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With the backing of the United States, Israel maintained that Saddam Hussein was 
financing Palestinian terror as it became well established that the direct financial support 
that Palestinian families received for their deceased sons and brothers led to an even 
greater “hero status” on the Palestinian street. Male suicide bombers were seen as 
committing acts of unparalleled heroism, and their families directly benefitted both 
financially and socially from these acts. Terri Toles Patkin writes that as the Palestinian 
point of view “shifted from negotiation about specific tracts of land to a no-compromise 
drive toward a final victory, the psychology of terrorism shifted from martyrdom as a 
means to martyrdom as an end... and a way to make the cost of conflict unbearable” 
(Patkin 2004, 79). Adding to this, Mohommad Hafez reflects that acts of suicide 
martyrdom in the Palestinian context became “opportunities for empowerment, 
vengeance, and in doing so they foster the myth of the “heroic martyr,” which inspires 
future volunteers for suicide attacks” (Hafez 2006, 7). Even unsuccessful male “martyrs”, 
who were deterred by Israeli forces during their missions and jailed for these actions, 
became heroic local figures. In a context where families of suicide bombers would 
receive more than twice the financial allowance than families of those killed by other 
means, the status symbol of the male suicide bomber rapidly ascended to the highest 
place of honor a emblematic of courage through personal sacrifice in the name of a just 
national cause (Luft 2002). 
From 1993 to August 2002, more than 135 male Palestinian suicide bombers 
launched attacks on Israeli civilians and soldiers, making suicide terrorism one of Israel’s 
gravest security threats (Moghadam 2003, 65). The Hamas leadership claimed 
responsibility for the majority of the attacks during this time period, with Palestinian 
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Islamic Jihad closely behind (Yom 2008). The local popularity of the Islamist groups rose 
sharply with the numbers of successfully dispatched suicide bombings. Specifically, 
Hamas and PIJ rose in local esteem for being seen as more in tune with the Palestinians 
and representative of their plight. With the Islamist organizations setting the agenda on 
innovative military tactics against the Israeli occupation, it was not until after the 
breakdown in the Camp David negotiations and outbreak of the second intifada in 
September 2000 that Fatah’s military wing, the Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades, first initiated 
suicide bombing missions on its own behalf as a tactical military method against Israel. 
Writing in 2002, Gal Luft, a former Lieutenant Colonel in the Israeli Defense Forces 
(IDF) notes, “The more enchanted Palestinians have become with the achievements of 
their “martyrs” the more Fatah has found itself under pressure to adopt the suicide 
weapon” (Luft 2002, 4). Luft explains that Arafat’s initial inclination in the 1990s was to 
show solidarity with the United States and avoid any association with terror against 
civilians (Luft 2002, 4). In light of the endemic violence of the second intifada, the 
substantive loss of “street” popularity at home deeply affected the support for Arafat and 
his leadership cadre.  As Luft notes, “Arafat inevitably succumbed to the anti-Israel rage 
and political calculations of his lieutenants” (Luft 2002, 4).52   
When two young Palestinian males blew themselves up on a bus near the Israeli 
city of Hadera on 29 November 2001 on behalf of Fatah’s Al-Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades, 
the secular political leadership of the Palestinian people formally joined the ranks of 
                                                 
52 As previously mentioned, all Palestinian suicide bombing missions against Israel to this point were 
committed by Palestinian men active in the militias of Hamas and Islamic Jihad. Incidentally, Al-Aqsa 
Martyrs’ Brigades had not undertaken any violent attacks in the pre-1967 borders of Israel. Also, these 
attacks against Israeli settlers and soldiers in the Palestinian Territories where largely drive-by shootings 
rather than suicide missions (Hasso 2005).    
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Hamas and PIJ in suicide campaigns against Israeli targets.53 However, rather than 
inspiring a communal “bond of blood” between the groups, Fatah’s Al-Aqsa Martyrs’ 
Brigades and the Islamist groups soon found themselves engaged in an ever more 
entrenched rivalry through their competition for street popularity. More precisely, Fatah, 
Hamas and PIJ competed over “which group could perfect the use of the suicide weapon 
and be viewed as most valuable to the war effort” (Luft 2002, 4-5). Thus, despite of the 
fact that Wafa Idris’ bombing may have been initially more serendipitous than planned 
on Fatah’s behalf, what is more profound is that it was claimed by the Fatah-associated, 
Al-Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades in order to directly compete with the Islamists. Until the 
moment of Wafa Idris’ attack, the unchallenged monopoly of suicide bombings was both 
male and Islamist. The move by Al-Aqsa Martyr’s Brigades to dispatch three more 
female suicide bombers in the aftermath of Idris’ mission was aimed at reinvigorating 
Fatah’s political significance on the Palestinian street. Equally, the unprecedented 
dispatching of young females demonstrated the long frustrations and deep hatreds of the 
Palestinian people for Israel and its military occupation of Palestinian land. In doing so, 
the secular-nationalist leadership further invigorated the cult of martyrdom and the 
popularity of suicide bombings among the Palestinian people. As Mia Bloom writes, the 
use of female bombers drew “propaganda mileage” for Fatah and the Al-Aqsa Martyrs’ 
Brigades: “The image of women defying tradition to sacrifice their lives for the 
Palestinian cause has drawn more attention to the despair of the Palestinian people” 
(Bloom 2007, 100). In the dispatch of female bombers, Al-Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades 
effectively placed even greater political pressure on Hamas and PIJ to keep up the 
                                                 
53 The Hadera bus attack on Thursday on 29 November 2001 killed three Israelis and wounded ten. 
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political pace or “lose influence over the course of political events” (Ness 2008, 5). 
Ultimately, the combination of providing a violent outlet for the hatred of the policies of 
the Israeli occupation and the internal political competition between the secularists and 
Islamists, gave birth to a new kind of Palestinian woman: the female suicide bomber 
(Beyler 2003).54 
 
Islamist Reactions to Female Suicide Bombers 
In the wake Wafa Idris’ act, the topic of female martyrdom ignited a flurry of 
debates and commentaries concerning the role of women in armed struggle, and most 
particularly in the Islamic context. Bloom states, “The advent of woman suicide bombers 
has thus transformed the revolutionary womb into an exploding one” (Bloom 2007, 95). 
She adds that for the secular militant groups, the involvement of women in this fashion 
signaled the fact that they were “waging a political war, not a religious one” (Bloom 
2007, 101). To this end, female suicide bombers were a part of a carefully planned and 
orchestrated political strategy. Yet, from within and beyond the borders of the Palestinian 
Territories, Islamist leaders publically grappled with the issue. The most imminent 
concern was allowing females to actively participate in armed struggle in an Islamically-
justified fashion. As the face of Wafa Idris made international headlines and brought even 
greater global attention to the Palestinian struggle, it became clear to the Islamist leaders 
                                                 
54 It is important to note is that the Palestinians were not the first to deploy female suicide bombers.  The 
phenomenon itself can be traced to the Syrian Socialist National Party (SSNP), a secular Lebanese 
organization also known as the “Communist Party”, which was pro-Syrian.  The SSNP is responsible for 
sending the first female suicide bomber in 1985, a 17-year-old Lebanese girl named Sana’a Mehaydali.  
Mehaydali’s target was an Israeli military convoy in Lebanon.  Pape and Feldman (2010) write that Sana 
explained her motive in the attack was to “liberate the south from the occupation of the Zionist terrorist” 
(Pape and Feldman 2010, 201). Subsequently, women played a role in five out of the twelve suicide attacks 
dispatched by the SSNP in Lebanon.  See also Mia Bloom (2005, 54-62).    
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that they were confronted with a dilemma in which their tactics for armed struggle 
needed to be re-examined.   
As Ness describes, the two centrally defining qualities of religious terrorism from 
the early 1980s until the second Palestinian intifada were a clear a lack of female 
participation and the specific ideology that deterred it (Ness 2008, 18). Ness notes the 
introduction of modern suicide terrorism by Hezbollah in 1983 as the standard set for 
other radical Islamic groups elsewhere. The model of Hezbollah’s resistance to repelling 
Israeli aggression in southern Lebanon was celebrated widely in the Arab world. 
Hezbollah’s trademark for suicide terrorism emboldened the wave of religious terrorism 
led by the Palestinian Islamists in the years between the first and second intifada (Ness 
2008, 18). As Tamimi writes, “It is very likely that Hamas was persuaded to use suicide 
bombers when it became clear that the tactic was delivering results in Lebanon” (Tamimi 
2007, 163). Throughout these years of activity, however, the Islamist leadership held to a 
strict gender separation of the public and private sphere. Here, it was given that “the 
resort to violence by women and girls, rather than constituting a restorative act, amounted 
to a sign of cultural fragmentation” (Ness 2008, 19). Yet, after Wafa Idris and the three 
other female suicide bombers dispatched by Al-Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades in the early 
months of 2002, the surprised Islamist leaders and clerics began to “take control of the 
phenomenon by announcing fatwas in order to justify events they had not planned” 
(Beyler 2003). 
One year into the second intifada—and nearly 80 years after Palestinian women 
marched alongside men in protest of the British Mandate—the unequivocal Islamist 
interpretation of the Islamic religious and legal canon on the topic of warfare was that 
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females were unsuited for the social and political arena, let alone for combat missions 
(Cook 2008). Even while gaining popularity as a homegrown alternative to the PLO, the 
Islamist groups widely ignored the long history of Palestinian women and their very 
prominent violent (and nonviolent) involvement in the Palestinian campaign. The 
Islamization of the struggle focused on a return to a sense of social and spiritual “purity” 
of the Palestinian people as a whole, and the piety and re-privatization of women was the 
central aim of Hamas in demonstrating its power, popularity and control the Palestinian 
street. The Islamists made Palestinian women’s bodies the representative domain of 
cultural and political contestation emblematic of the secular-Islamist divide. The extreme 
focus on the affective role of Palestinian females as mothers and their modest deportment 
in public spaces represented an immediately recognizable “return” to Islam on the part of 
the Islamist leadership, and this reinforced the greater sense of moral polarization that 
affected every aspect of Palestinian identity in the national struggle. In this way, the 
Islamization of the Palestinian struggle translated into more than the building of mosques, 
the closure of film theaters, and greater religious observance of individuals. The visibly 
“pious” comportment of Palestinian women was the visible marker of Islamist influence 
and political success, especially where the proponents of Islamization of the struggle 
regarded Hamas as the true representative of the Palestinian people (Mishal and Sela 
2000, 98). 
The “return” to Islam in the Islamist political agenda was a means of imposing a 
patriarchal power structure, wherein aspects of Palestinian masculinity were celebrated 
and female bodies were brought under Islamist control. Female veiling became 
synonymous with support for national liberation and male martyrdom, lending itself to 
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the overall privatization of Palestinian women. One clear example of this privatization in 
the name of the national struggle is found in the 1988 Hamas Charter. Specifically, 
Chapter 3, Article 17 articulates the role of the Muslim woman as having an equal role 
with men in the struggle for Palestinian freedom as “the manufacturer of men”.  The 
article states: 
The Muslim woman has a no lesser role than that of the Muslim man in 
the war of liberation; she is the manufacturer of men and plays a major 
role in guiding and educating the [new] generations (Islamic Resistance 
Movement (Hamas) 2000). 
 
Not a warrior in arms, but highly privatized by religious and political sanction, the Hamas 
Charter considers Palestinian females as demographic weapons in the quest for 
Palestinian sovereignty. Women are thus social and biological instruments for 
reproduction in order to maintain the monopoly of militants willing to die in armed 
struggle. According to this logic of “separate-but-equal”, the Palestinian female is 
therefore considered “equal” to her male counterparts for her ability to biologically create 
and educate future male fighters. Importantly, however, what is missing from the Hamas 
Charter is any suggestion or justification for female suicide bombers for the liberation of 
Palestine, although the broadly used term shahid (to indicate a male Islamic witness or 
martyr) is peppered throughout.55 
   Unlike the encompassing nature of the 1987 intifada, female organization and 
participation in public demonstrations by the 2000 intifada was scaled back and more 
tightly controlled once Hamas and PIJ began to gain political popularity and advance 
                                                 
55 For the complete Hamas Charter see Islamic Resistance Movement (Hamas), "Charter of the Islamic 
Resistance Movement (Hamas) of Palestine," Journal of Palestine Studies 22, no. 4 (Summer 1993): 124-
133. 
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their military power. As Claudia Brunner indicates, “in contrast to the First Intifada, 
when women played a major role in maintaining its steadfastness at various levels, the 
second one is a very masculine undertaking, rendering women invisible again for various 
reasons” (Brunner 2005, 31). One of these reasons was the dramatic increase in violent 
confrontations with Israeli military forces and the spike in casualties among Palestinian 
civilians in comparison to the first intifada years. Yet, even as the Palestinian street 
became even more distinctly radicalized as a result of the loss of life in local 
communities, the Islamist leadership only slowly lumbered toward a religious 
justification for more open female participation in the struggle. The problem for the 
Islamists was twofold.  First, the Islamists needed keep pace with the sudden turn in the 
political events as their secular enemy, Fatah, dispatched female suicide bombing 
campaigns. Second, the Islamists needed to quickly incorporate new roles of female 
militancy in a many that did not contradict the strict cultural norms and religious 
sanctions of Palestinian Islamism (Bloom 2007, 97-99). 
Certainly, the Islamists dominated the industry of dispatching male suicide 
bombers prior to the start of the second intifada, but the concept of isteshhad 
(martyrdom) was accepted as a male-only enterprise. Conventionally forbidden from 
taking up arms themselves, women were excluded from the religious and political status 
of isteshhad. The same Qur’anic references and public messages used for male suicide 
bombers were unavailable to females by the Islamists prior to Idris. Of course, before 
Fatah claimed responsibility for Idris’ suicide attack and successfully dispatched three 
more female suicide bombers in her name, Sheikh Ahmad Yassin, the founder of Hamas, 
publically stated that women were not needed for martyrdom operations since Hamas was 
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already unable to absorb the growing number of applications from shebab (male youths) 
who wanted to undertake them. On 31 January 2002, Yassin is quoted by the London 
newspaper, Al-Sharq Al-Awsat: 
At the present stage, we do not need women to bear this burden of jihad 
and martyrdom.  The Islamic Movement cannot accept all the Palestinian 
males demanding to participate in jihad and in martyrdom operations, 
because they are so numerous. Our means are limited, and we cannot 
absorb all those who desire to confront the enemy (Al-Sharq Al-Awsat 
2002). 
 
Yassin also stated that women’s place was in the home and that their bodies should not be 
used for this reason (Al-Sharq Al-Awsat 2002, Isa 2002). In line with the reference to 
women in the Hamas Charter, Yassin held firm to the notion that Palestinian women were 
better suited for activities related to maternity, sheltering and grieving in the Palestinian 
national struggle. He added, “The woman is the second defense line in the resistance to 
occupation. She shelters the fugitive, loses the son, husband and brother, bears the 
consequence of this, and faces starvation and blockade” (Isa 2002).  
Within the Islamist approach to the national struggle, a Palestinian female could 
only hope to attain the honor associated with martyrdom on the battlefield through the 
bravery of her sons, husband or male family members according to the prevailing 
interpretation of jihad (Ness 2008, 19). Yet, as the shock value of the female suicide 
bomber hit the world and was intensified in the media, it became clear that “the 
operational advantages that a female suicide bomber could offer made it impossible for 
Islamic religious groups to ignore and continue to deny the right for female participation” 
(Ness 2008, 5). In the weeks following his initial statements against the use of female 
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suicide bombers, Yassin took a decidedly different tact regarding “female martyrdom 
seekers.” Carefully, Yassin re-stated his position that Palestinian females were not 
needed in suicide bombing missions due to the numbers of Palestinian men early waiting 
to fill this role, but conceded that females would be allowed to carry out suicide bombing 
missions under a clear set of restrictions. According to Yassin, due to the social and 
biological differences between women and men, it was permissible for a woman to join a 
jihad operation, but under the provision that she was accompanied by a close male 
relative to serve as her escort.  He stated: 
The woman has a uniqueness that makes her different from man.  Islam 
gives her some rules.  If she goes out to jihad and fight, then she must be 
accompanied by a mahram (a close male relative she is forbidden to marry 
by the law of consanguinity) if she will be absent from home for more 
than a day and a night (Isa 2002). 
 
Important to Yassin was the issue of the proper comportment of Palestinian women and 
conventional of issues of modesty. For example, in March 2002, after the second Fatah 
female suicide bombing, Yassin stated that Hamas remained far from enthusiastic about 
the inclusion of women in warfare, for “reasons of modesty” (Zedalis 2004, 13). 
  Sheikh Yassin of Gaza was not alone among other Islamist leaders weighing in 
on the newfound subject of female martyrdom in early 2002. The debate also ignited an 
interesting split among leading Islamist voices elsewhere. For example, two weeks after 
Idris’ act, Sheikh Muhammad Sayyid Tantawi, the Grand Imam of Al-Azhar University 
in Cairo, was interviewed by a reporter from the London-based Arabic-language Al-
Sharq al-Awsat newspaper. In light of Yassin’s remarks about a female suicide bomber 
needing to be escorted by a male relative for the sake of religious appropriateness, 
 188
Tantawi was asked if unaccompanied women bombers like Wafa Idris were disobedient 
and their operations not therefore considered martyrdom. Tantawi’s response 
contradicted Yassin’s remarks. Condoning all levels of female suicide martyrdom, 
Tantawi replied: 
If a woman leaves her house for jihad and in order to uphold right and 
justice, then she is not a disobedient woman. If she is killed she will be 
considered a martyr, winning God’s acceptance, even if she left without a 
mahram (Al-Husayni 2002).  
 
Meanwhile, another Hamas leader conveniently noted that there was no specific Islamic 
religious ruling (fatwa) against a female becoming a martyr (Cunningham 2008, 90).  
Sheikh Hassan Yusef, along with another leader of Hamas, Ismae’eel Abu Shanab were 
also among those who reportedly stated that where is no fatwa that prohibited women 
from undertaking suicide attacks, ostensibly against Israeli occupation in the Palestinian 
territories (Cunningham 2008, 90). Similarly, it was noted that the Hamas Charter 
delineates certain activities for women such as motherhood and caretaking, but also does 
not specifically elide female participation in the armed struggle in the form of female 
suicide bombings. Elsewhere in the Islamic world, Muslim clerics grappled with the 
concept. Just as in the Palestinian Hamas context, Muslim leaders originally refused the 
legitimacy of female suicide bombings as martyrdom. In August 2001, the High Islamic 
Council in Saudi Arabia announced in a new fatwa that Palestinian women could become 
suicide bombers (Beyler 2003). Back in the Gaza Strip, Sheik Yassin issued a second 
statement on 2 February 2002, which granted a woman’s right to carry out a suicide 
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attack alone, under the condition that the mission does not take her away from home for 
more than twenty-four hours (Beyler 2003).   
The combination of the lack of a specific fatwa in the Islamic world regarding 
female suicide martyrdom, the silence in the Hamas Charter and the lack of any specific 
Islamic religious decrees to rule against these activities, enabled the Islamist leadership to 
increasingly distance itself from its highly religious support base. In this manner, the 
increasingly liberal statements made by Islamists appear to be far less spiritually ordained 
and more politically expedient. This demonstrates that Hamas’ gender ideology did not 
shape its political imperatives in any strict sense, but that emerging political imperatives 
(i.e. competing with Fatah-backed militancy against Israel) shaped Hamas’ gender 
ideology.   
More recently, Dr. Yunis al-Astal, a Hamas MP, discussed the Islamic precedent 
for female participation in jihad on Al-Rafidein TV, an Iraqi news program. In the 
interview dated 17 June 2007, Al-Astal’s statement demonstrates the evolution of 
Islamists leadership’s justifications for female suicide bombers as martyrs of the national 
struggle.  Al-Astal states: 
The most exalted form of jihad is fighting for the sake of Allah, which 
means sacrificing one's soul by fighting the enemies head-on, even if it 
leads to martyrdom. Martyrdom means life next to Allah.[...] When jihad 
becomes an individual duty, it applies to women too, because women do 
not differ from men when it comes to individual duties (Al-Astal 2007).  
 
In the next part of the interview, Dr. Al-Astal is asked about female suicide martyrdom 
seekers who embark on their operations without the permission of a husband or father or 
without wearing an Islamic head covering. Al-Astal replies: 
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When jihad becomes an individual duty, the husband's permission or 
consent is not required, because jihad becomes like prayer. Just like a 
woman does not have to ask for permission to pray, to fast during 
Ramadhan, or to give charity, she does not need to ask for permission 
when jihad becomes an individual duty. In my opinion, in places invaded 
by the enemy, jihad becomes an individual duty…With regard to your 
question about the veil, especially when it comes to martyrdom-seekers 
who had to go into the Zionist cities deep in Palestine – jihad is a duty, 
and so is wearing a veil, but the duty of jihad is ten times great than the 
duty of wearing a veil (Al-Astal 2007).  
 
Throughout this interview, Al-Astal is careful to strategically frame the Israeli-
Palestinian conflict in accordance with a dichotomous religious struggle between Jew and 
Muslim. In doing so, he creates an equally accessible and distinctly Islamist means of 
engagement for Palestinians—as both Muslims and citizens of Palestine—in the struggle 
that is territorially and religiously specific while seemingly gender-neutral. According to 
Al-Astal, the most important message concerning the topics of jihad and martyrdom in 
the context of the protracted struggle between Israelis and Palestinians is that it sends a 
message to the “Zionist enemies” that there is no place for both communities to 
simultaneously occupy in the land of Palestine. From this point of view, the message sent 
by male and female members of the Islamist armed resistance is the same: 
The most important message is that our enemies should know that there is 
no place for them on the land of Palestine. Each and every boy and man, 
and each and every girl and woman, is a potential martyrdom-seeker. The 
enemy should know that we are prepared to wear explosive belts, and to 
throw ourselves in the midst of the enemy, in order to make them taste the 
evil consequences of their deeds. They should know that they have no 
 191
other choice – either they leave or they will die, even if it takes a long time 
(Al-Astal 2007). 
 
Like male martyrdom seekers, Al-Astal states that the political message of the female 
martyrdom-seekers is to communicate equally an imperative to their enemies to “go back 
to where they came from, or else our jihad will continue until this land regains its 
holiness – from the [Mediterranean] Sea to the [Jordan] River" (Al-Astal 2007). 
 Al-Astal’s interview reflects the Islamist, zero-sum approach to the Palestinian 
national struggle. This approach was known for its unconditional rendering of a future 
Palestinian state, which some Islamists still seek to establish within the combined, 
present-day borders of the Palestinian Territories and Israel. In clinging to established 
national values, the Islamist leadership (particularly Hamas) confers an Islamic religious 
significance on its version of Palestinian nationalism. That is, “the Palestinian state 
envisioned by Hamas would come into being through a holy war (jihad), encompass all 
of Palestine, and implement the Islamic law (shari’a)” throughout the land (Mishal and 
Sela 2000, 15). At the same time, the careful evolution of this zero sum approach to the 
Palestinian struggle has also evolved and expanded into a more meticulously executed, 
and now (seemingly) gender-neutral vision of jihad—in which the entirety of the 
Palestinian population can and therefore must participate.   
However, it is important to note that even with the official Islamist stamp of 
approval for female suicide bombers, Hamas ultimately dispatched significantly fewer 
female suicide bombers than the secular Al-Aqsa Martyr’s Brigades. In fact, despite the 
fact that Sheik Yassin issued a public statement condoning women as potential shaheedas 
in 2002, not a single female suicide attack had been organized or claimed by Hamas at 
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that time (Beyler 2003). This was poignantly illustrated by the case of 21-year-old, 
Dareen Abu Aisheh, who reportedly first sought out Hamas to volunteer for her suicide 
mission, and was turned down on the basis of her gender (Beyler 2003). Soon after, Al-
Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades claimed responsibility for Dareen Abu Aisheh’s attack.   
Throughout the Al-Aqsa intifada the relationship between the Islamist leadership 
and female martyrdom seekers remained tenuous. In the case of Hamas, there appeared to 
be two equally important elements in the reluctance to dispatch female suicide bombers 
against Israeli targets. The first aspect was the already established conventional gender 
norms that the Hamas leadership specifically cultivated and maintained as a way of 
building its social and political credibility. There was also Hamas’ need for political 
survival. It was vital to be embraced on the Palestinian street as a powerful organization 
capable of representing the Palestinian people as a whole, while also (and perhaps most 
importantly) being seen as markedly different from the secular leadership of Fatah as the 
governing entity of the PLO. Perhaps these reasons account for why the only female 
suicide bombers dispatched by Hamas during the course of the second intifada was so 
dramatically different than the other female operatives sent by Fatah and PIJ. Unlike the 
other successful female suicide bombers known to the Palestinian conflict, 22-year-old 
Reem al-Riyashi became not only the first female Hamas bomber, and the first female 
bomber from Gaza, but also, significantly, the first mother to leave behind a husband, a 
3-year-old son, and a 1-year-old daughter in her suicide attack (Zedalis 2004, 8). Hamas 
leader Yassin defended the attack in the most dramatic shift in Islamist rhetoric 
concerning the use of females as suicide bombers. On 14 January 2004, within thirty 
minutes of the reports of Reem al-Reyashi’s attack at the Erez border crossing in Gaza, 
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Yassin defended the change in the approach to female martyrdom by telling reporters 
that, “jihad is an imperative for Muslim men and women” (Regular 2004). Yassin stated: 
 
The fact that a woman took part for the first time in a Hamas operation 
marks a significant evolution for the Izz a Din al-Kassam brigades. The 
male fighters face many obstacles on their way to operations, and this is a 
new development in our fight against the enemy. The holy war is an 
imperative for all Muslim men and women; and this operation proves that 
the armed resistance will continue until the enemy is driven from our land. 
This is revenge for all the fatalities sustained by the armed resistance 
(Regular 2004). 
 
Yassin’s statement again demonstrates that the evolution in Hamas’ use of females as 
potential weapons against the enemy became adamantly more tactical than spiritually 
ordained. Indeed, female bodies serve Islamist political ends as effective weapons against 
overwhelming Israeli military prowess. This fact of political necessity is supported by the 
claim of Mohammed, a veteran member of Hamas’ military wing in Gaza, who said that 
Riyashi was accepted as the first female Hamas suicide bomber due to the fact that the 
Israeli occupation was so heightened at the time that it allowed for very little movement 
of men (Milton-Edwards and Farrell 2010, 198). As Mohammed says, Riyashi’s attack 
came “during a very tight security atmosphere which meant no man could get close to the 
Israelis at Erez” (Milton-Edwards and Farrell 2010, 198). 
 To this end, it is also interesting to note that out of the numerous female suicide 
bombers dispatched by Fatah, PIJ and Hamas throughout the Al-Aqsa intifada, Hamas 
only dispatched two women with very distinctive social attributes. While both women 
were mothers, the second female suicide bomber dispatched by Hamas was also a 
 194
grandmother and a woman of considerable age in comparison to all of the women 
dispatched by the secular and Islamist forces alike.  On 23 November 2006, Fatima Omar 
Mahmud al-Najjar became the second female suicide bomber to be dispatched by Hamas. 
Like al-Riyashi, Fatima al-Najjar was also from Gaza, but gained attention and notoriety 
as a “first” for Hamas as well as in the history of female militancy in the Palestinian 
context. At 57-years-old, al-Najjar became the oldest female suicide bomber in the 
history of the Palestinian struggle. She was also the first grandmother in the history of the 
struggle to seek out and successfully deploy a suicide-bombing mission. The blast killed 
al-Najjar and wounded five Israeli soldiers.  
 Although Hamas, as the dominant Islamist group in the Palestinian Territories, 
only deployed two female suicide bombers in the course of the second intifada, support 
for this particular form of female political militancy remains intact. Evidence of this is 
given in Hamas MP, Yunis Al-Astal’s 2007 interview where he highlights the 
“exemplary cases of girls who were martyred for the sake of Allah” (Al-Astal 2007).   
However, the central reason for the emergence of the Palestinian female suicide bomber 
had little or nothing to do with those seeking gender equality or the elevation of the status 
of women in Palestinian society more generally. More directly, the emergence of the 
female suicide bomber shortly into the Al-Aqsa intifada came as a result of the fierce 
political competition between the Islamists and the secular authorities for dominance and 
popularity as vanguards of the Palestinian people and their cause. As Ness observes, the 
increasingly liberal position taken by Islamic terrorist groups regarding the right and 
obligation of females to engage in jihad against the enemy has little to do with 
Palestinian women as having the same rights as citizens during times of peace as they 
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have in times of war (Ness 2008, 4). Nevertheless, at the point in which the Islamist 
leadership began to condone the use of female suicide martyrdom as a political tool for 
the Islamist resistance, it became increasingly more common to see powerful political 
posters and propaganda depicting images of Palestinian women cradling guns in their 
hands while wearing full Islamic garb. Even today, the images of these women allude to 
their Islamic piety and simultaneous devotion to an armed struggle as members of the 
Islamist regime. In light of these inconsistencies, the question becomes, what were the 
Palestinian women themselves saying and doing while the Islamists and secular 
authorities battled more strategically for political control? 
 
“A Fatal Equality” 56: Female Voices on Suicide Bombing, Female Martyrdom  
Between February 2002 and May 2007, roughly 88 Palestinian women attempted 
acts of suicide bombing, although only ten were successful (McGirk 2007).57 Compared 
to the years of the first intifada, the emergence of the female suicide bomber is a 
phenomenon that can be directly associated with the Islamization of the Palestinian 
struggle, as a result of the battle for political control between secularists and Islamists 
within the Palestinian Territories and the PA. Yet Cindy Ness writes, “While radical 
Islam emerged as more of a home-grown phenomenon in the Palestinian conflict, even in 
this context religion does not appear to be the central catalyst motivating females to kill” 
                                                 
56 The title “A Fatal Equality” is borrowed from Dr. Islah Jad’s doctoral dissertation in which she explores 
the impact of nationalism, secularism and Islamism Palestinian Women’s Movement. Discussing female 
suicide bombings, Jad states that Palestinian women are not seeking total equality with men. Instead, their 
aim is to directly encourage men to return to their masculinized role as female protectors. As Jad eloquently 
explains, the women establish a “fatal equality”, in which they “rise above the male order and gain power 
over all structures of power, whether patriarchy, despotism or Occupation”(See Jad 2004).       
57 The numerical breakdown of successful female suicide bombers sent to attack Israeli targets is: 4 from 
Fatah, 2 from Islamic Jihad, and 2 from Hamas. 
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(Ness 2008, 5). Illustrating this point, Jad indicates in her analysis of Palestinian women 
between nationalism, secularism and Islamism, “Even though isteshhadeyyat, like their 
counterparts, are very much linked to Islamism and fundamentalism, Hamas was late to 
begin recruiting women for this kind of action” (Jad 2004, 189). If Fatah was the first to 
recruit women and Hamas was last (and dispatched the fewest number female bombers), 
then where were the women themselves in the process?   
In the small field of research that already exists on this topic, there is very little 
agreement as to whether Palestinian females undertaking suicide missions are fully 
victims of political circumstances or active agents in their own right. For example, 
Barbara Victor’s work on Palestinian female suicide bombers focuses exclusively on the 
hypothesis that the central motivating factor for Palestinian women in becoming suicide 
bombers is due to their gendered status as second-class citizens (Victor 2003). 
Meanwhile, Jad contradicts Victor’s claim through her contention that the acts of female 
suicide bombing were “committed out of a sense of empowerment and uniqueness”, and 
that the women undertaking these deadly missions “were in full control of their actions 
and their agency” (Jad 2004, 190). While it is important to note the ways in which the 
Islamist male leadership openly grappled with the terms and conditions of female suicide 
missions in the second intifada, it is even more compelling to discover what Palestinian 
women were saying and thinking during this time. 
In 2007, 27-year-old Thawiya Hamour, an unmarried Palestinian woman, was 
interviewed on film in Israel’s HaSharon Prison for Arab Women regarding her 
involvement, arrest and detention in a failed suicide bombing attack. Hamour was the 
sixth potential female suicide bomber dispatched by Fatah on 20 May 2002 (IDF-
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Spokesperson 2002). When the interviewer, Abigail Levy, the bereaved Israeli mother of 
a suicide attack victim, asked Hamour if someone “pushed” her to undertake her failed 
suicide mission, Hamour replied: “Of course not. It was my own will. I wanted to do it.  
Neither Hamas, nor PIJ would ever go seek a girl at her father’s house. That’s just not 
possible. I went to the guys on my own and told them that I wanted to carry out an 
operation” (Hamour 2007). As the emotional interviewer continues, Hamour sits in full 
Islamic dress, and calmly testifies on her own behalf. When asked if she regrets her 
actions, she replies: “I told you in the beginning. I did that for the sake of Allah, the 
Almighty. I understand what I did. I am here holding out. I did something that I believe to 
be for the good of Palestine” (Hamour 2007). 
In addition to Hamour’s claims that she believed her actions were for the good of 
Palestine, reports indicate that Hamour backed out of her suicide-bombing mission at the 
last minute. She claimed that her handlers directed her to dress immodestly, in the fashion 
of an Israeli woman, in order to avoid detection. In the media interviews that followed, 
Hamour stated, "I wasn't afraid. I'm not afraid to die. I went for personal reasons. 
However, I did not want to arrive 'upstairs' for impure reasons. I did not want to dress that 
way, because it is against my religion" (Hamour 2003). Here, it appears that Hamour had 
very strong personal convictions in affirming her goal in undertaking a suicide-bombing 
mission. However, with her goal in mind, Hamour was also deliberate in her vision of 
completing the mission to her own set of personal standards. For example, reports 
indicate a dispute between Hamour and her operators due to their command that she 
detonate the explosive belt affixed to her body even if she did not reach the target site.  
Hamour refused to do this—even as Israeli security forces in Tulkarm caught her—before 
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reaching her targeted destination in a densely populated area in West Jerusalem. When 
asked why she did not detonate her explosives at the moment she was discovered by the 
Israeli security forces, Hamour rhetorically replied, "To blow myself up for nothing, what 
for? To die just so that my operators can brag about carrying out a terrorist attack?" 
(Hamour 2003). 
The theme of independent thinking on behalf of the women carried out the 
suicide-bombing campaigns is also articulated by the family members of Fatima al-
Najjar, the 57-year-old woman who was sent by Hamas in November 2006 to carry out a 
mission against an Israeli raid in Gaza. According to Najjar’s family, she became 
radicalized after Israeli troops destroyed her home in 1990 during the 1987 intifada 
(Milton-Edwards and Farrell 2010, 199). Weeks before her death, she participated in a 
woman’s protest march in Beit Hanoun where Israeli forces laid siege to a group of 
Hamas fighters trapped inside a mosque. During the protest, the Israeli forces opened fire 
on the crowd of women, who were helping the male fighters flee the mosque. Sixteen 
Palestinians were killed, including some of the female protesters (BBC News 2006). 
Najjar’s son, Saber, said that his mother was hoping to be martyred that day, and was 
disappointed when other women were killed by Israeli fire and she survived (Milton-
Edwards and Farrell 2010, 199). Other family members added in an interview that, 
“having raised such a large family, Najjar believed she had fulfilled her wifely and 
maternal duties and wanted to contribute in a more direct way to the ‘resistance’” 
(Milton-Edwards and Farrell 2010, 199-200). According to Hamas, it was Najjar who 
approached Hamas fighters who were unable to get near enough to Israeli soldiers during 
 199
the raid, and told them, “If you can’t do something I can, because my house is close to 
the Israeli position” (Milton-Edwards and Farrell 2010, 199). 
 Hamour and Najjar’s cases illustrate the number of public displays of ready-and-
willing female volunteers that fostered the growth of female suicide attacks as a political 
weapon unique to the second intifada. Certainly, it cannot be overlooked that the very 
public legitimization of female suicide martyrdom on behalf of the Islamists and 
secularist groups alike empowered these women. For the first time in the history of the 
Palestinian struggle, Palestinian women of all ages were now encouraged to participate in 
the Palestinian resistance in a military role and not just as passive citizens forced by 
circumstance to stoically bear the array of traumas inflicted by violent military action 
directed against them and their communities. To this end, Hamour and Najjar’s cases 
demonstrate that they did not see themselves as either a passive victim of social and 
political circumstances or the malleable pawn of their handlers. Rather, their words and 
actions indicate that they considered themselves in control of undertaking and executing 
their own suicide missions against Israeli targets with the assistance of male support.  
In addition to an array of male voices of leading clerics throughout the Islamic 
world, female suicide bombers were widely heralded by Palestinian women as well. Most 
especially, a number of female voices emerged in support of the idea that Wafa Idris 
served as a role model for women engaged in the national struggle on behalf of their 
gender. As Clara Beyler, a researcher for the International Policy Institute for Counter-
Terrorism in Israel observes, “When women become human bombs, their intent is to 
make a statement not only in the name of a country, a religion, a leader, but also in the 
name of their gender” (Beyler 2003). For example, during the Ramallah-based public 
 200
funeral for Wafa Idris held by Fatah, one Palestinian woman from Tulkarm referred to 
Idris as the precedent for future female suicide bombing missions against Israeli targets.  
She said, "This woman will not be the last. We will all booby-trap our bodies and blow 
ourselves up in the Jews' faces" (Israeli Security Sources 2003).  
During the same funeral proceedings, a female member of Fatah’s Revolutionary 
Council eulogized Idris by praising her as a female martyr, following the path of female 
militants before her and restoring a sense of honor to the role of Palestinian women in 
struggle.58 Similarly, the mothers of the deceased female bombers darkly expressed pride 
and support for their daughter’s missions as a way of encouraging other Palestinian 
woman and girls to follow. In an interview with reporters after her daughter’s death, the 
mother of Wafa Idris tearfully described her daughter as a both martyr and “daughter of 
Palestine” (Idris 2002). Idris’ mother stated that she was proud of her daughter and hoped 
that more women would follow Wafa’s example. Similarly, the mother of Ayat Al-
Akhras, the third female suicide bomber sent by Al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades, stated that 
she did not personally encourage her daughter to blow herself up in the name of 
Palestinian nationalism, but believed that her daughter “intended her action to be an 
example to other girls” (Al-Akhras 2007). Finally, the mother of Dalal Al-Mughrabi, a 
20-year-old woman who was killed during her participation in an attack on the Coastal 
Road of Israel in 1978, has maintained since the time of her daughter’s death: “Dalal will 
never be forgotten as she will remain an admirable symbol of the Palestinian women's 
                                                 
58 Specifically, it was stated, "Wafa's martyrdom restored honor to the national role of the Palestinian 
woman, who sketched the most wonderful pictures of heroism in the long battle for national liberation. 
Wafa came today to complete the path of the martyr Dalal Al-Mughrabi and her comrades…" MEMRI, 
Wafa Idris: The Celebration of the First Female Suicide Bomber--Part III, February 14, 2002, 
http://www.memri.org/report/en/0/0/0/0/0/0/611.htm#_edn1 (accessed February 28, 2010). 
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struggle and an example to be emulated by young Palestinian men and women who will 
pursue the armed struggle until the liberation of Palestine"(Al-Amir 2008). 
 As Palestinian women came to occupy a decisively more violent role in the 
struggle for nationhood, what did this mean for gender equality? Looking back to the 
history of the Palestinian struggle, Leila Khaled, one of the most famous female militants 
for her brash activities of the 1970s wrote in her autobiography that violence, in general, 
was a way of “leveling the patriarchal society through revolutionary zeal” (Khaled 
1973).59 An advocate of gender equality and full female participation in the Palestinian 
struggle, Khaled wrote in her 1973 autobiography that Palestinian women would one day 
“demonstrate that their commitment was no less than those of their brothers, sons, or 
husbands” (Khaled 1973). On a personal note, she adds, “As a Palestinian, I had to 
believe in the gun as the embodiment of my humanity and my determination to liberate 
myself and my fellow men” (Khaled 1973, 8). Khaled argues that military training and 
violent participation was the way for women to achieve social and political equality in the 
national struggle (Khaled 1973). However, Khalid is careful to note in her writing that the 
Palestinian national struggle is first and foremost the concern of all Palestinian people, 
including women. Similar to the tensions between feminism and nationalism in other 
struggles for political liberation, Khaled demonstrates that political liberation precedes 
gender liberation on all counts. 
                                                 
59 Leila Khalid was the first “poster girl” of Palestinian militancy. Khalid was born in Haifa in 1944 under 
the British Mandate, and came of age in Southern Lebanon.  She is most famously known for her 
participation in the 1969 hijackings of TWA Flight 840, which was blown up after passengers had 
disembarked. Khalid acted on behalf of the Marxist-Socialist party, the Popular Front for the Liberation of 
Palestine (PFLP).     
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Nevertheless, after the first year of female suicide bombings, Dr. Samiya Sa'ad 
Al-Din, a Palestinian women living in Egypt, reflected on the role of female suicide 
bombers as the vanguards for gender equality. In her column in the Egyptian government 
daily Al-Akhbar, Al-Din wrote that Palestinian women were “tearing apart the gender 
classification of their birth certificates and declaring that sacrifice for the Palestinian 
homeland would not be for men alone” (Al-Din 2002). She adds, "... all Palestinian 
women will write the history of the liberation with their blood, and will become time 
bombs in the face of the Israeli enemy. They will not settle for being mothers of martyrs" 
(Al-Din 2002). In a similar vein, a columnist in the Jordanian newspaper Al-Dustour 
reflected on female suicide bombing as a means to security gender equality for women: 
The Arab woman has taken her place and her dignity.  It is the women’s 
rights activists in the West who robbed women of their right to be human, 
and viewed them as bodies without souls. Wafa [Idris] did not carry 
makeup in her suitcase, but enough explosives to fill the enemies with 
horror…Wasn’t it the West that kept demanding that the Eastern woman 
become equal to the man?  Well, this is how we understand equality--this 
is how the martyr Wafa understood equality (Al-Dustour 2002). 
 
With the emergence of female suicide bombers, the question of gender equality in 
the act came to be seen as inherent in the process of promoting Palestinian liberation 
through heroic, self-sacrificing acts.  In an editorial entitled, “It’s a Woman!” the 
Egyptian Islamist periodical, Al-Sha’ab, enthusiastically endorsed female suicide 
bombing as a means to shock the enemy while simultaneously “exploding” myths of 
women’s weakness, submissiveness and enslavement. Darkly, the editorial adds that 
women’s liberation comes in the form of “liberation of the body from the trials and 
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tribulations of this world…and the acceptance of death with a powerful, courageous 
embrace”(Al-Sha'ab 2002).60 
 More often than not, the idea of achieving gender equality through female 
militancy is a rhetorical tool used on behalf of the many public commentators who came 
to support female suicide bombing as a violent means to a still undetermined end in the 
Palestinian struggle. However, despite the fact that several dozen Palestinian females 
willingly volunteered for suicide bombing missions, these individuals were still operating 
under archaic patriarchal notions of gender rather than “exploding” these myths from 
within (Bloom 2007). According to Bloom, there is a well-scripted set of gender-based 
rules around which Palestinian society operates. Within this framework, women are 
regularly seen as self-sacrificial. For example, the patriarchal conception of motherhood 
is one of self-denial and self-effacement. As Bloom writes, “In a sense, martyrdom is the 
ultimate and twisted fulfillment of these ideas. So the spectacle of female suicide 
bombers doesn’t challenge the patriarchy as much as provide evidence of its power” 
(Bloom 2007, 102). Here, it seems contradictory that female suicide bombers of the 
second intifada are seen as the vanguards of gender equality in their time, when the 
message translated to women seeking to emulate the paths of female resistance fighters is 
that females are more valuable to their society dead than alive, especially in the state of 
protracted war against Israel (Bloom 2007, 102). 
                                                 
60 From the 2002 article:  “It is a woman who teaches you today a lesson in heroism, who teacher you the 
meaning of Jihad, and the way to die a martyr’s death.  It is a woman who has shocked the enemy, with her 
thin, meager and weak body…It is a woman who blew herself up, and with her exploded all the myths 
about women’s weaknesses, submissiveness, and enslavement…It is a woman who has proven that the 
meaning of [women’s] liberation is the liberation of the body from the trials and tribulations of this 
world…and the acceptance of death with a powerful, courageous embrace” (Al-Sha’ab 2002). 
 
 204
 Meanwhile, some contend that the distinction between female and male 
Palestinian suicide bombers of the second intifada is that the actions of females are more 
personal than political (Berko 2007). For example, it is argued that female suicide 
bombers undertake their mission out of a feeling of personal emptiness and desperation 
(Victor 2003). Departing from this perspective, Jad argues that the motive of Palestinian 
females seeking suicide martyrdom has less to do with personal desperation or the 
general desire for gender equality. In her highly nuanced account, Jad contends that 
female suicide bombers are not seeking equality on a par with Palestinian males, but aim 
to publically shame Palestinian manhood and Arab male leadership. The actual act of 
shaming is not related to the pursuit of gender equality, but to a conscious desire to 
motivate Palestinian men and the Arab male leadership to return to their positions as 
protectors of women (Jad 2004, 278).61 Clearly, the decision to invite or reinvigorate the 
return of patriarchal, masculinist protectionism by directly confronting and challenging it 
flies in the face of gender equality. Nevertheless, Jad’s account is consistent with 
prevailing statements made by female suicide bombers themselves. For example, in her 
videotaped farewell message, Ayat Al-Akhras said, “Enough torpor, enough 
relinquishing your duties in defending Palestine, I scorn your armies that watch 
Palestinian girls who fight in your time while you watch them on your TVs. This is my 
call to you and let each proud Arab Muslim hear me” (Jad 2004, 280). After Ayat’s 
death, her sister Sammar Al-Akhras, stated in anguish that Ayat went on her own suicide 
mission because “others have no courage” (S. Al-Akhras 2007). Echoing Ayat, Andalib 
                                                 
61 Mia Bloom (2007) illustrates this point elsewhere in the style of right-wing Hindu women who goad men 
into action by saying, “Don’t be a bunch of eunuchs” (Bloom 2007, 99). 
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Taqatqa sharply added in her farewell testament, “I said with my body what Arab rulers 
could not say with their tongues” (Jad 2004, 280).   
By taking the words of these Palestinian women in context, we can begin to see 
that the female approach to suicide bombing was far more dark and complex than 
previously considered, where the acts of female suicide bombers can be seen to carry a 
multiplicity of meanings. Where feminist ideals for gender equality are concerned, 
female suicide bombers represent a celebration of female ability in contrast to male 
impotency. At the same time, however, the bombers themselves are not seeking to imitate 
or become their male leaders’ counterparts. Where national sacrifice is concerned, the 
meaning of sacrifice is expanded in new ways to explain and account for the emergence 
of a new form of female political behavior and political citizenship. Moreover, the 
challenge and confrontation to Palestinian males and male Arab leadership on the 
grounds of patriarchy and principles of masculinist protectionism, forges a new political 
voice for Palestinian women while in the process of yearning for—if not further 
manifesting—the masculinist power structure that perpetuates armed struggle on an 
almost exclusively male political terrain. Nevertheless, Palestinian women have always 
seen their participation in the national struggle as a matter of personal and political right. 
In this manner, some Palestinian women see female participation in suicide bombing 
campaigns as an individual right to invoke the personal and collective right self-defense 
(Jad 2004, 278). Jad’s work subtly maintains that this decidedly feminist ideology of 
“The personal is political”, enables Palestinian women to seek out suicide bombing 
missions through a sense of “over empowerment and uniqueness”. These women are not 
only in full control of their act, but of their individual agency (Jad 2004, 278).   
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Certainly, the use of female agency and the femininity of female suicide bombers 
as a means for shaming masculinity and the failed protective abilities of Palestinian men 
and Arab rulers alike is a bold and understudied calculus in the study of female suicide 
bombers. With the strategic support of the Al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades, Wafa Idris and her 
immediate followers forever changed the face of the Palestinian national struggle.  
However, in line with Pape’s research on suicide terrorism more broadly, the 
participation of Palestinian women in female suicide bombing campaigns demonstrates 
that the acts of suicide bombing were neither erratic nor religious. “Instead,” as Pape 
writes more generally of suicide terrorism, “they are primarily political—i.e.: 
nationalistic—and operate at strategic social and individual levels that are complex and 
independent (Pape 2005, 21-22). Indeed, Hamas and PIJ may have eventually changed 
their position on the recruitment of women into their military operations to keep up the 
political pace with the propaganda mileage drawn by the Al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades from 
their own use of female bombers (Bloom 2007, 100). Yet from this point of view, the 
deliberations of the Islamist leadership had very little impact on the complex and 
interdependent reasons why Palestinian females actively sought out their own suicide 
bombing missions. Insightfully, Ness adds, “While radical Islam has emerged as more of 
a home-grown phenomenon in the Palestinian conflict, even in this context religion does 
not appear to be the central catalyst motivating females to kill” (Ness 2008, 5). 
 
Conclusion  
The main point of this chapter is to demonstrate the less than coherent framework, 
which lent itself to the emergence of the political role of Palestinian women as suicide 
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bombers. In examining the female Palestinian suicide bombers of the Al-Aqsa intifada, 
religious arguments run short whereas political calculations seem to triumph. Debunking 
the false assumption that religious motivations are directly correlated to the rise of female 
suicide bombers, it becomes apparent that the individual motivations of the female 
suicide bombers of the second intifada were more nationalist than religious. Moreover, 
illustrative of the feminist mantra, “The personal is political”, female Palestinian suicide 
bombers themselves saw suicide bombing as an opportunity both to express their 
nationalistic outrage against Israel and their frustrations with Palestinian males and Arab 
male leaders. Yet, at the very heart of the female bombers’ own aspirations, was a vicious 
struggle for power between the Islamists and the secular Fatah leadership of the PA. 
While Yasser Arafat publically entreated Palestinian women to join the military ranks of 
their fathers and brothers in the national struggle, the invitation sent a direct message to 
the Islamists, who had held a monopoly on male suicide bombers since 1993. The 
message was that Fatah was able and willing to respond to the needs of the Palestinian 
people, even if it meant sending women volunteers on suicide bombing missions. In rapid 
succession, Fatah’s Al-Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades dispatched the first four female suicide 
bombers, knowing that the conservative Islamist leadership would refuse the idea of 
female suicide bombers due to custom and social traditions of female modesty.  
Subsequent to the first female bombing attacks, the Islamist leadership made an 
ideological adjustment for women on the basis of carefully calibrated, yet questionably 
“official” Islamic rulings on the matter.   
Although ironic, it becomes clear that the rise of the Islamist political power in 
the interim period between the end of the 1987 intifada and the beginning of Al-Aqsa 
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intifada in 2000 is responsible—although indirectly—for the emergence of the female 
suicide bombers in 2002. In causal terms, a classic ‘security dilemma’ between the two 
Palestinian arbiters of power created an opportunity structure that afforded Palestinian 
females a new role in the Palestinian struggle. Thus, to recall Thucydides, the growth of 
Islamist popularity in the Palestinian Territories ignited a fear in the hearts of the 
secularists to maintain their own power and popularity in the Palestinian Territories and 
PA. Initially, the secular Al-Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades provided the necessary infrastructure 
for female suicide bombers. Then, with reluctance, the Islamist groups followed. In doing 
so, however, religious sanctioning by way of rhetorical gymnastics was used to swath the 
Islamist leadership in an air of religious authority while Palestinian females blew 
themselves up at Israeli checkpoints and on crowded pedestrian streets. Yet, as Brunner 
notes, “As to the bombings of 2003 and 2004, claimed by PIJ and Hamas, the few 
religious arguments cited can easily be deconstructed as part of their political public 
relations efforts” (Brunner 2005, 40). With this, the evolution of gender norms within the 
Islamist camp can be seen as clearly political rather than religious in nature. 
In a dually tragic fashion, female suicide bombing missions eventually came to be 
condoned by the Islamist leadership. However, this did not equate with any attempt to 
make a place for women within the hierarchy of the organizations. Moreover, the same is 
true for the secular leadership, which condoned female suicide bombings without the 
baggage of religious permissibility, even as female representation and gender equality 
remained a low priority under Fatah’s command. Indeed, there has always been a clear 
ambivalence about the leadership capacity of women and the role that women should 
play in the Palestinian national movement, and this has been buttressed by the social 
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norms appropriate to females more generally. Yet, more than victims of patriarchy and 
misogyny, Palestinian female suicide bombers stand out as the deadliest of active agents 
in their own right. They emerged from diverse demographic corners of the social, 
religious and political spectrum of Palestinian society, and their morally questionable, 
political behavior dramatically and permanently altered the face and character of the 
Palestinian national struggle.    
Throughout this discussion of the political role of Palestinian female suicide 
bombers, the alternative of nonviolent political engagement is underlying theme and 
alternative to the former. The focus of the next chapter will be devoted to a detailed 

































We are under occupation because we choose to be under 
occupation…just as a beaten wife has the choice to stay or leave. 
 
–Dr. Mubarak Awad, Founder of the Palestinian Center for the Study 
of Nonviolence 
 
Contained in the story of Palestinian nonviolence are two important issues. First is 
the fact that a discussion of nonviolence and peace building from within this 
predominantly Muslim community threatens to “derail those scholars and policymakers 
accustomed to traditional frameworks—apologetic, defensive, or orientalist—in the study 
of Islam” (Abu-Nimer and Groves 2003, 2). Second, within the story of nonviolent 
activism in the Palestinian Territories is the contextualization of female empowerment in 
practices inherent to Palestinian Islamic culture and society. In a departure from previous 
chapters, which explore the evolution of Palestinian women’s political behavior through 
the popularly known roles of mother, political activist and violent suicide bomber, this 
chapter endeavors to show the enduring significance of Palestinian women to the 
Palestinian struggle from the understudied perspective of their participation and 
mobilization as nonviolent activists. Since the rise of the Islamist movement in the early 
1990s, internecine politics between the Islamists and secular-nationalist groups have 
silenced the grassroots campaigns of the 1987 intifada that once united the Palestinian 
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community against the Israeli occupation. Yet, in addition to the rise of internecine 
tensions and violence within Palestinian society since that time, the Israeli occupation of 
Palestinian land and people also remains entrenched, if not formalized through the Oslo 
Accords. This is exemplified by the perpetuation of Israeli control over the people living 
in the Gaza Strip, West Bank and East Jerusalem. Added to this realm of Israeli control is 
the construction of the Israeli West Bank Barrier Wall, which has affected the lives and 
livelihoods of an estimated 411,000 Palestinian residents of the West Bank and East 
Jerusalem (B'tselem 2009). Moreover, the continued growth of Israeli settlements and 
their encroachment on Palestinian lands has continued to circumscribe and oppress the 
rights of average Palestinians. Through all of this, Palestinian women have continued to 
quietly work in nonviolent ways on behalf of their families and communities, and against 
the illegal usurping of Palestinian human rights by Israeli forces. By exploring the 
contemporary Palestinian nonviolence movement, this chapter locates where Palestinian 
women are and where they stand on the issue of nonviolence in the light of the rise of the 
Islamist political alternative, which often also presents itself as an alternative framework 
to do the bidding of the people. While the Islamist campaign for hearts and minds is 
cultivated among and by the new Islamic female activists of the Palestinian struggle, the 
question becomes, ‘Where and who are the women of nonviolent activism after the Oslo 
Accords?’ 
 
Nonviolence and Islam in the Palestinian Context 
A compelling story of the 1987 intifada was told to Mohammed Abu-Nimer and 
Joe Groves during an interview they conducted with a group of Palestinian men from 
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Hebron about nonviolence in the 1987 intifada (Abu-Nimer and Groves 2003, 128-129).  
One man from the interview group conveyed the tale of a group of shebab (Palestinian 
boys and older male teenagers) who were throwing rocks at an Israeli patrol in Hebron in 
February 1989. The Israeli patrol gave chase to the boys, and one was shot and killed. In 
the course of the chase, one of the Israeli soldiers became cut off from his patrol and 
became surrounded by the group of angry Palestinian shebab. Fearing for his life, the 
soldier ran to the door of a nearby Palestinian home and began pounding on it for help. 
According to the story, a Palestinian woman appeared at the doorway. Seeing what was 
happening between the Israeli soldier and the shebab, she quickly admitted the soldier to 
her home, refusing to allow the shebab to attack him. The woman led the soldier into her 
home and served him coffee while they waited until it was safe for him to return to his 
patrol. As Abu-Nimer and Groves reveal, “The woman was the mother of the boy whom 
the Israeli patrol had just killed” (Abu-Nimer and Groves 2003, 128).   
 Using this anecdote of the Palestinian woman’s nonviolent behavior toward her 
unexpected Israeli guest, Abu-Nimer and Groves illustrate a “microcosm of the complex 
intertwining of violence and nonviolence that characterizes the Intifada” (Abu-Nimer and 
Groves 2003, 128). In this story is an attempt to demonstrate the political implications of 
nonviolence on the Palestinian side of the struggle against Israel. These illustrations are 
tied to a subtle yet foundational theme of cultural and religious values and principles of 
Arab-Muslims that foster nonviolent and peace-building campaigns in their communities.  
Focusing on the Palestinian situation, Abu-Nimer and Groves’ work demonstrates that 
the use of nonviolence in the name of freedom from Israeli military occupation is relevant 
to the Palestinian people as Muslims. This work adds to the scholarship concerning the 
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decades of the Palestinian struggle, where nonviolent acts of civil disobedience largely 
typified the political tactics used by the unarmed Palestinians against the organized and 
disproportionate force used against them by their occupiers. For example, Gene Sharp, a 
leading scholar of nonviolence, identifies roughly 85 percent of all Palestinian activities 
pertaining to the 1987 uprising as nonviolent (Sharp 1989, 3).62 Identifying nonviolence 
as “a technique of conducting conflicts using psychological, social, economic, and 
political weapons”, Sharp describes three methodological approaches to nonviolent 
resistance. These methods include: 1) symbolic forms of nonviolent protest--such as 
vigils, marches, and flying flags, 2) noncooperation--including social boycotts, labor 
strikes, and many forms of disobedience and mutiny, and 3) nonviolent intervention--
ranging from hunger strikes to nonviolent occupations and blockades, the creation of self-
reliant institutions, and the establishment of a rival parallel government (Sharp 1989, 4). 
Sharp states that Palestinians “have already grasped and practiced some of the 
fundamentals of this technique”, and describes this rich history of Palestinian 
insubordination wherein, “People have simply refused to comply with something the 
Israelis wanted” (Sharp 1987, 48).   
Adding to Sharp’s analysis, Mubarak Awad maintains that Palestinians have used 
nonviolent methods since the beginning of the 1930s in their attempts to achieve their 
goals against Zionism (Awad 1984, 22). In 1984, Awad’s article “Non-Violent 
Resistance: A Strategy for the Occupied Territories” cited the consistencies in Palestinian 
nonviolent political activism against Israeli aggression. Awad also posits nonviolent 
                                                 
62 Sharp identifies commercial shutdown, economic boycotts, labor strikes, demonstrative funerals, and 
many types of political noncooperation as evidence of nonviolent resistance.  To this list, he also adds the   
development of alternative educational, social, economic and political institutions as evidence of 
nonviolent resistance and important to the perpetuation of the Palestinian struggle.    
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resistance as the only political tool available to the Palestinians to bring about their 
liberation from Israeli occupation (Awad 1984). Ultimately, however, it is Abu-Nimer 
and Groves work, which goes beyond the history of Palestinian nonviolent activism to 
portray key cultural and religious values and principles within Palestinian society that 
have historically animated nonviolent campaigns in the Palestinian struggle. Despite the 
fact that the 1987 intifada became one of the “most thoroughly studied examples of 
political resistance in history,” Abu-Nimer and Groves attest that the cultural and 
religious connection between nonviolence and Islam remains relatively understudied in 
the Palestinian case. Unfortunately, however, without more deeply investigating the 
significance of the Palestinian woman and her interaction with Israeli soldier, Abu-Nimer 
and Groves miss the opportunity to explore the gendered elements of nonviolent activism 
in the Palestinian struggle, especially where Palestinian women can be seen as the source 
of fostering and transmitting the key social and religious principles of nonviolence to 
which Abu-Nimer and Groves’ work lays claim.  
Historically, Palestinian women have not only served as the organizing force of 
nonviolent campaigns against the Israeli occupation, but also remain bastions of cultural 
and religious values within their communities, and attuned to nonviolent conflict 
mediation and resolution among their fellow Palestinians. These values include a 
kindness to one’s neighbor, a hospitality to strangers and upholding one’s personal faith 
through a recognition of the importance of humanity and its preservation. Taking Abu-
Nimer and Groves analysis a bit deeper into the fabric of societies in conflict, feminist 
political thinkers and advocates of conflict resolution see female involvement in 
peacemaking as a vital component for nonviolently constructing, creating and 
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perpetuating peace. According to this perspective, placing peacemaking efforts in the 
hands of women is a preliminary step in creating “inclusive security”, a citizen-driven 
approach to global stability, which emphasizes women’s agency, and not their 
vulnerability (Hunt 2001, 38). An example of this lies in Swanee Hunt’s celebrated 
account, “Women Waging Peace”, in which she provocatively writes, “Allowing men 
who plan wars to plan peace is a bad habit” (Hunt 2001).  
Hunt’s work is broadly representative of a community of scholars and political 
activists committed to conflict resolution, who consider women—regardless of class, 
country or creed—as agents of nonviolent political change. From this point of view, 
women are seen as suffering the most from violence in homes, communities and nations, 
and so war, state militarism and violence against women are held as inextricably linked.   
Unlike men, it is argued that women more easily conceptualize violence through their 
own vulnerability and see violence as not just an individual act, but as a structured event 
that emerges from social institutions and organizations (Bahdi 2003). Ostensibly, this is 
where a certain unity against violence brings women together as agents of social and 
political change despite their disparate political contexts and social traditions. Furthering 
this perspective is UN Resolution 1325, which calls for the incorporation of women in 
peacemaking efforts. The resolution demands a more active role for women in the 
prevention and reconciliation of conflicts through the “equal participation and full 
involvement of women in all efforts for the maintenance and promotion of peace and 
security, and the need to increase their role in decision-making with regard to conflict 
prevention and resolution” (United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325). Where 
the idea of women working for peace rests on the theoretical tenants of nonviolent 
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struggle, the springing up of local and international nonviolent organizations and 
techniques used by female activists only enriches the hypothesis that women are the true 
architects of peace the modern age. Still, however, the question remains, where are the 
female activists of nonviolence, peace and conflict resolution in the Palestinian struggle? 
 
The NGO-ization of the Women’s Movement and Nonviolence Movement 
Abu-Nimer and Groves write that efforts to apply peace-building approaches to 
the Middle East and other Muslim communities, have been hampered by the widespread 
assumption that Islamic religion and culture are inimical to the principles of peace 
building and conflict resolution” (Abu-Nimer and Groves 2003, 1). Yet, in contradiction 
to this, it is widely recognized that the early years of the 1987 intifada were carried out at 
the grassroots level by nonviolent means, where boycotts and civil disobedience against 
the Israeli authorities were used more regularly and with greater coordination than acts of 
violence (Nassar and Heacock 1990, 8-10, Dajani 1995, 95). Within this setting, what 
most characterized the 1987 intifada (in comparison to the many local uprisings 
preceding it) was the mass mobilization of women. As Suha Sabbagh characterizes 
female participation in the Palestinian struggle, “Rural women, camp dwellers, and camp 
refugee women poured into the streets, marched in demonstrations, and organized sit-ins 
in front of blown-up homes” (Sabbagh 1998, 2). In these nonviolent demonstrations in 
the streets, the women were not only challenging the Israeli military occupation, but also 
confronting the deeply rooted patriarchal traditions of Palestinian society (Hasso 2001).  
Transgressing these traditions brought Palestinian women into a discussion of their social 
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and political rights not only as Palestinians, but also as female citizens of a future 
Palestinian state.63   
 However, female participation in the 1987 intifada dwindled as the movement 
began to lose its spontaneous nature and became institutionalized (Sabbagh 1998, 3).  
According to Sabbagh, the reason for this decline is hotly debated.64 The democratic 
culture and responsive agenda of grass roots women’s organizations was once seen as 
responsible and relevant to Palestinian women’s lives, but this began to erode in the 
absence of internal democracy and growing hegemony of the Palestinian Authority after 
its establishment in 1994 (2008104). As the decade of the 1990s progressed, the leftist 
oppositional parties of the Palestinian struggle became increasingly fragmented, leaving 
the secular-nationalist parties unable to maintain their activity and viability due to the 
fragility of their own internal politics. Again, the heavy hand of the secular-nationalist 
leadership governing the Palestinian Authority did not help this situation. Despite the fact 
that the women’s organizations were the groups that fought the hardest to bring the 
Palestinian self-governance into existence, they were the first to be eclipsed as the 
Palestinian Authority and its security forces monopolized the public space.   
                                                 
63 As noted in previous chapters, much of the literature produced as a result of the first intifada attests to 
Palestinian’s women’s active political participation as indicative of a transformation of consciousness.  
Here, the most significant effect of the first intifada on women was the evolution that took place in the 
transformation of their roles of women-as-citizens in the struggle for Palestinian statehood.  For example, 
Sabbagh writes, “Through the spontaneous act of participating in the confrontation with Israeli soldiers, 
women have challenged their traditional role, which requires their exclusion from the public sphere” 
(Sabbagh 1998, 3).    
64 Sabbagh notes that Dr. Islah Jad considers the reason for the decline of female participation is because 
the UNLU failed to take women’s issues into consideration, and therefore failed to attract women as it 
continued to give direction in the first intifada.  At the same time, Hiltermann argues that women in general 
were afraid to support a political program. Perhaps it can be said that while many women joined the ranks 
of the women’s organization during the first intifada, they did not remain within them as the intifada 
became increasingly dictated by the UNLU (1998, 3). 
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Eileen Kuttab writes that as a consequence of the development of a nascent ‘state’ 
by way of Palestinian self-governance, the avenue of informal grassroots participation in 
Palestinian politics collapsed and was replaced by a formal political setting that largely 
excluded female participation. As a result of the collapse of civil society, the fragmented 
women’s organizations lost their organic structural ties with the grassroots and the 
national movement as they transformed from small, shoestring organizations into 
formalized and internationally funded NGOs with an agenda created and endorsed by 
their benefactors abroad. In this “NGO-ization” of the women’s movement, Kuttab 
asserts that the genuine dynamism of the women’s movement as a whole became a 
movement, which is now “keener to reproduce an alienating international agenda rather 
than a responsive relevant local agenda” (Kuttab 2008, 105).65 Added to this is the sense 
that the professionalization of the women’s movement since the Oslo years transformed 
what was once a voluntary endeavor of a community into an occupation for local elites, 
which has further isolated the revolutionary spirit of the movement from the masses.  
According to Kuttab, women’s NGOs “divided and fragmented the women’s sector into 
different professional groups according to the agenda of the organizations and the nature 
of the services that they make available” (Kuttab 2008, 111). This resulted in an 
inconsistent provision of services to Palestinian women, and compartmentalized the 
Palestinian women’s struggle for equality and its effectiveness.    
                                                 
65 “NGO-ization” is a term recently used in the Palestinian context to describe the process through which 
issues affecting the Palestinian population have been transformed into projects funding by NGOs.  Jad 
writes that such projects occur in “isolation from the general context in which they are applied and without 
due consideration of the economic, social and political factors affecting these projects” (Jad 2007, 623). 
Joining Jad, Kuttab (2008) adds that this process had failed to empower Palestinian women due to the fact 
that this process has transformed the cause for social change (promoting gender equality) into a “project” 
that is alien to the local context.  Accordingly, creating a project out of a social movement places the 
ownership of the project into the hands of a group of small professional elite for “the purpose of 
accountability vis-à-vis foreign funders” (Jad 2007, 628).   
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Evidence of the disconnection of the Palestinian women’s organizations from the 
local agenda as the Palestinian Authority became formalized and consolidated its power 
has tremendous bearing on the disconnection and seeming more recent irrelevance of the 
organizations promoting nonviolence in the Palestinian Territories. As Kuttab explains, 
“the most serious internal challenge of all those which have faced the women’s 
movement over the past fifteen years has been the movement’s transformation from a 
grass-roots struggle to an elite movement” (Kuttab 2008, 106). Similar to the social and 
political flailing of women’s NGOs in their quest for local legitimacy, are the struggles of 
the (presumably) gender-neutral NGOs in the Palestinian Territories, which seek to 
promote nonviolence. Like the Palestinian women’s NGOs, the NGOs that developed in 
the Palestinian Territories to promote nonviolence and conflict resolution are 
internationally backed, run by local elites and not directly accountable to the people. As 
Hatem Bazian explains, the growth of the NGO sector in the Palestinian Territories is 
alienating to local groups in their efforts to normalize Israeli-Palestinian relations (Bazian 
2007, 174). As a result the Palestinian people view foreign-backed NGOs in a negative 
light. Elucidating this perspective, Bazian says: 
Without exception, every foundation that funds work on Palestine (from 
the most conservative to the most ‘progressive’) does so from the 
understanding that Israel, as it currently exists, should stay intact, and the 
solution is to change Palestinians so that they will adapt to their colonial 
situation (Bazian 2007, 174). 
 
According to Bazian, the perception of NGOs among Palestinians is that the NGOs 
operate from the assumption that “Palestinians need to be trained to develop ‘civil 
society’ and learn to cooperate with Israel” (Bazian 2007, 174). Bazian concludes that 
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this approach promotes the development of an economic elite that is invested in the 
wellbeing of Israel, while failing to address the central issue of Palestinian hardship, 
which is the problem of Israeli colonization and occupation. 
It is from this perspective that the NGO-ization of the Palestinian nonviolence 
movement is as problematic as the NGO-ization of the Palestinian women’s movement.  
The central criticism of the handful of functioning NGOs in Palestine committed to 
nonviolence is similar to that of women’s NGOs, in that they only seek to promote and 
protect the rights of people who adhere to an agenda set by the outsiders who fund these 
organizations. Therefore, they are illegitimate entities in the Palestinian political 
landscape today. For example, while the existing nonviolence organizations, such as Holy 
Land Trust, offers free “Leadership Training” under the auspices of promoting 
community and social justice among Palestinians, it is still widely regarded as a foreign 
entity among the local people. This is not helped by the fact that this organization 
annually provides interested internationals (largely from the Christian community) with 
the opportunity to come to Palestine and participate in nonviolent protests against the 
Israeli construction of the separation barrier wall that now effectively divides Israel from 
the West Bank. Not mutually exclusive, both forms of political organization and activism 
against the Israeli occupation—the Palestinian women’s organizations and nonviolent 
protests—were once empowering platforms for female participants in the grassroots 
endeavors of the first intifada. Yet, in effect the institutionalization of both entities has 
come to serve local elites and international interests, thus alienating the direct 
participation of Palestinian woman as would-be political activists.  
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Nonviolent political activities long characterized the Palestinian struggle. 
However, Mubarak Awad is credited with his attempt for formalize the Palestinian 
nonviolent movement with the establishment of the Palestinian Centre for the Study of 
Nonviolence (PSCN) in the early 1980s. Following Awad’s deportation by the Israeli 
authorities in 1988, the work of the Palestinian Centre for the Study of Nonviolence was 
carried on by several local advocates, including Nafez Assaily who moved on to 
independently direct one of the PCSN projects, the Library on Wheels for Nonviolence 
and Peace, and Lucy Nusseibeh, who later founded the Middle East for Nonviolence and 
Democracy (MEND). In 1988, the office of the PCSN moved from Jerusalem to 
Bethlehem, and continued to grow under the leadership of Mubarak Awad’s nephew, 
Sami Awad, who completed his studies in International Peace and Conflict Resolution at 
the American University in Washington, DC. In the early 1990s, the Palestinian Centre 
for the Study of Nonviolence became the Holy Land Trust, which came to fruition in a 
joint venture with a American Christian organization known as the Journey of the Magi 
(JOM). Internationally diffused and led by an unquestionably Christian orientation, one 
of the major objections to the work of Holy Land Trust as one of the main organizations 
in Palestine that promotes nonviolence is that it is an elitist organization funded by 
outsiders in the interest of preserving the Christian community in Bethlehem under the 
banner of peacemaking. 
Local criticism of these organizations is that these NGOs are composed of 
internationals and local elites with a political agenda that is alien to the actual needs and 
interests of the people.66 This perspective is worsened by the fact that the local elites of 
                                                 
66 Fieldwork notes 2007 and 2009. 
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these organizations are secular, Western-educated, English-speaking, (and usually 
coming from the Christian minority in East Jerusalem and the West Bank) and are viewed 
as attempting to “represent all of Palestine while they drive designer cars, shop for their 
wives in Paris and New York, travel the world, eat in the finest restaurants, sleep in the 
finest beds, and are paid handsomely for talking about the Palestinian hardships.”67  
Specifically, these organizations attract Western media attention by inviting citizens from 
around the world to actively participate in nonviolent community protests against the 
Israeli occupation. For example, beginning in December 2004, groups of pro-Palestinian 
internationals began making their way to the West Bank village of Bil’in. Often 
outnumbering local protestors, the internationals nonviolently demonstrate against the 
construction of the West Bank Barrier Wall, which illegally expropriates Palestinian land 
for the “protection” of a nearby Israeli West Bank settlement called Modi’in.   
Certainly, the presence and sight of non-Palestinian citizens from around the 
world joining in solidarity with the Palestinian struggle is a compelling one for news 
cameras. For example, Rajmohan Gandhi, the grandson of the Indian independence 
leader, Mahatma Gandhi, recently made his way to Bil’in to applaud this form of 
nonviolent activism against the Israeli occupation. Gandhi duly remarked on the need to 
call international attention to the Palestinian people and the justness of their cause. On 
public record, he said, "It is our duty to awaken the international community, and to call 
attention to what is going on in Palestine, and seek support for the Palestinian people and 
their just cause" (Al-Jazeerah 2010). Despite these noble intentions, however, the 
institutionalized and internationally infused approach to Palestinian nonviolence rids 
                                                 
67 Fieldwork notes, Ramallah 2009. 
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local communities of the spontaneous protest known to them in the 1980s. In doing so, 
the presence of internationals and camera crews effectively quells the involvement of 
local Palestinian women in their attempt to locally mobilize and take to the streets in 
protest of the Israeli occupation. While the (still ongoing) weekly Bil’in protests in the 
West Bank replace violence with nonviolence, they unfortunately also replace local 
Palestinian activists (especially women) with internationals.68 
Whereas in the past, native Palestinians—with a large contingency of women—
designed and led their own political demonstrations, the nonviolent demonstrations of 
today are designed by the governing bodies of nonviolence NGOs and carried out by an 
ever-changing group of international volunteers who act as “human shields” to the 
Palestinian locals. As a result of this, the International Solidarity Movement (ISM), one 
of the most well known international organizations committed to the promotion of peace 
and nonviolence in the Palestinian Territories, has been criticized for not being 
Palestinian-led or run locally at a more organic level. As Charmaine Seitz writes, the 
public relations effort launched by the ISM must be “handled delicately to avoid 
perpetuating the view that internationals are trying to “teach” Palestinians nonviolence, 
inadvertently affirming the already pervasive stereotype that Palestinians are inherently 
violent” (Seitz 2003, 61). 
While small numbers of Palestinian women can be counted in the internationally 
headlined stories of Bil’in, their presence at these sights of protest is seemingly peripheral 
to the predominantly male voice of the Palestinian nonviolence movement led by the 
NGO sector. Moreover, while these protests are widely held as non-religious and open to 
                                                 
68 Having personally attended several of these wall protests in Bil’in 2007 and 2009, I was consistently 
amazed by the paucity of Palestinian females present for the weekly event. 
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individuals of all faiths, the question becomes, where is the connection between local 
faith, Palestinian women and the politics of nonviolence? Like the Israeli soldier 
mentioned at the start of this chapter who fortuitously encountered the Palestinian women 
willing to do her part in saving his life, it would appear that encounters with Palestinian 
female nonviolent activists occur behind the scenes of the international media fray and 
beyond the purposeful sound bites internationally-back NGOs. As this dissertation has 
shown, the rise of the Islamist political platform and its appeal presents a departure from 
the long history of secular nationalism. Within the Islamist infusion of the tenets of 
Islamic faith inside the struggle for a Palestinian nation, something new and relatively 
understudied has since emerged in connection with Islamic nonviolent activism:  the 
da’iyyat, or female Islamic religious mediator. 
 
Nonviolent Islamist Female Mediators 
Quietly existing in a place within Palestinian society that exists beyond the 
formalized realm of women’s and nonviolence-promoting NGOs is the understudied case 
of nonviolent female social activism of the da’iyyat, or female religious mediators in the 
Gaza Strip. Dating back to the Ottoman Era, Palestinian society has long employed a 
customary tradition of conflict resolution. This extra-judicial tradition is based on lineage 
or tribal councils, collective land administration assemblies, and public reconciliation 
committees, and has withstood nearly a century of external control, military rule and 
community dislocations (Shehada 2006, 34). Since the consolidation and systemic 
weakening the Palestinian Authority since 1993, in combination with the eruption of the 
Al-Aqsa intifada in 2000, Palestinian society has witnessed an ever more debilitating 
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process of social and spatial fragmentation, which is especially evident in moments of 
conflict between groups and families. Thus, within the splintering of leftist political 
factions and the rise of Islamist political parties, a group of new actors has emerged in the 
form of male and female religious mediators. As Nadha Sheheda highlights in a brief yet 
pivotal account of conflict mediation in the Palestinian Territories, today these female 
mediators “have stepped in to fill the breach in conciliatory mechanisms and save the 
now isolated communities that form the nation from total chaos by appealing to the only 
remaining connecting principle, name the common reference to ‘Islamic values’” 
(Shehada 2006, 34).    
Whereas male religious leaders have long acted as mediators in extra-formal 
settings in Palestine, the emergence of the female religious mediator is a new 
phenomenon enshrined by the rise of the Islamist movements in the 1990s. Outside of the 
Palestinian Territories, Saba Mahmood documents a similar phenomenon in Egypt with 
her account of urban women’s mosque movement as a part of larger Islamic revival 
(Mahmood 2005). Mahmood writes that the work of the women’s piety movement in 
Egypt is in large part attributed to the Islamization of the socio-cultural landscape of 
Egyptian society (Mahmood 2005, 3). However, within this vast proliferation of mosques 
and outlets for the proliferation of Islamic learning is not simply a religious ethos, but a 
religious ethos attached to social welfare. Mahmood’s work details the movement that 
began as women’s weekly religious lessons and became a mass movement of religious 
piety largely directed under the helm of its enthusiastic female supporters.  
Similarly, Sherine Hafez’s recent work on Islamic women activists in Egypt 
focuses on da’iyyat as “women preachers”. Like Mahmood, Hafez also looks at the 
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journey of Islamic activists women in Egypt. For example, she traces the development of 
one woman activist named Doctora Zeinab, who sees her role as a da’iyah as shaped by 
both Islamic historical traditions and liberal secular ideals and principles (Hafez 2011, 
108). As Hafez writes, Doctora Zeinab’s work focuses on the development of  “a 
contemporary dialogue with Islamic teachings, namely, a dialogue based on knowledge 
of Islam but going beyond traditional or rigid interpretations”  (Hafez 2011, 84). Like her 
male counterparts, Doctora Zeinab is well versed in the text of the Qu’ran and the 
technicalities of religious law. She is also equipped with a certificate allowing her to 
preach. She sees her role as a da’iyah as peacefully creating space in Egyptian society for 
an Islamic way of life that upholds and respects the rights of all people, including 
women. For her, acting as a political being in society is an expression of her personal and 
spiritual convictions as a devout Muslim. Noting this she says, “Religion is a behavior 
and is not just about knowledge. Because I teach about Islam, I can’t act differently from 
what I preach” (Hafez 2011).   
Turning back to of Gaza, Sheheda writes that the role of the da’iyyat has 
significantly transformed over time. The role of these women preachers has gone from 
“that of educators advocating Islamic values in mosques and charity centres to active 
involvement in various issues related to community and social life, including 
interventions in public and private conflicts” (Shehada 2006, 35). Importantly, the appeal 
of “Islamic values” from inside the Palestinian experience is what drives these female 
volunteers and simultaneously protects them as political activists. They are largely 
members of Hamas (and to a lesser extent the PIJ), and their community-driven work 
underscores the importance of the Islamist movement in lending order to chaos in the 
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atomized Palestinian political landscape. The da’iyyat largely come from a middle class 
background and have attained higher levels of education in a variety of specializations 
including medicine, agriculture, architecture and Islamic studies (Shehada 2006, 35).  
Although the central element of their activism operates within the realm of Palestinian 
social networking, this has the political potential for not only fostering the growth of the 
Islamist movement, but also in bringing nonviolent conflict resolution as an acceptable 
strategy for struggle against the Israeli occupation. The da’iyyat meet and visit with 
hundreds of women from various regions, generations, statuses and classes, and are 
available to their female “clients” in moments of personal crisis and celebration (Shehada 
2006, 35). Where the da’iyyat are advocates of women’s rights within the family and 
community, their Islamic religious training and respected backgrounds ensure them a 
large degree of respect in their communities. As Shehada writes, “The male leaders of the 
community do not seem to feel threatened by [their] activism, unlike their reaction to 
other outspoken feminist activists” (Shehada 2006, 35). Most importantly, the Palestinian 
da’iyyat rely on their femininity and their Islamic religious training to put forth a very 
clear political program of conflict resolution that promotes personal patience, endurance, 
and faith. Although the da’iyyat perspective is that of a moral agency framed within an 
Islamic perspective, the approach to personal agency and conflict resolution has very 
strong overlaps with the foundational principles of nonviolence. 
The nature of the work of the da’iyyat within the Palestinian Islamist movement is 
associated with such terms as fundamentalism, the subjugation of women, social 
conservatism, and above all else, terrorism and violence, yet their political connection 
with social justice and nonviolence is resoundingly clear. As Shehada writes, the da’iyyat 
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work within the framework of Islam to “teach their followers to work hard to improve 
their living conditions, but at the same time they train them to accept the hardships of 
being truly pious” (Shehada 2006, 35). Meanwhile, nonviolence is a form of 
assertiveness and empowerment that enables the activist to retain her humanity, 
sometimes in the face of overwhelming violence. In both cases, the concept of self and 
moral agency is attributed to the individual who lives her life for the greater good.  
However, in the former case, the da’iyyat work to promote the Islamist movement, 
which, at its core is an illiberal project that aims to use all means possible to destroy the 
state and the people of Israel. Nevertheless, the link between nonviolence and Islamic 
teaching is clear, even if the politics of the Islamist movement radically blur this 
connection. 
Although underexplored in its potential relationship to Palestinian nonviolent 
struggle more broadly, the Palestinian da’iyyat is a salient example of the ways in which 
studying religion in its social context may help to better understand the interaction 
between nonviolence and religion in the Palestinian struggle against Israeli occupation.  
Indeed, there are often overlooked ways in which nonviolence manifests itself within 
Palestinian society, how it can facilitate nonviolent resistance and foster peace-building 
campaigns. Complementary to this is the fact that the female da’iyyat continue to defy 
traditional gender barriers on the basis of their community work despite some criticism in 
the mediate that they might be naïve and misled “mouthpieces” for conservative Islamist 
groups (Hafez 2011, 2). This can even be seen as yet another embodiment of the long 
history of female participation in the political arena, where female activism in the 
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Palestinian political struggle has always been seen as a direct extension of traditional 
domestic duties, although still a challenge to gender norms.   
 The story of the involvement of Palestinian women in nonviolent actions within 
the Palestinian struggle is nearly as old as the struggle itself and continues today. Yet the 
political implication of the Palestinian da’iyyat is an understudied subject of the 
Palestinian struggle and the growing role of Islamist women within it. The lack of serious 
attention given to the da’iyyat movement especially highlights the dilemma for feminist 
analysts, many of who are unconvinced of the latent liberating potential for women 
within Islamist movements. Moreover, the international supporters of a nonviolence 
movement within the Palestinian territories increasingly seek to link nonviolence training 
and nonviolence activism to the Palestinian elite. As outsiders to the growing chasm 
between secularists and Islamists in the Palestinian political landscape, these generous 
donors conflate the participation of secular, male activists from elite circles as an 
indication that a nonviolent movement in Palestine is taking shape. Thus, the course of 
action following the good intentions of well-meaning donors, local elites and the 
Western-educated administrative bodies of nonviolent organizations only exacerbates the 
tremendous political rift in Palestinian society. The exclusion of men and women who are 
not secular elites means that the naïve sense of incompatibility between Islam and 
nonviolence is not given a chance to evolve. Islamists (and particularly, Islamist females) 
have no voice in the secular NGOs that promote nonviolence in the Palestinian 
Territories. At the same time, this growing population of Palestinians does not seek to 
participate in the secular political efforts of NGOs, which appear to stray from the 
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centrality of Islamic teachings and the role of Islam in their personal lives and political 
struggle against Israel. 
 
Budrus: Another Account of Palestinian Woman as Nonviolent Activists 
While it can be argued that the institutionalized model of the Palestinian 
nonviolence movement is in many ways similar to the NGO-ization of the women’s 
movement, there are other emergent examples of Palestinian females employing 
nonviolent political tactics outside of the realm of organized protests led by the peace and 
nonviolence NGOs. For example, the West Bank village of Budrus is a recent place 
where a nonviolent and politically unaligned protest movement has emerged in protest at 
the construction of the Israeli separation wall. Grassroots and locally organized, what is 
exceptional about the Budrus protest is that is led by a father and daughter team. The 
father, Abd al-Nasser Marrar, is a Palestinian community organizer, and head of the 
Popular Committee Against the Wall in Budrus. His daughter Iltezam Morrar, a devout 
Muslim, was fifteen years old at the time that she helped to launch the women’s 
contingent of the unarmed movement. Through nonviolent protest, the members of this 
small village of 1300 effectively changed the course of construction of the West Bank 
barrier wall. Despite mass arrests by the Israeli authorities and the numerous injuries 
inflicted on the protestors by live ammunition fired upon them by the Israeli army, the 
village of Budrus eventually procured a legal victory in Israeli courts. In doing so, they 
safeguarded their own and other village lands from destruction in the name of Israeli 
security measures. 
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Inherent in the protest movement was the extensive presence of Palestinian 
women.  As one witness attests: 
 
In Budrus, female participation was several times more than men's. People 
describe rural and peasant women as being conservative and unwilling to 
leave their homes, but what I saw was exactly the opposite. All they need 
is someone to encourage their participation. In the first march that was 
called for, I went to the mosque loudspeaker and announced a march of 
women and asked that women join, and I didn't notice a single woman 
who was absent. No one objected to my call; on the contrary, the women 
who participated were convinced that they were doing the right thing. We 
have photos of the first demos here, and it was the women who were 
stopping the bulldozers. And this happened more than once in Budrus, and 
they succeeded in getting to the bulldozers before the men did. They were 
lying down in front of the bulldozers. I haven't seen similar participation 
by women in any other location (Audeh 2007). 
 
Perhaps tellingly, the protests in Budrus that brought about a decided change to the path 
of the Israeli-built wall were largely composed of the actual villagers—and especially, 
the majority of the female population. Compared with this is the protest the Bi’lin village 
wall site mentioned previously, which is well attended by internationals and brings 
international media attention to the Palestinian plight, the Budrus protests are under 
populated by internationals and, hence, allow for greater female participation. Also, 
despite the good intentions of the NGOs, which organized the demonstrations in Bi’lin, 
nothing has been done to change the building plan of the wall itself as in the case of 
Budrus. While the NGOs may tirelessly work to promote the rights of the Palestinian 
population, what is largely absent in these noble attempts is the actual will of the local 
population and its women. 
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 Indeed, the spontaneous outpouring of the local population in the case of 
Budrus can be seen as a resurrection of the successful organizational aspects of the 1987 
intifada, before civil society became emptied by the profound instability and lack of 
peace brought by the Oslo Accords. Here, the story of Budrus is noteworthy not only for 
its effective nonviolent strategy and inclusion of female participants, but also for being a 
movement that united local actors from the rival Palestinian factions in the common 
cause of preserving Palestinian lands.   
 
Conclusion 
Beyond of the daily lives of the Palestinian people, and largely removed to the 
realities of those who live (and die) in the midst of the political impasse of the Israeli-
Palestinian conflict, the international community insists that peace is possible. Against 
this, some Palestinians would argue that along with the death of the Oslo peace process, 
so, too, is any prospect for peace. Those in the community of international peacemakers 
attest that women are the gatekeepers of conflict resolution and bearers of “inclusive 
security” more broadly. Meanwhile, as the massive cost of the Israeli occupation 
continues to assault the human rights of the Palestinian people, the use of nonviolent 
political tactics has managed to mobilize international support for the Palestinian 
struggle. Within all of these areas, a paradigm shift is occurring. Yet, where grassroots 
efforts from within the Palestinian struggle and international efforts combine, a greater 
scholarly interest in the role of Islamic (and Islamist) women in the areas of nonviolence 
and conflict resolution remains to be fully developed and explored. 
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Notable in this chapter is the observation that at the heart of the Palestinian 
struggle is a struggle for national identity, the foundation of which is a strong and 
overriding affiliation with Islamic religious values and social customs. This is seen in 
Mubarak Awad’s formal attempt in the early 1980s to link Islamic religious values to 
nonviolent Palestinian action against the Israeli military occupation. Certainly, Awad’s 
work was an early attempt to actively promote peace building and nonviolent strategies 
and values based on an indigenous Islamic religious context. However, Awad’s work was 
prematurely disrupted due to his deportation from the Palestinian Territories by the Israeli 
authorities in 1988. While the legacy of Awad’s work persisted in the development of 
internationally backed NGOs working to promote nonviolence education, these 
organizations also fell into the trap of Palestinian NGO-ization that disrupted the 
identification between nonviolence and Islamic values among the local people. The 
reason for this is simple: like the well-known NGO-ization of the Palestinian women’s 
organizations, the NGO-ization of the nonviolence organizations effectively placed local 
elites in a formalized structure that is more accountable to its donors than the local people 
it seeks to serve.   
While the nonviolence NGOs formally coordinate and organize nonviolent 
protests against the Israeli occupation, two important and vastly understudied 
developments have evolved in the Palestinian Territories that involve women in advocate 
roles as esteemed conflict mediators and nonviolent activists. The first is seen in the rise 
extremely respected and revered female religious mediators in the Gaza Strip. Yet, 
because of their Islamist political affiliation, these activists for peace and conflict 
resolution largely remain outside of secular and internationalist initiatives to incorporate 
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Islamist women into a liberal, nonviolent agenda for the Palestinian struggle. Second, the 
case of the West Bank village of Budrus serves as a model for inclusive nonviolent 
efforts that involve women from all sectors of Palestinian society. The success of the 
Budrus initiative—as opposed to nonviolent movements elsewhere in the Palestinian 
Territories—is its locally grown model of nonviolence and the close involvement of 
village women at the grassroots level. The Budrus initiative was neither created nor 
directed by a Palestinian NGO, but developed organically from the people. Especially 
relevant to this case is that the Palestinian female protesters in Budrus were organized 
and led by a devout Muslim girl, who also happened to be only a teenager in the earliest 
days of the protests.  Most importantly, the nonviolent protest at Budrus effectively 
changed the course of the construction of the Israeli barrier wall—a major symbol of 
Israeli occupation.   
These examples of the use of nonviolence as a political tool of the Palestinian 
struggle are now seen as directly providing the people with tangible results. The case of 
Budrus serves as a working model for the development of a purely nonviolent Palestinian 
struggle, one that is held together by a common political experience rather than gender-
based, and religious and internecine differences. In parallel, the work of the dai’yyat in 
Gaza in areas of local conflict resolution demonstrates the strong potential for the 
political involvement of the Islamic female religious mediator in a grassroots effort that 
will inevitably combine the tenets of Islam with that of nonviolence. Certainly, these 
areas remain to be explored in further research. It is argued that women’s political efforts 
are often invisible, remaining hidden behind and within cultural constraints (Gnanadason 
2005); yet what remains clear is the centrality of Palestinian women to the political 
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processes within Palestine and their continuously evolving role in the nationalist struggle.  
Where a nonviolent struggle operates in the “extralegal or extra parliamentary realm, 
often when institutionalized political channels have failed or no longer function” (King 










How could I be free? 
I am a Palestinian living under occupation. 
I am a woman living in a male-dominated reactionary society. 
I am a wife in a society that has made men into gods and women into 
submissive dolls. My home arrest has ended. My enslavement persists.  
My battle for emancipation has only begun. 
         
     -Raimonda Hawa Tawil, My Home, My Prison 
 
 
 This dissertation has attempted to examine and rethink the role of women and 
their political behavior in the rise of the Palestinian Islamist movement between 1987 and 
2007. Focusing on the historic rise of the Islamist movement in the Palestinian case, this 
work has traced the political engagement of Palestinian women through four ascribed 
roles in the struggle for nationhood, such as mothers, political organizers, violent activists 
and nonviolent activists. The central problematic of this inquiry is to understand these 
prevailing roles in light of the rise of Islamo-nationalist politics, especially as this 
ideology appears antithetical to feminist conceptions of social and political equality. 
Emerging from this paradox is a demonstration of the fact that Palestinian women in 
these roles in spite of prevailing social and political odds against them. In light of the 
Islamo-nationalist rise, secular as well as Islamist women are also committed as ever to 
maintaining a place for women in the political process. 
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Central to nationalist ideology in the Palestinian case is the emphasis on the 
‘Islamic essence’ of the Palestinian struggle (Islamiyat al-qadiyya al Filastiniyya). At the 
heart of this ‘essence’ is the role that women play in the family life of society. Thus, from 
the unique historical Islamist reconfiguration of society and politics of the Palestinian 
case, it is important to see how Palestinian women are continuously re-appropriating, 
negotiating, re-interpreting their own political voice at the heart of this unique and lasting 
struggle for self-determination. However, against the false impression that Palestinian 
female supporters of Islamist movement are simultaneous pawns of patriarchal 
oppression and victims of a local and international battle for and against Palestinian 
statehood, this dissertation looks beyond such caricatures of Islamic women to recognize 
the ways in which they, like their secularist female counterparts, continue to place gender 
equality on par with national self-determination. In effect, this project enables the actions 
and voices of Palestinian Islamist women to speak for themselves.  
Intrinsic to this study is the problem of conflating the use of word “agency” as 
synonymous with female resistance to patriarchal structures. This study has explored the 
social and political forces behind Islamist movement and the relationship between this 
movement and Palestinian women. As such, this dissertation has not sought to solely 
analyze Palestinian women’s political behavior as “agency” solely in terms of feminist 
resistance to the subordination of patriarchal power. Instead, it has explored the relevance 
and importance of Islamist ideology in the evolution of Palestinian women’s relationship 
to their role as citizens in the quasi-state of the Palestinian Authority. While not ignoring 
the question or implication of power in this interplay, this dissertation looks to the history 
of Palestinian women’s political activism and fight for gender equality within the 
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Palestinian struggle. It sees their power and political agency as obvious, if not simply 
given.  
Comprising the foundation of this project, Chapter One framed the history of 
Palestinian female political activism. It also presented the problematic and method to this 
study. The method consisted of a historical and ethnographical approach that inductively 
seeks to understand the complexities of female roles in the Palestinian struggle by tracing 
the shift in the political expression and political identity of Palestinian women in the 
Islamo-nationalist rise.   
Chapter Two presented a review of literature pertaining to the four scholarly areas 
where this project makes its greatest contributions. These areas are nationalist and post-
colonial studies, social movements, identity studies and feminist political research in the 
Middle East. Overall, this dissertation makes its mark by way of an interdisciplinary 
approach to these areas. Adding to each of these fields, its greatest contribution is that it 
makes for a more robust account for understanding of the details and nuances of the 
relationship between female political identity and the emergence of the Islamo-nationalist 
movement in Palestine.     
Moving more deeply into the case, Chapter Three posited a new way of seeing 
Islamization in the Middle East as this issue frames recent Palestinian history. This 
chapter presented a streamlined historical account of Palestinian Islamism within the rise 
of Islamist politics in the Muslim world. This chapter also grounded the chapters that 
follow in the vocabulary of Islamist politics and the specific elements of Islamo-
nationalism in the Palestinian case. 
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 Moving next to the in-depth study of Palestinian women, Chapter Four examined 
of the nature of political motherhood in the Islamo-nationalist rise. First, it explored the 
maternal imagery used the secular-nationalist discourse, and the similar usage of this 
imagery in the Islamist platform. Next, it compared the political characteristics of female 
leaders as “mothers” of the first intifada and second intifada periods. The role of political 
mother is also used to illustrate how the Islamization of the Palestinian struggle has led to 
the increased popularity of mother-candidates in the 2006 Palestinian elections.   
Looking at other organizational aspects of female political activism, Chapter Five 
explored the changing opportunity structures concerning Palestinian women’s political 
mobilization and organization in the 1987 and 2000 intifada periods. Specifically, it 
examined the causes and consequences of the demobilization of the secular-nationalist 
women’s organizations and the rise of Islamist women’s groups. Particular scrutiny is 
paid to the ways in which the rhetoric of Palestinian women’s contributions to the 
nationalist movement changed, and with this, how rhetoric used to justify the mobilizing 
effort of women by the women themselves also evolved.        
Moving next to the violent aspects of female political engagement, Chapter Six 
examined the rise of female Palestinian suicide martyrs and the deadly role that women 
played in the Palestinian resistance during the Al Aqsa intifada. This chapter presented an 
in depth look at the politics of the female suicide bombing phenomenon from the paucity 
of female suicide bombers in the 1987 intifada and to their emergence in the Al Aqsa 
intifada in 2002. This chapter specifically sought to highlight the often-overlooked story 
of the entrenched fractionalization of Palestinian politics and its impact on Palestinian 
women. It found that the changes in the secular and Islamist stance concerning female 
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suicide campaigns resulted from of political rivalry between the nationalist factions and 
their leadership. However, this chapter also presented accounts from Palestinian women 
themselves, who see the act of suicide bombing as a fatalistic way of engaging in an act 
pursuant to national liberation and gender equality. 
Looking to nonviolent aspects of female political participation, Chapter Seven 
sought to reveal the role of women as nonviolent political activists across the secular-
nationalist and Islamo-nationalist spectrum. It searched for women beyond the media-
driven spotlight of organized violence, and discovered how some have continued to work 
in nonviolent ways on behalf of their families and communities. In particular, this chapter 
looks to the understudied case of nonviolent female social activism associated with 
female religious mediators, or da’iyyat, in the Gaza Strip. The Palestinian da’iyyat serve 
as a salient example of the ways in which a focus on women and religion in this context 
may help to better understand the interaction between nonviolence and religion in the 
Palestinian struggle against Israeli occupation. Additionally, the role of women in the 
nonviolent protests in Budrus is highlighted as a working example of the continued 
success of the Palestinian nonviolent movement, especially with women actively 
involved in the protests and collective undertaking of the community.  
Two observations inductively emerge from this study. The first observation is 
admittedly optimistic, while the second is far darker. First is the observation that the 
Palestinian Islamo-nationalist movement is not a coherent entity. As such, its political 
interpretations, laws and institutions can be seen as fluid and continuing to evolve. Like 
any socio-political movement, globalization, media, international events and internal 
pressures influence its evolution. Along with this, the social and political power of 
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Palestine’s Islamist women is to be taken seriously as an integral component in the 
evolution of the Islamist movement. It would be all too easy to dismiss female Islamists 
as misguided and contradictory to feminist ideas of secular equality for all. For example, 
doing so naïvely promotes an arrogance that fails to account for how secular ideology 
concerning egalitarian ethics with respect to marriage, divorce, child custody, veiling, 
inheritance and court witnessing are adopted into the voice of Palestinian Islamist women 
today. Importantly, the specific law for a quota-driven system of representation that 
favors women in the Palestinian Authority and enables them to serve as political 
candidates has also directly benefited Islamist women in maintaining their active role in 
the evolving political discourse to date.  
Moreover, just like their secular and Islamist sisters elsewhere, the Islamist 
activist women of Palestine are “living, breathing, human subjects who are unbounded, 
temporal and desirous and thus defy notions of unitary, fixed essences” (Hafez 2011, 6). 
To extend this observation further, in light of growing political extremism in the 
Palestinian Territories and polarizing effects in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, it may 
very well be the voice of Islamist women that ultimately reigns in the extremist elements 
of Islamic radicalism in the long run. As this study shows, across the political spectrum, 
Palestinian women have steadily contributed to the feminization of their society and its 
political processes despite the pull from polarizing forces. From this, it is possible that 
while Islamist women continue to focus on the rights of women (as rights for all) in this 
context, their voices may also inevitably demand a negotiated end to the Israeli-
Palestinian crisis as well as the full democratization of Palestinian society.  
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Building from the first observation, however, is a darker observation concerning 
what may lie in the immediate future for Palestinian women and their social and political 
rights, especially in the Gaza Strip today. This project has highlighted the many instances 
in which secular-nationalist and Islamo-nationalist women respectively forced the hand 
of Palestinian leadership to adapt to and accommodate female voices in the political 
process. However, one critique of the women of the secular-nationalist movement in the 
years of the 1987 intifada and its aftermath is that they made the fatal mistake of 
prioritizing nationalism as antecedent to women’s rights. One criticism of this is that the 
secular-nationalist women’s movement mistakenly gambled on national liberation as a 
correlate to women’s liberation, but subsequently lost all grounding for gender equality in 
the establishment of the Palestinian Authority. Similarly, a new concern for the women of 
the Islamo-nationalist movement emerges. So long Palestinian female Islamists remain 
focused on conservative theological arguments for women’s rights and gender equality in 
the political arena rather than demanding an end to the systemic socioeconomic and 
political problems that plague the Palestinian people, then their impact will be limited at 
best.  
With this observation, concern stems from a myopic look at Islamic law at the 
expense of universal standards for women’s rights and gender equality. For example, the 
United Nations Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against 
Women (CEDAW) delineates a universal standard for women’s rights as an international 
bill of rights for women. This is a standard that the Hamas government has chosen to 
ignore. In fact, upon taking control of Gaza in 2007, the Hamas government immediately 
amended the Personal Status Law and the Penal Code to impose a strict and 
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discriminatory version of Islamic law on all of its citizens, but this most distinctly 
affected women and their rights. Among other repressive laws forwarded by the Hamas 
government, women are not allowed to walk on the beach alone or smoke in public. 
Another element of these “reforms” entailed that female lawyers are mandated to appear 
in court wearing the hijab, regardless of their personal religious observance. These issues 
specifically bring to mind the lessons learned from the disappointment suffered by many 
secular-nationalist feminists in the establishment of the Palestinian Authority. To date, 
women remain widely underrepresented in the political process and only a small few 
achieve high positions of power and influence. In the case of the Hamas take-over in 
Gaza, history seems to be repeating itself, especially as the repeal of universal laws 
concerning women’s rights harkens to the attempt to re-domesticate women. As the 
women of Iran and the secular-nationalist women of Palestine have learned, a narrow 
focus on the legitimacy of the Islamic system of governance to the exclusion of universal 
alternatives may ultimately help reproduce and enforce the very parochial legal codes 
Islamist female activists wish to see reserved to the dustbin of history.  
Without a doubt, the risk of reinforcing the subjugation of women in the name of 
local patriarchal conventions and extreme interpretations of Islamic law is already 
prevalent under Hamas rule in the Gaza Strip today. Added to this is the fact that the 
Hamas authority in Gaza is now responsible for governing even more extremist groups 
within it. One group in particular is Tawhid wa-al-Jihad (Monotheism and Holy War). 
Tawhid wa-al-Jihad recently claimed responsibility for murder of an Italian peace activist 
in Gaza named Vittorio Arrigoni, and it is widely speculated that this group has direct ties 
to Al Qaeda (The Associated Press 2011). Arrigoni’s brutal death serves as a pertinent 
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reminder of more extreme forces other than Hamas reside in the Gaza Strip today. These 
forces stem from a militant and aggressive movement known as Jihadi Salafism.69 In 
Gaza, the movement has generated a number of smaller groups in addition to Tawhid wa-
al-Jihad, including Jaysh al-Islam (Army of Islam) and Jaysh al-Umma (Army of the 
Nation). While their ranks may be modest in number, their ability to shape events inside 
Gaza and beyond is on the rise (Buck 2011). At the time of this writing, it remains to be 
seen if Hamas has the capacity to reign in these forces or if it will succumb to their 
demands. Regarding the centrality of women’s rights to this debate, the immediate 
change in the Personal Status Law and Penal Code in 2007 suggests that Hamas currently 
relies on these extremist factions to maintain its power in the Gaza Strip, even at the 
expense of its female supporters. Certainly the fate of Gaza and its women is yet to be 
written.  
Where there is a looming sense of darkness in the Gaza Strip with regard women 
and their rights, there is a ray of hope in the Palestinian Authority governed West Bank. 
Emerging just beyond the scope of this study, two Palestinian women, Khuloud Faqih 
and Asmahan Wuheidi, made history in February 2009 when they were appointed as the 
first female Islamic judges in the West Bank city of Ramallah. Although their jurisdiction 
only pertains to the Palestinian Authority in the West Bank, their appointment to this 
extremely high position of authority no doubt serves as a model to their sisters in Gaza 
and a sign of progress made towards gender equality in the West Bank under the 
Palestinian Authority.  For example, in the Palestinian Authority today, Islamic courts 
                                                 
69Gilles Kepel (2003) coins the term Jihadi-Salafism, explaining that the movement originated in Saudi 
Arabia in the aftermath of the arrival of foreign troops on Saudi soil in 1990. He writes, “The movement 
attracted some preachers, generally young, locally well-educated who were also in contact with Syrian and 
Palestinian Muslim Brother migrants in Kuwait and well-established there” (Kepel 2003, 98). 
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preside over family affairs such as marriage, divorce, inheritance and child custody. 
These courts continue to rely on Islamic jurisprudence rather than secular rule of law. As 
representatives of women in the legal framework, the female judges claim that they will 
help their sisters to obtain and uphold their rights under Islamic law. Despite the clear 
political obstacles and physical barriers to direct dialogue and collaboration among 
women in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank to today, the outcome and effects of the 
appointment of female Islamic judges on women’s rights and gender equality strongly 
merits future study. 
Finally, to reflect back to the beginning of this study, I will add that as my limited 
time in Palestine came to an end, I regularly wondered what would come of the future 
generation of Palestinian girls and women, especially the ones whom I had come to know 
so well. These questions began in the earliest phases of my research in a refugee camp in 
Bethlehem, and remained with me through the end of my fieldwork, which took place in 
a neighborhood in East Jerusalem known as Sheikh Jarrah. By 2009, the Jerusalem 
neighborhood of Sheikh Jarrah became the scene of many home demolitions and forcible 
evictions of Palestinian families from Jerusalem. That year, I spent much of my time at 
the Young Women’s Christian Association (YWCA), working as a volunteer for 
community-based programs on female education and empowerment. Next door to the 
YWCA was the home of the Hanoun family, who were forcibly removed from their home 
by Israeli court order that August. 
Although the Great Catastrophe of 1948—or the Nakba, as it is known among 
Palestinians—happened decades ago, the events in Sheikh Jarrah in the summer of 2009 
demonstrated to me that the catastrophe did not end with establishment of the Israeli state 
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in the spring of 1948. Rather, the widespread devastation of 1948 was only the precursor 
for decades of catastrophes to come. Less than twenty-four hours after the Hanoun family 
became homeless in the streets of Jerusalem, I watched as a Jewish family moved directly 
into the same home under Israeli police protection. Every day for a week, I sat in 
solidarity with the Hanoun family under the scant shade of an olive tree across the street 
from their former home. I watched as the adults silently and bitterly bore witness to yet 
another layer of their historic victimization—simply for being born Palestinian. I also 
watched as the Hanoun family’s eight-year-old twin daughters sat at their mother’s feet, 
clinging to her as she inconsolably wept for days. Watching these girls, I wondered how 
this crisis would inevitably impact their personal and political choices as they come of 
age. In what manner will these girls become mothers, political activists, martyrs, conflict 
mediators or even female Islamic judges? 
When each day ended, the family kept their vigil by sleeping on mats in the open 
air of the street of their former home. They huddled together under blankets to shut out 
the cold wind of the sunless desert while the new Jewish family inside their home also 
bedded down for the night. At one point, I saw a woman inside the home unlatch and 
open the front window. She stood there letting in the breeze while the Hanoun family lay 
huddled in the street. Witnessing this agonizing and traumatic scene, I wondered what 
kind of demonization it takes for any woman of a young family to look across the street 
and see another mother huddled in the cold with her children and choose not to interpret 
this interaction as a crisis of conscience, much less a catastrophe of humanity. Again, I 
considered this as point of return for future study. 
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Carrying these considerations with me, I returned to Bethlehem at the end of 
September 2009 for a last visit and a final farewell to my host family in Azzeh Camp. 
The weekend coincided with a wedding celebration, and the women of the family 
outfitted me for the party in a traditional Palestinian dress, known as thawb.  Between the 
festive dancing and singing in the women’s tent, I was able to note how much the 
community changed since my arrival in 2007. The passage of time was apparent. Young 
women were now married and new babies were born. Two chairs once reserved for the 
most elderly matriarchs of the camp now stood empty.  
Not a minute after I sat down from dancing, I felt a tap on my shoulder from little 
Amal. Now a lanky eight-year-old, Amal took me by the hand and excitedly pulled me 
through the crowded tent until we stood in front of her third grade teacher. Amal proudly 
introduced me to the women as her “American sister who teaches English to girls.”  Upon 
this introduction, the teacher asked if I would come to Amal’s class to give an English 
lesson.  
The following day, I accompanied Amal to the nearby Deheishe Refugee Camp 
where she was enrolled in the UNRWA Girl’s School. As we made our way through the 
squalid conditions of the camp, we came upon the entrance of the school where a famous 
mural of its most celebrated alumna, Ayat al-Akhras (the third female suicide bomber of 
2002) invited us to come inside. Looking over her right shoulder, I noted how Ayat’s hair 
was draped in a checkered Palestinian scarf. Her right arm was cocked at the elbow, her 
hand held a black handgun and her finger lingered on the gun’s trigger. Between the 
piercing look in her eyes and warm smile, she resembled something of a movie star to 
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me, a militant icon of Palestinian girlhood. Pausing for one last stare at the mural, I asked 
Amal if she knew its significance.  
“Amal, who is this girl?” I asked. 
“That is a beautiful shaheeda,” Amal diligently informed me. “Her name is 
Ayat.” 
“Why is Ayat on the wall?” I persisted. 
“Because she is very beautiful…and brave…and good. She died doing an 
important mission against the Israelis,” Amal explained. 
“Do you like her,” I persisted. 
“I love her,” she said with a smile.  “I love her like I love you—like she is my 
sister.” 
Amal clasped my hand again. Giving it a shake, she reminded me that we were 
late for class.  
Walking in the footsteps of Ayat al-Akhras’ former girlhood routine, I followed 
behind Amal through the threshold of the Deheishe Refugee Camp Girl’s School. For the 
next hour, I delivered a special English lesson to the third grade class. The lesson began 
with a translation of each student’s name from Arabic to English and back to Arabic 
again. While Amal’s future is yet to be written, it is perhaps fitting that the English 
translation of her name is: “Hope”. 
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